Opinion
No. 6-177 / 06-0084
Filed March 15, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Nancy A. Baumgartner, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals from the permanency order placing her daughter with the child's father. AFFIRMED.
Karla M. Wolff, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bruce Kempkes, Assistant Attorney General, Harold Denton, County Attorney and Kelly Kaufman, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Alan Wilson of Miles Law Firm, Corydon, for father.
Melody Butz of Allen Vernon, P.L.C., Marion, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Mahan, JJ.
Sheryl, the mother of Amber, appeals from the permanency order placing Amber with her father, David. Sheryl contends the court (1) should have ordered that the permanency goal be her reunification with Amber and should have given her another six months to pursue reunification, and (2) should have ordered that the permanency goal be long-term foster care instead of placement with David. On de novo review, we affirm.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The marriage of Sheryl and David, the parents of Amber, born in 1994, was dissolved in 2000. Amber was placed in Sheryl's physical care following a bitter custody battle. Following the dissolution, Sheryl and Amber moved to a town five hours away from David. Various contempt and modification actions have been filed since the dissolution, primarily concerning Sheryl's interference with visitation. Both Sheryl and David receive social security disability.
The Department of Human Services became involved with Amber after the police were called to Sheryl's mobile home during a dispute between Sheryl and David, with Amber in the middle. Because of the poor condition of Sheryl's home, the department was notified. It requested that a child-in-need-of-assistance petition be filed because of concerns about the home and about Amber's behavior. By stipulation, Amber was found to be a child in need of assistance in August of 2004 under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(1) (2003) (mental injury caused by the child's parent). Amber was hospitalized in October of 2004 after making statements she would harm herself. She was removed from Sheryl's care in December of 2004. Amber has been in foster care since her removal. She was diagnosed with depression and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.
In August of 2005 the Iowa Citizen Foster Care Review Board recommended that reunification with Sheryl not be a goal, but rather that the department consider placing Amber with David. It noted his home was approved after a home study and that his joint custody of another child was going well. Sheryl was involuntarily committed by her adult children in September because of concerns about suicidal threats she was making. After Sheryl's hospitalization, her visits with Amber were changed to supervised. In November the guardian ad litem reported she did not believe Amber could safely be returned to either parent on a full-time basis. Amber's behavior and emotional state improved while she lived in foster care. By November, however, Amber's school performance was declining and she was experiencing emotional and mental problems.
A contested permanency hearing occurred in late November. Amber's guardian ad litem and therapist recommended leaving her in foster care. The department recommended changing the permanency goal to placement with her father. The court found David had complied with all the requirements of the case permanency plan, had regularly exercised visitation, and was more supportive of Amber's relationship with Sheryl than Sheryl was of Amber's relationship with him. It further found Sheryl had not made much progress with the requirements of the case permanency plan. The court carefully considered its three options: continued foster care, placement with Sheryl, and placement with David, and found problems with all three. It was clear to the court that the permanency goal should not be placement with Sheryl because of her lack of progress, her resistance to help or change, and her open hostility toward David. In comparing continued foster placement to placement with David, the court noted there was no assurance Amber would remain in the same foster home for the seven years remaining before she reached her majority. It recognized the rebuttable presumption that the best interest of a child is served by giving custody to a natural parent. In re T.D.C., 336 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 1983); see Iowa Code § 232.1 (giving preference to a child's home). The court gave weight to the concern of the therapist and the guardian ad litem that placing Amber with David would mean she would have little contact with Sheryl, but found it an insufficient reason for not placing Amber with David when the only alternative was seven more years of foster care. In its permanency order filed in January of 2006, the court ordered that the permanency goal be placement of Amber with David by June 15, 2006.
DISCUSSION
Review of a permanency order is de novo. In re K.C., 660 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Iowa 2003). We review the facts and the law and adjudicate rights anew. In re H.G., 601 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Iowa 1999). We give weight to the juvenile court's findings, but we are not bound by them. In re N.M., 528 N.W.2d 94, 96 (Iowa 1995). There is a rebuttable presumption that the child's interests are served by parental custody. Id. The interests of the child are the paramount concern in our decision. Id. Permanency with Sheryl and an additional six months.
When the court did not find a permanency goal stated in the case permanency plan, it ordered that the goal be placement with David. Sheryl argues the goal should have been placement with her and the court should have ordered an additional six-month period for reunification as set forth in section 232.104(2)(b). We find Sheryl has not made the effort to comply with case permanency plan requirements, she puts roadblocks in the way of receiving services or making progress toward reunification, and placement with her would put Amber at risk. Her resistance and lack of progress indicate to us an additional six months would be of no benefit and would only delay the permanency Amber needs.
Foster care as a permanency goal.
Sheryl also argues in the alternative, that the court should have made long-term foster placement the permanency goal instead of placement with David. We do not find sufficient evidence in the record to rebut the presumption of placement with a parent. The court properly applied the law.