Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. SCSCJVSQ095084401, SCSCJVSQ095084501, SCSCJVSQ095084601
HULL, Acting P. J.
After sustaining jurisdiction over three children based on evidence the mother’s mental health endangered them, the juvenile court awarded legal and physical custody of the children to their respective fathers and terminated jurisdiction. The mother timely appealed. The appeal lies. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395; unspecified statutory references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.)
The mother contends the trial court should not have terminated jurisdiction, abused its discretion in making orders affecting visitation and improperly denied the mother’s request that she be allowed to represent herself.
We find no error; accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Facts and Proceedings
On March 25, 2009, the Siskiyou County Human Services Department (the Department) filed a petition alleging that A.S. (age 14), B.S. (age 10) and S.C. (age 3), were dependent children because they were at substantial risk of serious emotional damage. (§ 300, subd. (c).)
On March 26, 2009, the Department filed an amended petition that explained concisely that the mother had joint legal and physical custody of the children, but her mental health was deteriorating and she was experiencing paranoid delusions. She made multiple false allegations of sexual abuse involving the youngest child, and all of the children were exhibiting adverse symptoms as a result of the mother’s behavior.
A detention report was filed on March 27, 2009. It states that the Department had had 28 referrals about the mother dating to 1998, involving “ongoing mental health issues including paranoia, persecutory delusions, and mania.” Her “mental health appears to have significantly declined in the recent months, and this decline has begun to affect her children. [A.S.] has become increasingly withdrawn and depressed and admits to his own depression. [B.S.] has begun to believe her mother’s delusions and admits that she thinks cars are following her and she sees people who are not there. [S.C.]’s verbal skills have noticeably diminished in the last few months, she is no longer potty trained, and has started to refuse to play.” A.S. and B.S. were currently with their father, and S.C. was with her father.
The detention report incorporates the affidavit for the protective warrant. In part it recites that the social worker interviewed A.S. on March 19, 2009, regarding an altercation he had witnessed at his grandmother’s house, leading his grandmother to get a restraining order against the mother. “I [the social worker] asked [A.S.] if there was ever a time when his mother and sisters just sat around and relaxed. [He] replied, ‘only when my mom is sleeping.’ I asked [him] if he thought there was something I could do to help his family. [He] stated to me ‘make my mom sleep all the time.’” A.S. was tearful and sad during this interview.
The social worker also spoke with B.S. that day. B.S. reported that she watches “‘for the cars that follow my mom before school, at recess and lunch... and they are following me too.’ I asked [her] if her mother ever talks to people that are not there. [She] said ‘sometimes.’” B.S.’s mother had conversations with people that are not there, often with a dead uncle. “‘Uncle E. died and my mom talks to him and she sees him.’ [B.S.] then stated to me ‘I see him too.’”
The social worker also spoke with S.C.’s father that day. He reported that without warning the mother left S.C. on his doorstep on March 17, 2009, knocked, and then waited in a parked car until she saw the door open, then drove off. S.C. was nervous and upset and announced that S.C.’s father and grandmother were going to die, and that she could not stay there after dark. He arranged to give her back to her mother at the Yreka Police Department. On another occasion, he found a message from S.C. on his answering machine, crying and asking him to pick her up, and he could hear the mother in the background, laughing.
On March 20, 2009, the social worker spoke with A.S. and B.S.’s father, who reported that the mother “has been calling him more than usual and becoming more confrontational and threatening.” When she said she was going to kill him, he heard B.S. “in the background yelling, ‘Hey that is my dad.’” The social worker listened to his answering machine tapes, which contained 70-100 messages that “ranged from 3:00 a.m. to 11:30 p.m.... In all of the messages [the mother] yells, screams, accuses [S.C.’s father] of sleeping with other women, and conspiring to get [S.C.]. In those messages [the mother] refers to [S.C.] as ‘the kid, that kid, my baby, our baby.’ In none of the messages does [she] refer to [S.C.] by name.”
That day, the social worker spoke to the mother, who denied any wrongdoing, but reported bizarre and unfounded suspicions, such as that S.C.’s grandmother was beating the child, that the cooks at a local diner were acting on behalf of S.C.’s father, and that B.S. “knows that somebody is watching her.” The mother said “at first I thought it was you guys (CPS) but now I think it might be the task force.” She admitted she laughed when S.C. called her father, crying and asking to be picked up, but “I only laughed because she looked so cute.”
The social worker reviewed local police files, showing the mother made harassing phone calls to S.C.’s father, repeatedly violated the restraining order that S.C.’s grandmother had obtained, vandalized the car of an employee at the local diner, and repeatedly accused S.C.’s father of molesting S.C. The molestation claims were unwarranted; twice a doctor found S.C. had a diaper rash, and the most recent accusation, on March 4, 2009, was based on nothing more than S.C.’s father’s acquiescence in S.C.’s request to stay home from school, which the mother interpreted as a plan to molest S.C.
When A.S. and B.S. were delivered to their father pursuant to the protective warrants, they were happy, although A.S. began to cry when he realized he would have to leave his school and his friends. S.C. smiled when told she was going to be staying with her father. When the mother was told her children had been taken and was offered services, she was angry and said she was not going to take medication and would refuse services. Later she said the social worker had done her a favor because “‘I was going to give my kids to their fathers but now you have done it for me.’ [The mother] then stated ‘I was going to let you take them to foster care and you said no.’” The next day, March 26, 2009, the mother made abusive phone calls to the Department.
Later on March 26, 2009, the social worker spoke to A.S., who had returned to his old school and said he did not want to live with his father and wanted to stay with his aunt E.K. (who turned out to be a family friend) and remain at his school; however, he admitted he was depressed and said he wanted to attend the court hearing, and “I want to tell my mom to calm down and don’t act weird.” The social worker supported A.S.’s wishes, and recommended foster care placement, with the goal of relative placement.
On March 27, 2009, the juvenile court appointed counsel for the mother, for the fathers, and for the children, detained the children, placed A.S. in a foster home, placed the other children with their fathers, and continued the hearing to the following week.
On March 30, 2009, the court largely adopted the social worker’s recommendations.
On May 4, 2009, the jurisdictional report was filed. A.S. and B.S. were with their father, and S.C. was with her father. A.S. and B.S. were enrolled in the same middle school and both were playing sports; A.S. was also in a church band. They had had two visits with their mother, the second of which was “extremely chaotic” and the social worker had to end it early. The mother became upset upon seeing that B.S. had a new haircut, and this made B.S. cry. A.S., too, cried in the lobby. Their father was willing and able to provide them a stable home.
S.C.’s grandmother reported that the mother was calling S.C.’s father’s home “constantly and this has an adverse effect on [S.C.]’s behavior, ” though a social worker reported the mother behaved appropriately at thrice-weekly supervised visits with S.C. S.C.’s father “appears to be making a safe and loving home for [S.C.] with the help and support of his mother, ” but would benefit from parenting education.
The jurisdictional report explains that the mother had made repeated, hostile, phone calls to the Department, and sometimes would call back minutes later and speak appropriately: “It is disturbing that [her] demeanor can change rapidly almost from one minute to the next.”
Dr. Ray Carlson performed a five-hour psychological assessment of the mother on April 20, 2009, and his report was attached to the jurisdictional report. He found the mother’s thinking “was clearly paranoid” and “[s]he impressed me as an individual who could become quite angry if she felt misunderstood or not listened to, ” and her insight into her own behavior and motives was limited. She was born in 1980, and had a chaotic childhood. She was removed from the home at age 11, and ran away from a foster family at age 13. At age 12 she began what she characterized as a “consensual” sexual relationship with her foster father, and she continued having sex with him after she left his home. At 13 or 14, she began having sex with A.S. and B.S.’s father, then aged 18, and that relationship lasted until she was 20. Her parents had a dysfunctional relationship, her father was an abusive alcoholic, and her mother had tried to commit suicide and has had repeated psychiatric hospitalizations. The mother had two younger siblings and stated “I was more their mom than their sister.” The mother used marijuana constantly from age 15 to the present, and she has a medical marijuana card, which she said was for migraines and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, but “They have it down as bipolar.” She claimed that without the marijuana she gets upset, demanding and pushy. She had been told to seek psychiatric medications, but prefers to use marijuana. She had a sporadic job history and was on SSI disability. She admitted there were restraining orders against her that eightdifferent people had obtained.
Based on the mother’s history, as well as the results of several psychological tests he performed, Dr. Carlson diagnosed the mother with “Paranoid personality disorder with associated borderline features.” She “likely became parentified” as a child which commonly leads to “overcontrolling and belligerent personality characteristics.” She “has extrapolated her negative experiences to include most people. This has resulted in a fundamental paranoid mindset that is resentful of her past hurts, vengeful towards the mistreatment of others, vigilant towards the motives of others, and prepared to see threats and dangers in her environment.” “Because she fails to see how she provokes others, the lack of receptivity she finds in people simply serves to reconfirm her paranoid suspicions about them. It is a self-defeating cycle.” Her marijuana use could have caused “perpetual or transient psychotic symptoms, ” but unless she was weaned it would be hard to know one way or the other. “She admits to significant depression over many years. Her erratic and explosive behavior also point to the possibility of episodes of mania.... While a mood disorder is certain, long-term observation by a treating professional would reveal more precisely the nature of the mood problem. In any event, her emotional instability will best be treated by cognitive behavioral interventions, supportive and confrontational therapeutic methods, anger management, and a clarified and targeted psychiatric regimen.” “There are self-destructive patterns in her life that will lead to perpetual conflict with others if they are not addressed. These patterns will leave indelible emotional marks on her children.”
The jurisdictional report recommended the children be placed with the fathers, who should have sole legal and physical custody, with supervised visitation to the mother. The mother should receive “the treatment she so desperately needs to be able to parent her children in a safe and healthy manner”; specifically, “mental health therapy with a therapist who will confront her and help her deal with her most troubling paranoid and borderline cognitions.”
The jurisdictional hearing was held on June 12, 2009. The Department offered into evidence the jurisdictional report and attachments, including the detention report and warrant affidavit, and no parties lodged any objections.
The mother had prepared a typed, six-page, single-spaced, rambling narrative detailing her version of events, and it was admitted into evidence. It was not signed under penalty of perjury, but by agreement of the parties it was accepted as if it had been her testimony. In her oral testimony, the mother objected to termination of jurisdiction because she claimed her younger daughter, S.C., had been masturbating on her car seat, and she did not think she was crazy for taking S.C. to the doctor when she saw S.C.’s privates were red and swollen. She wanted all of her children to be together and to receive counseling. She was reluctant to reveal her current employer because she believes her “exes” will get her fired as they have done in the past. She testified: “They’ve learned how to get CPS involved now. It’s called a third-party call. You call somebody else. You get them to call CPS saying something bad, like, say about my house or whatever. And then CPS has to go because it’s a third-party call. And they’re no longer harassing me.” She had become upset about B.S.’s haircut because “she had just went to a new school. So I feel to cut a girl’s hair like they did that day, it’s emotional abuse.” However, the mother admitted B.S. liked her new haircut.
A.S. and B.S.’s father testified he could afford counseling for them through his insurance, but the therapist told him he would need to have legal custody to enroll them in therapy, otherwise he would have started therapy already; as soon as that issue was resolved, his children would be in therapy. He would comply with whatever visitation was ordered, although he lived far away. Both children had adjusted well, and got along with another child in his household. The mother continued to make threatening phone calls. He did not want A.S. to live with E.K. because he was A.S.’s father and because a man living with E.K. had domestic violence issues, according to court records. When he has to travel, his wife, a schoolteacher, minds the children.
S.C.’s father testified that he, too, had received repeated harassing phone calls from the mother. He had been complying with visitation, as ordered, and S.C. had been to a therapist. Although he was not sure she needed therapy, he would comply with whatever the therapist suggested, which currently was to have sessions every other week.
At the end of the hearing, the court stated “It’s clear to me that the kids have been exposed to some really crazy behavior, and that they have been harmed greatly by this behavior.” The court ordered the children to be placed with their fathers. In part, the court denied A.S.’s request to be placed locally with E.K. because the court was concerned the mother would violate the restraining orders (issued later) and try to see him if he lived nearby. The court did not find that continuing jurisdiction would be in the children’s best interests, because both fathers were capable of attending to the needs of their respective children.
The mother timely filed this appeal.
Discussion
I
Termination of Jurisdiction
The mother contends the trial court should not have terminated jurisdiction because there was a need for further court supervision. We disagree.
At the hearing, the mother’s counsel objected that if jurisdiction were terminated, there would be no assurance that A.S. or B.S. would receive necessary counseling, and there would be no effective way to ensure consistent visitation. The children’s counsel, too, recommended that jurisdiction be preserved. The juvenile court disagreed, finding there was no basis to believe the fathers would not act appropriately for their respective children’s welfare.
On appeal, the mother in part emphasizes her own longstanding erratic and abusive behavior, and contends that the children needed counseling, which in turn required court supervision. She claims the assurances by the fathers were too vague to ensure that they would provide their children with proper treatment and abide by appropriate visitation schedules.
The juvenile court exercised the authority granted by section 361.2, which provides in part as follows:
“(a) When a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.
“(b) If the court places the child with that parent it may do any of the following:
“(1) Order that the parent become legal and physical custodian of the child. The court may also provide reasonable visitation by the noncustodial parent. The court shall then terminate its jurisdiction over the child. The custody order shall continue unless modified by a subsequent order of the superior court....”
The court ordered the fathers to be the legal and physical custodians of the children, made visitation orders (discussed more fully in Part II, post), and then terminated jurisdiction, exactly as provided by section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1).
“The discretion afforded the juvenile court in this area appears very broad.” (In re Sarah M. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1486, 1496, disapproved on other grounds by In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 204 (Chantal).) We see no abuse of discretion in this case.
The statutory preference is for termination of supervision. Although the mother asserts there is a risk that the fathers will not provide necessary treatment for their respective children, and may not adhere to visitation schedules, the juvenile court was not required to find that continued supervision was necessary. The jurisdictional report showed that the children were doing well in the respective homes and the fathers were cooperative, and both fathers testified they would provide appropriate treatment and adhere to the visitation schedule.
The fact that the father of A.S. and B.S. lived far away, making visitation difficult, and had not arranged therapy for his children before the jurisdictional hearing, does not show the court abused its discretion. That might have been a basis on which the juvenile court might have questioned the father’s sincerity, but it did not compel the court to do so. His explanation that the therapist wanted him to have legal custody before he could arrange appointments was not inherently implausible. As for visitation, he testified “I have always committed to getting those children to their visits on time. So, I would do my best to get my children to see their mother as much as possible.” The juvenile court could rationally accept that testimony as true.
The mother relies on In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124 (Austin), which she contends has similar facts. We find that case distinguishable. There, the juvenile court gave the father custody, but declined to terminate jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 1128.) Austin held the trial court did not abuse its discretion, because the record contained substantial evidence that “showed a need for continuing supervision.” (Id. at p. 1134.) The father had had little contact with Austin the prior 10 years, and the juvenile court “wanted to monitor the conflict among the adults and ensure that Austin would not be blamed for the dependency. In addition, the social worker believed Austin needed both individual therapy and conjoint therapy with each parent, which would occur only if the matter remained open.” (Id. at p. 1134.) Based on this evidence, as well as other evidence not relevant to this case, Austin found the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by not terminating jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 1135.) But Austin did not hold or imply that continued jurisdiction is always necessary to monitor the custodial parents.
On this record, we find the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by terminating jurisdiction.
II
Visitation Modifications
The mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by conditioning visitation modifications on consultation with a psychologist establishing the mother’s progress on specific issues. We disagree.
The juvenile court stated that the mother’s “time with the children will not be increased until she has had adequate therapy to address the issues that were addressed in Dr. Carlson’s report. And she has to provide proof that in the view of her therapist, that she will be able to comport herself in the children’s best interest while exercising visits.” The formal order after hearing provides that the parents shall arrange the location and duration of supervised visits, with a minimum of one visit per week for S.C. and a minimum of one visit per month for A.S. and B.S.
As to all three children, the orders provide as follows:
“Any subsequent family law order changing the visitation set forth herein shall consider the mother’s progress on the following issues, to be determined by Dr. Ray Carlson or another psychologist mutually agreed upon by the parents or as ordered by the Court.” The orders then list a series of areas that had been identified in Dr. Carlson’s report as follows: “a. [The mother]’s ability to perceive how she provokes others; [¶] b. The effect of [the mother]’s use of marijuana on her ability to parent her children; [¶] c. [The mother]’s possibly schizoaffective features, including transient psychotic symptoms and aggravated mood instability; and [¶] d. [The mother]’s mood disorder, including her paranoid outlook and borderline features, as treated by cognitive behavioral interventions, supportive and confrontational therapeutic methods, anger management and a clarified and targeted psychiatric regimen, with a therapist other than or in addition to Kathy Cullison and with therapists and treating physicians consulting with one another[;] [¶] e. [The mother]’s ability to act in the best interests of her child[ren].”
The mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion because it “in effect, unlawfully delegated and abdicated its judicial authority to regulate and modify visitation.” We disagree.
First, contrary to an implication in the mother’s briefing, the court did not delegate the occurrence of current visitation. The court ordered the parents to work out the location and duration of visits, but ordered a minimum schedule for such visits.
Second, although the mother cites Chantal, supra, 13 Cal.4th 196 in her brief, she fails to address its essential holdings, which defeat her contention of error.
In Chantal, the juvenile court awarded legal and physical custody to the mother, terminated jurisdiction, and made a visitation order that was filed with a family law case number, in part reading as follows: “‘Visitation... for father... to be facilitated by [Chantal’s] therapist, Diane Childs. [¶] Before visitation with father and his daughter can occur, father must be: [¶] 1. In psychotherapy with a therapist qualified to work with issues such as [father]’s. [¶] 2. Father must attend therapy regularly and make satisfactory progress for a time before any visits as determined by his therapist....” (Chantal, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 202.) Apart from the fact that this order precluded any visitation until the father made progress in counseling, this order is quite similar to the order made in the instant case.
The California Supreme Court upheld this order against claims that the juvenile court lacked authority to condition visitation on counseling, and that it had unlawfully delegated visitation authority to the therapists. As for the former claim, the court explained: “As the present case illustrates, however, there are situations in which a juvenile court may reasonably determine that continued supervision of the minor as a dependent child is not necessary for the child’s protection, and at the same time conclude that conditions on visitation are necessary to minimize, if not eliminate, the danger that visits might subject the minor to the same risk of physical abuse or emotional harm that previously led to the dependency adjudication.” (Chantal, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 204.)
As for the latter claim, the court held: “Father correctly observes that the order vests some discretion in a therapist of his choice, to determine when ‘satisfactory progress’ has been made and the ordered visitation may begin. The juvenile court apparently concluded that to protect Chantal, visitation should not begin until father makes sufficient progress in his own therapy. A juvenile court faced with this situation has two options. First, if circumstances warrant, it could deny father visitation, which in effect would require him to later move the family court to amend the order if he wished to secure visitation.... Alternatively, the juvenile court could issue the order it did, specifying that visitation commence in a carefully restricted setting when father’s chosen therapist determines that father has progressed satisfactorily.
“Even assuming arguendo that the order delegated too much judicial discretion, father is not prejudiced thereby. As noted above, father does not contest the position that on this record the juvenile court would have been within its discretion if it simply denied him any visitation. The fact that the juvenile court rejected that course, and instead issued the restrictive order challenged now, amounts to a windfall to father, not a violation of his rights.” (Chantal, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 213-214, fn. omitted.)
If the mother contends a therapist improperly fails to report that she has made adequate progress to increase her visitation schedule, her remedy would be “to raise those claims in the family court, and a family court judge would make the final decision” as to whether visitation should be increased. (Chantal, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 214.)
Finally, in the reply brief, the mother contends the Department conceded the visitation order had to be clarified. This is not correct. The passage of the Department’s brief cited by the mother argued that if we found an error in the visitation order, we should remand for clarification, instead of remanding with directions for continued court supervision. That passage was not a concession of error.
We find no error in the visitation order.
III
Self-Representation
The mother contends the juvenile court improperly failed to allow her to represent herself. Again, we disagree.
At the jurisdictional hearing, the following took place:
“MR. HENRY: Your Honor, we have a preliminary issue in that the mother is requesting to represent herself and ask that counsel be relieved so that she can do that.
“THE COURT: All right. And let me hear, Ms. S[.], if you have any statements in support of your request to represent yourself. And then I’ll hear any comments, if any, from counsel Henry.
“[THE MOTHER]: I really respect Mr. Henry and... it’s not that I don’t want to be represented. It’s that I really need to be heard on these matters. And sometimes when you have an attorney you don’t get to speak as much, and they don’t always know every little detail I know. They only know what they know. So, he can only represent me as far as he can. He doesn’t know every [nook] and cranny I know. And that’s my only concern here.
“If the courts think that--you know, I’m fine with being represented. I just want to be heard.”
The juvenile court told the mother that she had the right to testify, but she did not have the right to personally cross-examine witnesses if she had an attorney, because that would be her attorney’s job. The juvenile court denied the mother’s request for self-representation.
This ruling was made by Judge Masunaga, who shortly thereafter was disqualified. Judge Dixon conducted the remainder of the hearing.
Later at the hearing, after the mother and both of the fathers testified and had been cross-examined by counsel, the mother interrupted: “Your Honor, I’m not properly being represented. I need to cross-examine [the fathers].” The court advised the mother that she was represented by counsel, and asked her attorney if he wanted time to speak with his client. The following occurred:
“Your Honor, in terms of cross-examination, no. I possibly should have a short conversation with my client. But I’m prepared to go forward and handle that at a later time. I don’t have any further cross-examination of [S.C.’s father].
“THE COURT: All right. [S.C.’s father], you can step down.
“[THE MOTHER]: Then I need to testify.
“THE COURT: Mr. Devlin [S.C.’s father’s counsel]?
“MR. DEVLIN: Father rests.
“[THE MOTHER]: I’m not leaving here without being heard. I’m not.”
After extensive colloquy with counsel, the court determined that A.S. had the right to make an unsworn statement. And as the courtroom was being cleared, the mother again interrupted. A.S. stated he wanted to be placed with E.K., and that his sisters should be placed with their fathers. Later, when the Department’s counsel was summing up, the mother again interrupted, and when counsel finished her argument, the mother stated “I need to testify.” When the mother’s counsel finished his argument, the mother again interrupted. Still later, when all the arguments were complete, the mother again addressed the court and asked to testify, but the court told the mother she had already testified.
As the court was stating her ruling on the record, the mother interrupted repeatedly, and eventually left the courtroom. She returned and continued to interrupt and argue with the court.
At the end of the hearing, the mother again stated “I don’t want [any more] representation, Your Honor. I’ll represent myself in this matter. And... I don’t feel I was properly represented today. And I would be asking for another chance to represent myself, I guess. [¶] THE COURT: [The mother], your motion is denied. [¶] [THE MOTHER]: I have mental conditions that would allow that, Your Honor.” She continued to interrupt as the court attempted to advise her of the terms of the restraining order that was being issued.
On appeal, the mother points to the requirements for a valid waiver of the right to counsel and contends the juvenile court should have conducted an inquiry to determine her wishes. We disagree. As the Department notes, because the juvenile court did not relieve counsel, the requirements for a valid waiver of counsel are not relevant.
Further, we conclude that neither judge erred.
The mother’s initial request before Judge Masunaga was ambiguous at best. She stated “it’s not that I don’t want to be represented. It’s that I really need to be heard on these matters.” “I’m fine with being represented. I just want to be heard.” That was not an unequivocal request for self-representation. (Cf. People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1002 [self-representation motions must be “timely and unequivocal”].) We cannot fault Judge Masunaga for concluding the mother did not want to discharge counsel.
We note in passing, the mother suggests a “‘Marsden-type’ hearing” was required. Judge Masunaga asked the mother to state her reasons. The mother does not explain what more was required. To the extent she means she was entitled to an in camera hearing, because she fails to provide argument or analysis supporting that contention, it is forfeited. (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 214, fn. 19.)
In any event, the mother’s later interruptions, stating she wanted to cross-examine the fathers and needed to give more testimony, were also not unequivocal requests for self-representation. Instead, they showed the mother was incapable of conforming her behavior to the requirements of a courtroom, showing that she was not capable of properly representing herself. (See In re Angel W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1085.)
The mother’s final statement on the subject, where she did unequivocally state she wanted to represent herself, came after the trial court had made its decision. That was manifestly untimely.
Accordingly, we find no error.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: ROBIE, J., BUTZ, J.