Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. 04JVSQ2553801 & 04JVSQ2553901
SCOTLAND, P.J.
A.S. (appellant), the mother of two children at issue in this case (the minors), appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395; further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) She claims the evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding that the minors were adoptable. We disagree and shall affirm the orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November 2004, a dependency petition was filed on behalf of the minors, a three-year-old girl and a one-year-old boy, after appellant was arrested on drug-related charges. The petition alleged there were bottles of alcohol in the home within the minors’ reach, appellant had a criminal history of drug-related offenses, and she had lost custody of three other children, in part as a result of her substance abuse. Appellant’s parental rights had been terminated as to two of those children.
In March 2005, appellant and the minors’ father admitted the allegations, with amendments not relevant to the issues on appeal. At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court denied appellant reunification services but granted services to the presumed father. The minors were placed together in a foster home.
Thereafter, the girl made statements to her foster parents indicating that she had been exposed to sexual activity and sexual abuse, and she displayed sexual activity during therapy and in the foster home. According to her therapist, the girl “appear[ed] to have been severely sexualized.” She threw tantrums at bedtime, experienced “terrifying dreams,” vomited on appellant’s visitation days, and said that she did not want to return to appellant’s care.
The boy could barely walk, said no words, and did not play or explore when he first was placed in foster care. He had been “afraid to make any noise or cry” and “would just lay, sit, [or] stand in the playpen and follow the people around the room with his eyes.” As the boy started to feel more comfortable in the foster home, “he began throwing fits and bashing his head on things, biting himself and vocalizing his feelings.” He had nightmares and would wake up screaming in the middle of the night. However, after a period in foster care, he began talking and singing, and his nightmares began to decrease.
At the six-month review hearing in November 2005, the court terminated the father’s reunification services and set a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to select and implement a permanent plan for the minors. Visitation was terminated based on the court’s determination that it was detrimental to the minors.
Both minors “prospered” in foster care. In the report for the section 366.26 hearing, the social worker opined that the minors were suitable for adoption, although an adoptive home had not yet been identified. They were described as “likeable and lovable” children, who were “intelligent, engaging, attractive, and enjoy[ed] good physical health.” The girl was “imaginative” with “a sweet disposition” and “generally kind to others.” The boy “tend[ed] to be happy and playful,” had “a wonderful sense of humor,” and was “catching up developmentally.” Both could “be very loving.”
The minors continued to have mental health problems, however. Both had been diagnosed with reactive attachment disorder, post- traumatic stress disorder, and sleep disorder. The girl “c[ould] rage for hours, ha[d] nightmares, some inappropriate sexual behavior, a high level of anxiety, some hyperactivity, and hyper-vigilance.” Nonetheless, the minors’ mental health problems had improved, with “the greatest improvement” having occurred after visits were discontinued.
According to the social worker, despite the minors’ behavioral challenges, there were “numerous prospective adoptive families available to them.” A preliminary on-line search produced over 89 potential adoptive families with approved home studies who were interested in children with characteristics similar to the minors’. Furthermore, the social worker felt it was likely that the minors’ challenges would be “resolved or managed in such a way that they [would] not have a detrimental impact on their adoptability.”
At the initial section 366.26 hearing in May 2006, the court identified adoption as the permanent placement goal, but did not terminate parental rights. The court continued the hearing so an appropriate adoptive family could be located.
According to the report for the subsequent hearing, the minors’ behavior had continued to improve, and the girl’s therapy sessions had been reduced to twice per month. The boy no longer banged his head or engaged in other self-injuring behavior. The minors had exhibited the ability to bond with their foster parents and were responding positively to forming a relationship with prospective adoptive parents with whom they were becoming acquainted. The prospective adoptive parents had completed a home study, had considerable experience as foster parents to sibling sets, and were educated in parenting children with adverse mental health diagnoses. The social worker anticipated that the transition to the prospective adoptive home would be completed in the following month.
At the continued section 366.26 hearing, the only evidence presented was an offer of proof by appellant that, if called as a witness, she would testify there was a psychological bond between the minors and her. The juvenile court terminated parental rights and ordered adoption as the permanent plan for the minors.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding that the minors were likely to be adopted. We disagree.
Appellant did not raise this claim in the juvenile court. However, “[w]hen the merits are contested, a parent is not required to object to the social service agency’s failure to carry its burden of proof on the question of adoptability.” (In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 623, cited with approval in People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1126, fn. 4.) We construe appellant’s offer of proof regarding the bond between the minors and her as a challenge on the merits.
“‘At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child. . . . The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. . . .’” (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368, italics omitted.) “In order for the court to select and implement adoption as the permanent plan, it must find, by clear and convincing evidence, the minor will likely be adopted if parental rights are terminated.” (In re Tabatha G. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)
“The issue of adoptability posed in a section 366.26 hearing focuses on the minor, e.g., whether the minor’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt the minor. [Citations.] Hence, it is not necessary that the minor already be in a potential adoptive home or that there be a proposed adoptive parent ‘waiting in the wings.’” (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) And “the fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in adopting the minor is evidence that the minor’s age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor. In other words, a prospective adoptive parent’s willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family.” (Id. at pp. 1649-1650, italics omitted.)
“On review of the sufficiency of the evidence [to support an order terminating parental rights], we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.)
Here, prospective adoptive parents for the minors had been identified by the time of the section 366.26 hearing. They were skilled in parenting siblings and were educated in working with children with mental health issues. The minors were getting acquainted with them, and it was expected that the transition to their home would be completed within a month. In addition, the minors’ ages and many of their character traits supported the conclusion that it would not be difficult to find another adoptive placement if the prospective adoptive home fell through for some reason. In fact, numerous other prospective adoptive families identified in a preliminary search were interested in adopting children with the minors’ characteristics. Although there remained some mental health concerns about the minors, they had continued to improve in this regard, and many of their problems had resolved. Indeed, at the section 366.26 hearing, the parties did not suggest that the minors might not be adoptable.
In claiming the evidence does not support the finding that the minors were generally adoptable, appellant focuses on their history of behavioral and emotional problems. However, as we have noted, the fact one family wanted to adopt the minors was evidence that they were generally adoptable. (In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1649-1650.) Furthermore, the minors’ behavior had improved significantly since visits with appellant had ceased, and the social worker opined it was likely the minors’ problems would continue to decrease such “that they [would] not have a detrimental impact on their adoptability.”
Appellant raises an array of other claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence of adoptability. She argues it had taken more than a year to find a prospective adoptive family, the prospective adoptive parents had not committed to adopting the minors, and “there was no evidence that there were any other families even considering adoption.” She asserts there was insufficient evidence that the prospective adoptive parents “were aware of the full extent of the [minors’] mental health problems.” She suggests it was error to order a plan of adoption without an evaluation regarding how the minors would react to separation from the foster parents. And she claims there was a “paucity” of information before the court concerning the extent of the minors’ improvement.
The social worker’s reports provided sufficient information on these issues to dispel the concerns now raised by appellant either directly or by inference. The magnitude of the minors’ previous problems and their vast improvement following the discontinuation of visits counter any negative inference that might be drawn from the length of time that it took to locate a prospective adoptive family. The commitment of the prospective adoptive family may be inferred from the fact that the minors were in the process of transitioning into their home. And based on the prospective adoptive parents’ experience with children with mental health problems, and the fact the minors were being transitioned into their home, the juvenile court properly could infer they were selected because of these skills and were aware of the minors’ mental health needs. The minors’ separation from the foster parents, with whom they had become bonded, was being addressed by allowing them to develop a positive relationship with prospective adoptive parents before transitioning the minors into their home. And, contrary to appellant’s claim, the reports described in detail the progress the minors had made in recovering from the abuse and neglect that they had suffered while in appellant’s care.
If appellant had doubts as to the minors’ general adoptability or the prospective adoptive parents’ ability to care for the minors, it was incumbent upon her to examine witnesses at the section 366.26 hearing to explore such concerns. Absent any evidentiary basis for questioning the feasibility of the minors’ prospective adoptive placement, such placement was sufficient to support a finding that the minors were adoptable.
In sum, both the minors’ qualities and the fact prospective adoptive parents had been identified who wanted to adopt them provided sufficient support for the juvenile court’s finding of adoptability. To the extent the minors had special needs, there is no evidence in the record that they presented an impediment to adoption at the time of the section 366.26 hearing.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s findings and orders are affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON, J., RAYE, J.