In re Armstrong

27 Citing cases

  1. In re Jacobsen

    609 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2010)   Cited 122 times
    Holding that Marrama requires the court to read-in a bad faith exception

    These courts reasoned that the plain text of the statute did not permit a contrary conclusion, see, e.g., id. at 405-06, and that an exception should not be implied where the debtor was merely forgoing the protections of the Bankruptcy Code, see, e.g., id. at 407. These courts also considered the voluntary nature of Chapter 13 bankruptcy and concluded that an absolute right to dismiss was consonant with the principle that a debtor cannot be compelled to commit post-petition earnings to complete a confirmed repayment plan. See, e.g., id. at 408; see also In re Armstrong, 408 B.R. 559, 571 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing post-petition earnings and voluntariness). Other courts, however, disagreed and held that § 1307(b) is subject to an exception where a Chapter 13 debtor acts in bad faith or abuses the bankruptcy process.

  2. Procel v. United States Trustee (In re Procel)

    467 B.R. 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)   Cited 51 times
    Holding that the parties' participation in property transfers and numerous bankruptcy filings was sufficient for the Bankruptcy Court to find that the current bankruptcy petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, and defraud the appellees

    re Williams, 435 B.R. 552, 555 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2010) (noting that “most reported decisions have held that Chapter 13 debtors have an absolute right to dismissal of an unconverted case” (collecting cases)); In re Hamlin, No. 09–05272–8, 2010 WL 749809, at *4 (Bankr.E.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2010) (finding that right to dismiss is absolute); In re Sickel, No. 08–00309, 2008 WL 5076981, at *1 (Bankr.D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2008) (same); In re Polly, 392 B.R. 236, 248 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2008) (same); In re Campbell, No. 07–457, 2007 WL 4553596, at *1 (Bankr.N.D.W.Va. Dec. 18, 2007) (same); In re Hughes, No. 04–40725, 2007 WL 7025843, at *3 (Bankr.S.D.Ga. Nov. 30, 2007) (same); In re Davis, No. 06–1005, 2007 WL 1468681, at *2 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. May 16, 2007) (same), with Jacobsen v. Moser ( In re Jacobsen ), 609 F.3d 647, 660 (5th Cir.2010) (finding no absolute right to dismiss); Rosson v. Fitzgerald ( In re Rosson ), 545 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir.2008) (same); In re Caola, 422 B.R. 13, 20 (Bankr.D.N.J.2010) (same); In re Armstrong, 408 B.R. 559, 569 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.2009) (same); In re Norsworthy, No. 05–15098, 2009 WL 6499238, at *1 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. May 27, 2009) (same); In re Chabot, 411 B.R. 685, 700 (Bankr.D.Mont.2009) (same); In re Letterese, 397 B.R. 507, 512 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2008).

  3. Procel v. United States Tr. (In re Procel)

    Case No. 10-CV-6418 (KMK) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2012)

    5 B.R. 552, 555 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) (noting that "most reported decisions have held that Chapter 13 debtors have an absolute right to dismissal of an unconverted case" (collecting cases)); In re Hamlin, No. 09-05272-8, 2010 WL 749809, at *4 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2010) (finding that right to dismiss is absolute); In re Sickel, No. 08-00309, 2008 WL 5076981, at *1 (Bankr. D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2008) (same); In re Polly, 392 B.R. 236, 248 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2008) (same); In re Campbell, No. 07-457, 2007 WL 4553596, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Dec. 18, 2007) (same); In re Hughes, No. 04-40725, 2007 WL 7025843, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Nov. 30, 2007) (same); In re Davis, No. 06-1005, 2007 WL 1468681, at *2 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. May 16, 2007) (same), with Jacobsen v. Moser (In re Jacobsen), 609 F.3d 647, 660 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding no absolute right to dismiss); Rosson v. Fitzgerald (In re Rosson), 545 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); In re Caola, 422 B.R. 13, 20 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (same); In re Armstrong, 408 B.R. 559, 569 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009) (same); In re Norsworthy, No. 05-15098, 2009 WL 6499238, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 27, 2009) (same); In re Chabot, 411 B.R. 685, 700 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2009) (same); In re Letterese, 397 B.R. 507, 512 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008). The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Rosson is typical of the courts finding no absolute right to dismiss under § 1307(b).

  4. In re Burbridge

    585 B.R. 16 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2018)   Cited 2 times

    III. Marrama did not overrule or abrogate BarbieriIn the present matter, none of the parties argue that Marrama overruled Barbieri . Instead, Endurance, and the supporting parties, primarily rely on In re Armstrong, 408 B.R. 559 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009), to argue that Marrama abrogated Barbieri such that the right to dismiss a chapter 13 case is absolute only if the debtor has not proceeded in bad faith.Armstrong concluded, in relevant part, that Marrama abrogated Barbieri by: (1) expanding § 105(a) beyond Barbieri's limited view; (2) holding that the anti-waiver provision in § 706(a) does not prevent a debtor from forfeiting the right through bad faith conduct; and (3) concluding that the right to convert is not absolute notwithstanding the § 706(a) stating that the debtor may convert "at any time." SeeArmstrong, 408 B.R. at 570–72.

  5. In re Williams

    435 B.R. 552 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010)

    See, e.g., Molitor, 76 F.3d at 220 (stating that the unlimited application of § 1307(b) would create an "escape hatch" that would "open up the bankruptcy courts to a myriad of potential abuses"); Fonke, 310 B.R. at 813 (stating that the unrestricted application of § 1307(b) would advantage "dishonest individuals who are misusing the system"); Cobb, 2000 WL 17840, at *3 (stating that the absolute right to dismiss "would encourage abuse of the bankruptcy system"). See Jacobsen v. Moser (In re Jacobsen), 609 F.3d 647, 660 (5th Cir. 2010); Rosson v. Fitzgerald (In re Rosson), 545 F.3d 764, 773-74 (9th Cir. 2008); Molitor v. Edison (In re Molitor), 76 F.3d 218, 220 (8th Cir. 1996); Simmons v. Cobb (In re Cobb), No. 99-3193, 2000 WL 17840, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2000); Gaudet v. Kirshenbaum Inv. Co. (In re Gaudet), 132 B.R. 670, 676 (D.R.I. 1991); In re Caola, 422 B.R. 13, 20 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010); In re Armstrong, 408 B.R. 559, 569-72 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Norsworthy, No. 05-15098, 2009 WL 6499238, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 27, 2009); In re Chabot, 411 B.R. 685, 700 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2009); In re Letterse, 397 B.R. 507, 512 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008); In re Fonke, 310 B.R. 809, 813 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004); In re Johnson, 228 B.R. 663, 668 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999); In re Howard, 179 B.R. 7, 10 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995); In re Vieweg, 80 B.R. 838, 841 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); In re Gaudet, 61 B.R 349, 350 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1986); In re Powers, 48 B.R. 120, 121 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985); In re Tatsis, 72 B.R. 908, 910 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1987); In re Jacobs, 43 B.R. 971, 974-76 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984). This policy concern is questionable. Applying § 1307(b) according to its terms does not grant Chapter 13 debtors immunity for misconduct — bad faith conduct is subject to a range of judicial sanctions after dismissal, see Polly, 392 B.R. at 246, and in some instances can be the basis for a criminal prosecution, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 158(d).

  6. In re Williams

    435 B.R. 552 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010)

    1991); In re Caola, 422 B.R. 13, 20 (Bankr.D.N.J.2010); In re Armstrong, 408 B.R. 559, 569-72 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.2009); In re Norsworthy, No. 05-15098, 2009 WL 6499238, at °1 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. May 27, 2009); In re Chabot, 411 B.R. 685, 700 (Bankr.D.Mont.

  7. In re Williams

    Case No. 10 B 07121 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2010)

    See, e.g., Molitor, 76 F.3d at 220 (stating that the unlimited application of § 1307(b) would create an "escape hatch" that would "open up the bankruptcy courts to a myriad of potential abuses"); Fonke, 310 B.R. at 813 (stating that the unrestricted application of § 1307(b) would advantage "dishonest individuals who are misusing the system"); Cobb, 2000 WL 17840, at *3 (stating that the absolute right to dismiss "would encourage abuse of the bankruptcy system"). See Jacobsen v. Moser (In re Jacobsen), 609 F.3d 647, 660 (5th Cir. 2010); Rosson v. Fitzgerald (In re Rosson), 545 F.3d 764, 773-74 (9th Cir. 2008); Molitor v. Edison (In re Molitor), 76 F.3d 218, 220 (8th Cir. 1996); Simmons v. Cobb (In re Cobb), No. 99-3193, 2000 WL 17840, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2000); Gaudet v. Kirshenbaum Inv. Co. (In re Gaudet), 132 B.R. 670, 676 (D.R.I. 1991); In re Caola, 422 B.R. 13, 20 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010); In re Armstrong, 408 B.R. 559, 569-72 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Norsworthy, No. 05-15098, 2009 WL 6499238, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 27, 2009); In re Chabot, 411 B.R. 685, 700 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2009); In re Letterse, 397 B.R. 507, 512 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008); In re Fonke, 310 B.R. 809, 813 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004); In re Johnson, 228 B.R. 663, 668 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999)); In re Howard, 179 B.R. 7, 10 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995); In re Vieweg, 80 B.R. 838, 841 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); In re Gaudet, 61 B.R 349, 350 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1986); In re Powers, 48 B.R. 120, 121 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985); In re Tatsis, 72 B.R. 908, 910 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1987); In re Jacobs, 43 B.R. 971, 974-76 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984). This policy concern is questionable. Applying § 1307(b) according to its terms does not grant Chapter 13 debtors immunity for misconduct — bad faith conduct is subject to a range of judicial sanctions after dismissal, see Polly, 392 B.R. at 246, and in some instances can be the basis for a criminal prosecution, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 158(d).

  8. In re Williams

    Case No. 10 B 07121 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2010)

    See Jacobsen v. Moser (In re Jacobsen), 609 F.3d 647, 660 (5th Cir. 2010); Rosson v. Fitzgerald (In re Rosson), 545 F.3d 764, 773-74 (9th Cir. 2008); Molitor v. Edison (In re Molitor), 76 F.3d 218, 220 (8th Cir. 1996); Simmons v. Cobb (In re Cobb), No. 99-3193, 2000 WL 17840, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2000); Gaudet v. Kirshenbaum Inv. Co. (In re Gaudet), 132 B.R. 670, 676 (D.R.I. 1991); In re Caola, 422 B.R. 13, 20 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010); In re Armstrong, 408 B.R. 559, 569-72 (Bankr.E. D.N.Y. 2009); In re Norsworthy, No. 05-15098, 2009 WL 6499238, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 27, 2009); In re Chabot, 411 B.R. 685, 700 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2009); In re Letterse, 397 B.R. 507, 512 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008); In re Fonke, 310 B.R. 809, 813 (Bankr.

  9. In re Lorek

    Case No. 2:20-CV-60 JD (N.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2021)

    Mileusnic v. Chael, 616 B.R. at 770. While the Appellant points to several bankruptcy court decisions around the country that took into account the debtor's bad faith in considering the motion to dismiss (In re Armstrong, 408 B.R. 559 (Bankr. E.DN.Y. 2009); In re Taylor, 462 B.R. 527 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2011); In re Mattick, 496 B.R. D.N.C. 2013); In re Broughton, 2015 WL 13854913 (Bankr.

  10. Endurance Am. Ins. Co. v. Burbridge

    1:18-CV-591 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2019)

    Of particular relevance here, Endurance points out that the bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of New York has concluded that Marrama, viewed in conjunction with recent amendments to § 1307 of the Code, abrogated Barbieri's earlier conclusion about the absolute right of voluntary dismissal set forth in § 1307(b). In re Armstrong, 408 B.R. 559 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009). Importantly, however, Armstrong has not been the last word on the matter.