Opinion
357498
01-13-2022
In re ARMSTRONG, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED
Shiawassee Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 19-014434-NA
Before: Boonstra, P.J., and Cavanagh and Riordan, JJ.
Per Curiam.
Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to four children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist), (c)(ii) (failure to rectify other conditions), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent). We affirm.
The parental rights of the children's father were also terminated by the trial court, but he is not a party to this appeal. Accordingly, unless otherwise noted, the term "respondent" refers only to respondent-mother.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In September 2019, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed an amended petition requesting the children's removal from respondent's and the children's father's care. The petition alleged that a complaint was made to Child Protective Services indicating that respondent and the children's father were arguing over "which parent was high" in front of the children, and he accused respondent of "picking drugs over the children" because she refused to participate in substance abuse treatment. The petition also stated that the children did not have shoes or shirts on and were dirty, the family was homeless, and respondent admitted to using drugs.
Both parents entered pleas of no contest in October 2019, allowing the trial court to take jurisdiction over the children. At that time, the trial court placed the children in foster care, awarded both parents parenting time, and stated that the temporary goal was to reunite the children with their parents. The trial court issued a dispositional order adopting the case service plan recommended by DHHS. Among the requirements in respondent's service plan was that she attend parenting classes, participate in random drug screens, participate in substance abuse counseling and inpatient or outpatient substance abuse treatment, undergo a mental health assessment, find and maintain adequate housing, and obtain employment. On February 4, 2020, the trial court permitted the parents to withdraw their pleas; however, respondent subsequently entered another no-contest plea.
After six permanency planning hearings were held to evaluate respondent's progress in adhering to the service plan, DHHS petitioned for termination of the parental rights of both parents. Over the course of 15 months, respondent showed improvement in her parenting skills, attended most of her parenting time visits, and overall substantially complied with her parenting time responsibilities. However, she was noncompliant with her service plan in all other respects. She did not attend parenting classes. Further, respondent called in only 13% of the time to see whether she was selected for random drug screening, and when she was selected to be tested, she tested positive every time for substances such as amphetamine, methamphetamine, cocaine, and cannabis. In addition, respondent never completed a substance abuse treatment program and never attended substance abuse counseling. Although she did go to one substance abuse treatment center, she only stayed for a few nights and did not complete the program. Respondent's DHHS case worker also provided her with several referrals for substance abuse treatment centers and offered to personally take her to the treatment center of her choice on three occasions, but respondent refused to go. Further, respondent did attend a mental health assessment, but she did not follow the recommended treatment plan proposed by the doctor. Finally, respondent failed to find and maintain adequate housing and there was no evidence that she secured employment.
II. ANALYSIS
A. STATUTORY GROUNDS
On appeal, respondent argues that the statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights were not established by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.
"In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met." In re VanDalen, 293 Mich.App. 120, 139; 809 N.W.2d 412 (2011). This Court reviews for clear error the trial court's factual findings and its determination that statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exist. In re Mason, 486 Mich. 142, 152; 782 N.W.2d 747 (2010). A finding is clearly erroneous if, even though there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a mistake. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The trial court terminated respondent's parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j), which provide in relevant part:
(3) The court may terminate a parent's parental rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
(ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court's jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions, the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
(g) The parent, although, in the court's discretion, financially able to do so, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.
If this Court concludes that the trial court did not clearly err by finding one statutory ground for terminating respondent's parental rights, this Court does not need to address the additional statutory grounds. In re HRC, 286 Mich.App. 444, 461; 781 N.W.2d 105 (2009).
Termination of parental rights is proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) when "the totality of the evidence amply supports that [the parent] had not accomplished any meaningful change in the conditions" that led to the court taking jurisdiction over the minor, In re Williams, 286 Mich.App. 253, 272; 779 N.W.2d 286 (2009), and "there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age," MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
Respondent argues that it was unreasonable for the trial court to terminate her parental rights because she repeatedly tried to enroll in drug treatment services and was unable to do so, through no fault of her own, because of the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown. However, the record demonstrates that respondent failed to comply with her service plan for more than 15 months-from the entry of her plea in February 2020 until the termination hearing in May 2021- and refused multiple referrals and opportunities to comply with the service plan.
The petition alleged that respondent admitted she used drugs, and she pleaded no contest to the allegations in the petition. According to respondent's service plan, respondent was required to complete a substance abuse treatment program and attend substance abuse counseling. Respondent never completed a substance abuse treatment program or attended substance abuse counseling. Although respondent argues on appeal that she was unable to complete a substance abuse treatment program because of COVID-19 and subsequent lockdowns, the record does not show that she ever attempted to attend a substance abuse treatment center and was denied because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Instead, DHHS presented evidence that respondent was provided multiple referrals and attended one treatment program, but stayed only for a few nights before leaving the program voluntarily. Respondent failed to follow through with referrals for substance abuse treatment. And respondent's DHHS caseworker even offered to personally take respondent to a treatment place of her choice on three separate occasions in October and November 2020, but she refused.
In addition, respondent's service plan required that she submit to random drug screens. Throughout the pendency of the case, respondent was noncompliant in submitting to random drug screens. Respondent was required to contact a call center every day to see whether she needed to be randomly tested for substances. Respondent called in only on 13% of the days she was supposed to. And respondent tested positive for substances in every test that was successfully completed.
One of respondent's samples could not be processed because the sample broke during shipping.
Respondent's service plan also required that respondent find and maintain suitable housing. The evidence presented at the termination hearing demonstrated that respondent failed to find and maintain suitable housing and had not rectified this by the time of the termination hearing. Finally, respondent's service plan required that she undergo a mental health evaluation. Although respondent attended a mental health evaluation, she did not follow the doctor's recommendations, including that respondent seek counseling.
In summary, from February 2020 to May 2021 respondent failed to accomplish any meaningful change in the conditions that led to the court taking jurisdiction over the four children. Given these circumstances, this Court is not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court erred by concluding there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions that led to the adjudication would be rectified within a reasonable time considering the children's ages. Because petitioner established grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) by clear and convincing evidence, we need not consider whether petitioner established the remaining grounds for termination. See In re HRC, 286 Mich.App. at 461.
B. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent also argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that termination of her parental rights was in the children's best interests. We disagree.
"Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich.App. 35, 40; 823 N.W.2d 144 (2012). "[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence." In re Moss, 301 Mich.App. 76, 90; 836 N.W.2d 182 (2013). This Court reviews for clear error the trial court's determination of best interests. Olive/Metts, 297 Mich.App. at 40.
When determining whether termination is in the best interests of the child, the trial court's focus is on the child, not the parent. In re Schadler, 315 Mich.App. 406, 411; 890 N.W.2d 676 (2016). "[T]he court may consider the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, [and] the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality . . . ." Olive/Metts, 297 Mich.App. at 41-42 (citations omitted). The trial court may also consider other facts, such as "a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." In re White, 303 Mich.App. 701, 714; 846 N.W.2d 61 (2014). In addition, the trial court may consider the parent's substance abuse problems. In re AH, 245 Mich.App. 77, 89; 627 N.W.2d 33 (2001).
Respondent argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that termination of her parental rights was in the children's best interests because respondent shares a strong bond with her children and is motivated to maintain sobriety. However, the bond between the parent and child is only one factor that the trial court could have considered. See Olive/Metts, 297 Mich.App. at 41-42. The trial court emphasized the children's need for permanency, stability, and finality, as well as the additional help needed to support the children who were subject to individualized education plans. As previously noted, respondent did not comply with her service plan. Respondent failed to attend a substance abuse treatment program, failed to participate in random drug screens, failed to participate in substance abuse counseling, failed to obtain treatment recommended after her mental health assessment, and failed to find and maintain adequate housing. Given respondent's failure to adhere to the service plan, it is unlikely the children would be returned to her care in the near future, if at all. In other words, terminating respondent's parental rights was the best way to provide the children with a safe, stable, secure, and permanent home.
Under these circumstances, the children's need for permanency, stability, and finality outweighed the bond between respondent and the children. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests.
Affirmed.