Opinion
No. 11-15-00188-CV
02-04-2016
IN THE INTEREST OF A.R.M., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 161st District Court Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. B-3350-PC
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The trial court entered an order in which it terminated the parental rights of the father of A.R.M. The father appealed. On appeal, the father presents two issues in which he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.
We note that the mother's parental rights had been terminated in an earlier order. --------
I. Termination Standards and Findings
Termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2015). To determine on appeal if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25-26 (Tex. 2002).
To terminate parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)-(T) and that termination is in the best interest of the child. FAM. § 161.001(b). In this case, the trial court found that Appellant committed three of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)—those found in subsections (D), (E), and (O). Appellant does not challenge these findings, but he does challenge the trial court's finding that termination is in the child's best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). Accordingly, we will uphold the order of termination if the evidence is sufficient to support the best interest finding.
II. Analysis as to Best Interest
Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence in support of the trial court's best interest finding. Appellant asserts that the evidence presented at trial was legally and factually insufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination of his parental rights would be in A.R.M.'s best interest. With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child's best interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
The Department of Family and Protective Services originally became involved with the child in this case when they received a report of neglectful supervision by the mother. The mother, who had a history with the Department, was selling drugs out of the home in which she and her children lived. Appellant was the father of only one of these children. Shortly after the Department removed the children from the mother, A.R.M. and the mother's other children tested positive for cocaine. Appellant told a Department investigator that he had been concerned about the mother's drug issues but that he had no proof of her drug activities.
Appellant also had a history with the Department. At the time of removal, Appellant was searching for employment and lived with his fiancée and her young children. Appellant had had only sporadic contact with A.R.M. from 2007 to the time of her removal. Additionally, Appellant lived in government housing and had no room in his apartment for A.R.M. due to the limitations on the number of children that could reside there. Appellant explained that, if A.R.M. were to move in with them, "the whole family would be kicked out of the apartment."
Appellant had a history of domestic violence against A.R.M.'s mother. He spent two and one-half years in prison, during the period from 2004 to 2007, for one of his assault-family violence convictions. He also had one family violence incident with his current wife. Appellant agreed that he had probably been in jail in Ector County twenty-four times. He stated that he had smoked marihuana at the beginning of this case but that he had since "laid off" marihuana use. Appellant tested positive for marihuana on one occasion while this case was pending and, on other occasions, refused to take a drug test.
At the time of the final hearing, which was a trial de novo before the district judge, Appellant said that he had not talked to A.R.M. in about a year, but he did not want to have his parental rights terminated. Appellant still did not have room in his home for A.R.M. He had earned a degree from a technical college and was seeking employment at a wind energy company.
A.R.M. was thirteen years old at the time of the final hearing in this case. A.R.M. talked to the district judge on the day prior to the final hearing, presumably to express her desires about the termination proceeding. A.R.M.'s guardian ad litem informed the court that A.R.M. believed that it would be in her best interest to remain with her fictive kin and be adopted by them. A.R.M. and her younger half sister had resided with fictive kin, their "PE coach" and his wife, for over one year. That placement was safe and appropriate, and A.R.M. was happy and thriving in that placement. The coach, his wife, and their two biological children developed a strong, loving family bond with A.R.M. and her half sister. The coach and his wife testified that they love A.R.M. and her half sister and want to adopt both girls. The coach testified that, from the day the girls first moved in, "it was like they were meant to be there." Both the coach and the Department's conservatorship worker in this case testified that termination of Appellant's parental rights would be in the best interest of A.R.M. A.R.M. needed stability, and Appellant in thirteen years' time had not been able to provide that for her. The Department's plan for A.R.M. was termination of the parents' rights and adoption by the fictive kin.
Based upon the Holley factors and the evidence in the record, we cannot hold that the trial court's best interest finding is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72. The trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that it would be in A.R.M.'s best interest for Appellant's parental rights to be terminated. We hold that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's best interest finding. Appellant's first and second issues are overruled.
III. This Court's Ruling
We affirm the trial court's order of termination.
MIKE WILLSON
JUSTICE February 4, 2016 Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,
Willson, J., and Bailey, J.