Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD222248
BUTZ, JUDGEM.R. (appellant), the mother of A.R. (the minor), appeals from an order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) Appellant contends the juvenile court committed reversible error in terminating her parental rights without determining the identity of the father of the minor and providing him with notice of the dependency proceedings. Concluding appellant lacks standing to tender her claim, we shall dismiss the appeal.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2005, the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over the minor after it sustained allegations that appellant suffered from mental illness and was incarcerated and unable to arrange for the care of the three-month-old minor.
On December 14, 2006, this court reversed an order of the juvenile court terminating appellant’s parental rights to the minor in a previous dependency appeal in the same matter on the grounds that the juvenile court and Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) violated the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.), and the juvenile court erred by proceeding with a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing without learning whether appellant wanted to be present at that hearing. (In re A.R. (Dec. 14, 2006, C052532) [nonpub. opn.], review den. Mar. 14, 2007, S149703.)
We take judicial notice of our opinion in that appeal. (Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (a).)
Appellant was present at the August 9, 2007 section 366.26 hearing. After appellant’s counsel submitted the matter, the juvenile court found it likely the minor would be adopted, and terminated appellant’s parental rights. Appellant then addressed the court, asserting she knew the identity of the minor’s father. When the court noted that paternity testing had excluded one man named by appellant’s counsel, appellant stated: “What about [A.C.]? He was the next one. There’s only two that I was having sex with.” The court refused to consider the matter further.
DISCUSSION
Appellant’s sole contention on this appeal is that the juvenile court committed reversible error in terminating her parental rights without determining the identity and address of the father of the minor and providing him with notice of the dependency proceedings. According to appellant, as she has standing to establish paternity, she also has standing to argue a potential father has been denied his due process rights.
While appellant can file a notice of appeal as a party, the ability to appeal does not confer standing to assert issues when she is not aggrieved by the order from which the appeal is taken. (In re Joseph G. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 712, 715; In re Frank L. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 700, 703-704 (Frank L.); In re Carissa G. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 731, 734; In re Gary P. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 875, 877.)
Standing to challenge an adverse ruling is not established merely because a parent takes a position on an issue that affects the minor (Frank L., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 703); nor can a parent raise the minor’s best interest as a basis for standing (In re Nachelle S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1557, 1562). Without a showing that a parent’s personal rights are affected by a ruling, the parent does not establish standing. (Frank L., at p. 703.) To be aggrieved or affected, a parent must have a legally cognizable interest that is affected injuriously by the juvenile court’s decision. (In re Paul W. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 37, 55; In re Jenelle C. (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 813, 818.) In sum, a would-be appellant “lacks standing to raise issues affecting another person’s interests.” (In re Gary P., supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 876.)
To have standing in this case, appellant must show how, at a section 366.26 hearing, a potential father’s due process rights affected her interests. (Frank L., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 703.) Here, she has made no showing that her personal rights were implicated. (Ibid.) Accordingly, appellant lacks standing to tender the claim.
In In re Caitlin B. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1193-1194 (Caitlin B.), this court held a mother lacked standing in a termination of parental rights appeal to claim two alleged fathers did not receive proper notice of the section 366.26 hearing. As we noted in Caitlin B., the interest of the mother was limited to issues pertaining to her own parental rights, rather than extending to a potential father’s parental rights. (Caitlin B., at pp. 1193-1194.)
Appellant’s attempt to distinguish Caitlin B. from the case here is unavailing. It is apparent from the discussion at the section 366.26 hearing in this case that appellant did not know for certain the identity of the biological father of the minor, and her interests are not interwoven with those of any alleged father. Moreover, appellant’s reliance on Gabriel P. v. Suedi D. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 850, 864, is misplaced. That case established only that, in a paternity action, a mother may rely on the paternity presumptions contained in the Family Code. (Gabriel P., at p. 864.) At a termination of parental rights hearing, by contrast, paternity matters do not affect a parent’s interests. (Caitlin B., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1193-1194.)
For the foregoing reasons, we agree with DHHS that appellant lacks standing to pursue an alleged father’s claim of improper notice in this case. (Caitlin B., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1194; In re Carissa G., supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 738.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
We concur: MORRISON, Acting P.J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.