Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD229049, JD229050, JD229051, JD229052.
BUTZ, J.
The Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed petitions alleging that twin minors A.Q. (case No. JD229049, born March 2004), Av.Q. (case No. JD229050, born March 2004), At.A. (case No. JD229051, born September 2002), and A.A. (case No. JD229052, born July 1999) were subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court because they were at risk of serious physical harm from mother B.Q.’s excessive corporal punishment (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (a)), from her failure to adequately supervise them (§ 300, subd. (b)), and from her problem with substance abuse (ibid.). After mother submitted the issue on the social study report (§ 355, subd. (b)), the court sustained the jurisdictional allegations. Following a contested dispositional hearing (§ 358, subd. (a)), the juvenile court ruled that the dispositional social study (§ 358, subd. (b)) contained clear and convincing evidence to sustain its proposed findings. The court ordered the removal of the four minors from mother’s custody, and the provision of reunification services to mother.
As to the twins, it is unclear whether they have a hyphenated surname or their presumed father’s name is a middle name. We use the mother’s surname.
We use initials for the given names of the mother and minors, even though this substantially impairs readability (particularly in situations such as here where minors share initials) and leads to confusion for legal researchers and record-keeping, as they are not among the 1,000 most popular birth names during the last nine years. (Keith R. v. Superior Court (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1051, fn. 2; In re Branden O. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 637, 639, fn. 2; In re Edward S. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 387, 392, fn. 1.)
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
On appeal, mother contends that in connection with the requirement in the reunification plan for random drug testing, the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to tailor it to her particular circumstances; she claims the evidence at the dispositional hearing demonstrated that the designated location was excessively difficult for her to reach. Mother also contends, based on the court’s oral remarks at the hearing, that the juvenile court’s written order improperly delegated discretion to the social worker to decide when mother could begin unsupervised day-long visits with the minors. We shall affirm the judgment (dispositional order).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mother’s arguments do not implicate the jurisdictional facts, the facts supporting removal of the minors from her custody, the basis for the condition of random drug tests, or the basis for the previously imposed limits on visitation. We therefore omit these and focus only on the facts relating to the appellate claims.
At the dispositional hearing, the social worker testified that the testing facility would tell mother when she called each morning whether her color group needed to submit to testing that day. The facility closed at 6:00 p.m. and was no longer open on weekends. If unavailable for a particular test day, she could contact the social worker and make arrangements to go for testing on the following day. The DHHS did not have any other alternative for people who worked full time. This was the only location with which the DHHS had a testing contract. The social worker was not aware that mother did not presently have a valid driver’s license, but had offered bus passes to her when mother reported difficulty in getting to the testing facility. She was aware that mother was pregnant and felt overwhelmed otherwise with her schedule of classes for anger management and parenting. Mother had been having visits with the minors for the previous few months under the supervision of the relative with whom they were living, and the relative had not reported any negative occurrences during these visitations to the DHHS.
Mother testified that there was a suspension of her driver’s license at present, so she relied on the minors’ grandmother to transport her. She acknowledged receiving the bus passes, but she was experiencing sciatic pain (in addition to her pregnancy) and the round trip from her home to the testing facility (which was downtown) took five hours. She had told the social worker of her willingness to submit to the testing requirement and the difficulties of satisfying it (particularly as her job, working 30-40 hours per week for her mother supervising transitional homes for parolees and registered sex offenders, took her out of town frequently), but the social worker had said this was the only testing site. Mother thought her obstetrician might be able to include drug screening during prenatal visits.
Mother did not provide any confirmation in support of this belief. The social worker did not know if the DHHS would permit this alternative method of testing.
The grandmother testified that mother was an “on call” employee. She was not aware that mother had been having any difficulty getting to her drug tests, because the grandmother had been taking her to them once a week. She could give mother a work schedule flexible enough to accommodate any number of random drug tests, and upon finding out only recently that mother needed to report more than once a week was willing to take her to these as well.
In closing argument, mother’s attorney reiterated mother’s request for more convenient drug testing. The court asserted the importance of the testing requirement, and noted the conflict between mother and the grandmother on the issue of the accessibility of the testing site. The court also stated it was “not going to buy this business about you’re too overwhelmed with services.”
In its oral remarks while reviewing its written visitation order, the court noted it thought the family reunification social worker’s willingness “to increase the visitation” was important to the court; the court expressed its opinion that visitation “should go to all day Saturday or all day Sunday. [¶] And once... those visits are going and there’s no problems, then we should go to overnights. That should start. And we should start that right away. Not the overnights, but the unsuperviseds right away.” Addressing mother, the court added, “[The reunification social worker] has the discretion when she is going to give you unsupervised visits and when they’re going to go to overnight visits.”
The written dispositional order filed after the hearing included the directive that mother comply with the case plan, which, inter alia, required her to comply with all required tests that the DHHS arranged. It also provided the mother with “regular visitation with the [minors].... The [DHHS] shall determine the time, place[,] and manner of visitation, including the frequency... [and] length of visits, and whether the visits are supervised.... The [DHHS]’s discretion shall extend to determining if and when to begin unsupervised overnight and weekend visits.”
DISCUSSION
I
Focusing only on her own testimony, mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to accommodate her unique circumstances with respect to the site of drug testing, because this simply set her up for failure. She asserts ipse dixit that she is entitled to a case plan that she can complete independently without assistance from family members.
“The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547) in light of the specific needs of the parent (David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 793), including assistance in areas where compliance is proving difficult (David B., at p. 794). The assistance of others in the parent’s compliance with a case plan can be part of the assessment of the reasonability of the services. (Misako R., supra, at pp. 543, 547 [proper to include efforts of church volunteers in assessing the adequacy of provided services].)
In the present case, the juvenile court was of the view that mother exaggerated the difficulties of reaching the inconvenient testing site. It was entitled to credit the grandmother’s testimony that she would make sure mother’s schedule (and present lack of a driver’s license) would not interfere with mother’s compliance with the condition of drug testing. Grandmother also agreed to take mother to drug testing even if it were twice weekly. In light of this substantial evidence, the court was not unreasonable in failing to accommodate her otherwise.
Given the availability of the grandmother’s assistance, we do not need to address mother’s complaint that the juvenile court’s advice to her about the need to clear up the problem with her driver’s license somehow indicated an assumption that she would be able to drive herself to the tests, or that the social worker had not been aware of the obstacles that mother faced in keeping her testing appointments.
II
Relying on the court’s oral remarks in announcing its ruling, mother argues this constituted an implicit finding that unsupervised visits were in the best interest of the minors and did not pose any risk to them. Therefore, the court was unreasonable in delegating this decision to the discretion of the social worker.
Mother suggests that the court ignored the requirements of section 362.1, subdivision (a)(1)(A). This statute, however, requires visitation only to be as frequent as possible under the circumstances (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1010 (Christopher H.)); it does not express any preference for visitation being unsupervised.
It is the court’s obligation to define a parent’s right to visitation. (In re Donnovan J. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1476.) Apart from this decision to allow for visitation itself, the court may delegate all other aspects of managing the details of the visits to the DHHS. (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1489; Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1008-1009; In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1373-1374, 1376-1377 (Moriah T.).) We review a juvenile court’s visitation ruling for an abuse of discretion. (Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 692, 699, fn. 6.)
Mother entirely misinterprets the court’s oral remarks as directing the immediate commencement of unsupervised visits. The juvenile court simultaneously explained to mother that this change in the manner of visitation was in the discretion of the reunification social worker. Therefore, the delegation of this issue in the written order accurately reflects the intention of the court and does not establish an abuse of discretion.
If the DHHS subsequently failed to heed the juvenile court’s recommended course of action, mother was free to file a petition to modify the order (§ 388) alleging an abuse of discretion in the management of visitation details. (Moriah T., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1377.)
More importantly, however, a party cannot impeach a written judgment or order with the court’s oral remarks in announcing its ruling. (Smith v. City of Napa (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 194, 199; cf. In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 876 [it is result, not reasoning, that is subject to review]; but see People v. Hartsell (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 8, 13-14 [in criminal case, oral pronouncement of judgment is the judicial act, and written entry of it in minutes of court cannot add to or delete from oral pronouncement].) Mother’s effort to establish an abuse of discretion thus fails for want of an adequate factual predicate.
DISPOSITION
The judgment (dispositional order) is affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON, Acting P. J., ROBIE, J.