In re Johnson, 102 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1012-13 (1981). ¶ 16 As an initial matter, respondent has forfeited any challenge concerning her stipulation, as she did not raise the issue before the juvenile court. "Where a party fails to make an appropriate objection in the court below, he or she has failed to preserve the question for review and the issue is waived." In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 242 (2001) (citing In re Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d 985, 991 (1998)). While respondent claims in her brief on appeal that she "told the court she wanted to withdraw her agreement to the stipulation," that is not borne out by the record.
At the dispositional hearing, the trial court must consider the best interest of the child. 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West 2008); In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 760 N.E.2d 85 (2001). We will reverse a trial court's dispositional determination only if the findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence or if the trial court abused its discretion by selecting an inappropriate dispositional order.
We first note that the respondent mother has waived this issue for purposes of appeal because she did not raise this issue at the trial level. See People v. Primm, 319 Ill. App. 3d 411, 423, 745 N.E.2d 13, 25 (2000); see also In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 242, 760 N.E.2d 85, 98 (2001) ("Where a party fails to make an appropriate objection in the court below, he or she has failed to preserve the question for review and the issue is waived"). In the instant case, the issue of whether the respondent mother had a parental duty to obey the treatment plans and recommendations of S.K.'s medical team was never raised at the trial level.
We first note that the respondent mother has waived this issue for purposes of appeal because she did not raise this issue at the trial level. See People v. Primm, 319 Ill. App. 3d 411, 423, 745 N.E.2d 13, 25 (2000); see also In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 242, 760 N.E.2d 85, 98 (2001) ("Where a party fails to make an appropriate objection in the court below, he or she has failed to preserve the question for review and the issue is waived"). In the instant case, the issue of whether the respondent mother had a parental duty to obey the treatment plans and recommendations of S.K.'s medical team was never raised at the trial level.
¶ 17 At the first, or adjudicatory, stage of a termination proceeding, a parent's private interest in raising her child is mitigated by the fact that there is not a final or complete severance of the parent-child relationship and by the numerous opportunities the parent will be afforded over a lengthy period of time to regain custody. In re April C, 326 Ill.App.3d 225, 237 (2001); In re A.A., 324 Ill.App.3d 227, 239 (2001). The risk of erroneous deprivation of the parent's interest is procedurally safeguarded by: (1) the lower level of proof at the adjudicatory stage (preponderance of the evidence) than at the termination stage (clear and convincing evidence), and (2) the opportunity at the second stage to present evidence and correct any errors that may have occurred at the earlier stage.
Respondent did not object. "Where a party fails to make an appropriate objection in the court below, he or she has failed to preserve the question for review[,] and the issue is waived," that is to say, forfeited. In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 242 (2001). Not only was respondent required to make a contemporaneous objection, but she also was required to reiterate
We observe that both of respondent's arguments rely on her contention that the circuit court appointed L.T. as the minor's legal guardian pursuant to the Probate Act. ¶ 32 Typically, on appellate review the circuit court's determination at a dispositional hearing will be reversed only if the findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence or if the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by selecting an inappropriate dispositional order. In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 238 (2001) (quoting In re T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1062 (1991)). We acknowledge, however, that respondent does not challenge the factual findings of the circuit court, but instead argues the circuit court improperly commingled the statutory requirements of the Probate Act and the Juvenile Court Act when rendering its ultimate determination as to who would be appointed the minor's legal guardian.
In order to make a child a ward of the court, the court must determine that the parent is dispositionally unfit to care for the child. 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West 2006); In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 760 N.E.2d 85 (2001). If the child is made a ward of the court at the dispositional hearing, the court shall determine the proper disposition.
In order to make a child a ward of the court, the court must determine that the parent is dispositionally unfit to care for the child. 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West 2006); In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 760 N.E.2d 85 (2001). If the child is made a ward of the court at the dispositional hearing, the court shall determine the proper disposition.
Johnson, 102 Ill. App. 3d at 1014, 429 N.E.2d at 1372. More recently, in In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 242-43, 760 N.E.2d 85, 99 (2001), the First District addressed the situation in which one of the respondent parents in a case in which three children were alleged to be abused ( 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2) (West 2000)) argued on appeal that the trial court erred by accepting her admission and stipulation to the State's abuse allegations. The appellate court rejected that argument on various grounds, one of which was to note that the respondent father entered into the same stipulation of facts, and his "stipulation alone would have provided a sufficient factual basis for the trial court to make its findings of abuse."