Consequently, alleged deficiencies invalidate the resume only if the resume taken as a whole is insufficient to inform or put the reader on inquiry of the nature, scope and impact of the proposed diversion. 807 P.2d 9, 15 (Colo. 1991); accord Board of Comm'rs v. Collard, 827 P.2d 546, 552 (Colo. 1992). Once the applicant satisfies the initial burden of providing information that would alert a reasonable person to investigate the claims further, the potential objector bears the responsibility of conducting a reasonably diligent inquiry and is charged with all notice that such an inquiry would produce.
We first address the subject-matter jurisdiction of the water court to grant the conditional decree in Case No. 83CW360. Defects in subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Collard, 827 P.2d 546, 549 (Colo. 1992); see also Monaghan Farms, Inc. v. City County of Denver, 807 P.2d 9, 18 (Colo. 1991). Park County Coalition argues that the 83CW360 decree is void because Columbine filed its application in 1983 without intent to divert water to a beneficial use and without having made an appropriation.
Because a published resume notice substitutes for personal service, it "must put interested parties ‘to the extent reasonably possible on inquiry notice of the nature, scope, and impact of the proposed diversion.’ " Monaghan Farms, Inc. v. City & Cty. of Denver By & Through Bd. of Water Comm’rs , 807 P.2d 9, 15 (Colo. 1991) (quoting Closed Basin Landowners Ass’n v. Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist. , 734 P.2d 627, 633 (Colo. 1987) ).
"Subject matter jurisdiction concerns `the court's authority to deal with the class of cases in which it renders judgment.'" Monaghan Farms v. City County of Denver, 807 P.2d 9, 18 (Colo. 1991) (quoting Closed Basin Landowners Ass'n v. Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist., 734 P.2d 627, 636 (Colo. 1987)).
Treating the appropriators' motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, the water court dismissed Arapahoe's complaint with prejudice after finding that the 1973 application claimed in-stream flow rights, that the W-1987 decree did not grant a riparian right, and that the 1974 court had subject matter jurisdiction. The 1991 court, relying on Monaghan Farms, Inc. v. City County of Denver, 807 P.2d 9 (Colo. 1991), also found that the resume notice was adequate and "sufficient for the subject application," because it put Arapahoe on inquiry notice. Accordingly, the resume notice conferred personal jurisdiction.
Without specific notice, interested parties would not be alerted of "the nature, scope and impact of the proposed diversion." See Monaghan Farms, Inc. v. City County of Denver, 807 P.2d 9, 16 (Colo. 1991). Thus, Englewood concludes that the statement of claim was insufficient.
The receipt of inquiry notice charges a party with notice of all the facts that a reasonably diligent inquiry would have disclosed." City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co. , 926 P.2d 1, 25 (Colo. 1996) (quoting Monaghan Farms, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver , 807 P.2d 9, 15 (Colo. 1991) ).
Colburn v. Gilcrest, 55 Colo. 92, 94, 151 P. 909, 910 (1915)."Monaghan Farms, Inc. v. City and County of Denver By and Through Bd. of Water Com'rs, 807 P.2d 9, 15 (Colo. 1991). Notice is critical due to the manner in which deeds of trust are perfected.
” Monaghan Farms, Inc. v. City and County of Denver By and Through Bd. of Water Com'rs, 807 P.2d 9, 15 (Colo.1991). Notice is critical due to the manner in which deeds of trust are perfected.
The long history of agreements among the Kelleys, Ochsner, and Ryland established (1) that the Kelleys would purchase the Kelley Lots from Ochsner after the Filing 2 Plat was recorded, (2) that the lots would be shown on the Filing 2 Plat, and (3) that the rest of the Filing 2 Plat, but not the Kelley Lots, would be a part of Ryan Ranch. Consequently, nothing about the Filing 2 Plat or the CCR would have appeared abnormal to Respondents or reasonably caused them to suspect Ochsner and Ryland had privately conveyed the Kelley Lots between themselves before Ochsner sold the lots to the Kelleys. See Monaghan Farms, Inc. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 807 P.2d 9, 15 (Colo. 1991) (“Inquiry notice requires sufficient facts to attract the attention of interested persons and prompt a reasonable person to inquire further.”). ¶50 Thus, contrary to the Association's contentions, no notice or clerical error ameliorates the fact that the amendment—again, assuming without deciding that the Filing 2 Plat and Ryland–Ochsner deed constituted an amendment—failed to comply with section 38–33.3–217(3) of the Act.