Opinion
April 6, 2000.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (William McCooe, J.), entered March 5, 1999, which, in an article 78 proceeding by a police officer to annul respondent Police Department's determination denying petitioner's request for permission to engage in off-duty employment as a professional boxer, granted respondents' cross-motion to dismiss the proceeding as time-barred, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Elliot I. Susser, for petitioner-appellant.
Elizabeth S. Natrella, for respondents-respondents.
ROSENBERGER, J.P., WILLIAMS, TOM, RUBIN, BUCKLEY, JJ.
The motion court correctly held that the determination denying petitioner's request to engage in off-duty employment as a professional boxer became final and binding within the meaning ofCPLR 217(1) when petitioner was informed of the denial of his administrative appeal (see, Matter of Biondo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 N.Y.2d 832; cf., Watergate II Apts. v. Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 N.Y.2d 52, 57). Petitioner's attempt to resort to contractual grievance procedures, rejected by respondent Police Commissioner on the ground that the matter does not involve a contractual right subject to the grievance process, did not toll the four-month limitations period (see, Matter of Lubin v. Board of Educ., 60 N.Y.2d 974, cert. denied 469 U.S. 823; Matter of Jones v. McGuire, 92 A.D.2d 788). In any event, the determination was not arbitrary and capricious. Under General Municipal Law § 208-d, a police officer may engage in off-duty employment provided, inter alia, it does not "affect his physical condition to the extent that it impairs his ability to efficiently perform [his or her regular] duties". Given this qualification, it cannot be said that the blanket prohibition against professional boxing apparently applied here is so lacking in reason as to be arbitrary (see, New York State Assn. of Counties v. Axelrod, 78 N.Y.2d 158, 166).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.