Citing to In re Application of the County Collector for Judgment Order of Sale Against Lands Lots Returned Delinquent for Nonpayment of General Taxes for the Year 1982 Prior Years, 202 Ill. App. 3d 405 (1990), the public guardian also argues that, even if Apex's actions were not fraudulent, this court should invoke its "equitable powers" to void the tax deed order and return the property at issue to Mary Lowe's estate. The public guardian argues that Mary Lowe lost her home through no fault of her own, and emphasizes that Judge Staniec, in the affidavit which he submitted to the circuit court, stated that he would not have issued the tax deed order if he had known that Lowe was hospitalized in 1995 and 1996.

Section 22-45(4) was not at issue in Lowe (see Lowe I, 217 Ill. 2d at 22), and it was not yet in effect at the time of the last published opinion of this court on a similar issue (see, e.g., In re Application of the County Collector for Judgment Order of Sale Against Lands Lots Returned Delinquent for Nonpayment of General Taxes for the Year 1982 Prior Years, 202 Ill. App. 3d 405, 412 (1990) (hereinafter New York Guardian); see also Lowe I, 217 Ill. 2d at 27 (explaining that the codification of section 22-45(4) prevents the situation at issue in New York Guardian)). Thus, the application of sections 22-45(4) and 2-1401(f) is an issue of first impression in this court. We will first address whether Devon has satisfied the standard for relief under section 22-45(4).

See Robinson v. Ada S. McKinley Community Services, Inc., 19 F.3d 359, 363 (7th Cir. 1994) ("We will not follow an Illinois Appellate Court's interpretation of state law if we are convinced that the Illinois Supreme Court would decide the issue differently.") Likewise, in Application of the County Collector, 202 Ill. App.3d 405, 147 Ill.Dec. 666, 559 N.E.2d 1006 (1st Dist. 1990) ( Capitol), the interested party was never identified. No attempt was made to serve the interested party by any means.

Consequently, regardless of the accuracy of her belief, Huff's statements and actions concerning her procurement of the tax deed cannot be fairly characterized as fraudulent. Johnson also argues that, even in the absence of fraud, we should affirm the trial court's vacation of the tax deed. He cites In re Application of the County Collector for Judgment and Order of Sale Against Lands and Lots Returned Delinquent for Nonpayment of General Taxes for the Year 1982 and Prior Years, 202 Ill. App.3d 405, 559 N.E.2d 1006 (1990) (New York Guardian), for the proposition that the proof of fraud requirement should be replaced with an equity-driven analysis. In that case, the court relied on equitable principles to afford relief to a party who, through no fault of his own and through no fraud by any party, stood to lose property in which he had a significant interest.

( In re Application of County Treasurer (1980), 84 Ill. App.3d 506, 511-12, 405 N.E.2d 869, 873.) The general purpose of a section 2-1401 petition is to alert the court to such facts existing at the time judgment was entered that would have precluded judgment had the court known of those facts. ( In re Application of the County Collector for Judgment Order of Sale Against Lands Lots Returned Delinquent for Nonpayment of General Taxes for the Year 1982 Prior Years (1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 405, 410, 559 N.E.2d 1006, 1009.) The trial court's judgment may be sustained by a reviewing court on any grounds supported by the record.