Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County.Super.Ct.No. J231549 William Jefferson Powell IV, Judge.
Elizabeth Garfinkle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting, Tami Falkenstein Hennick, and Meredith A. White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RAMIREZ P. J.
Defendant and appellant A.O. (minor) was found by the juvenile court to have committed misdemeanor battery with the infliction of serious bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d).) At the time of the offense, minor was less than a month away from turning 13 years old. Minor contends the evidence was not clear and convincing that he knew of the wrongfulness of his action as required by Penal Code section 26. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On January 12, 2010, minor rode his bike straight down a ramp and collided with the five-year-old victim who was going up the ramp on a scooter. Three of the victim’s teeth were knocked out.
The victim’s father testified that before minor went down the ramp, minor put his handlebars to the side; minor displayed a “quick jerky” movement of the handlebars. Minor did not run away or resist when another child brought him over to speak to the victim’s father. When asked by the victim’s father why he had hit the victim, minor replied, “[I]t was an accident.”
The victim’s cousin was with minor at the top of the ramp prior to the collision. Minor said, “Those two kids are in the way.” The cousin replied, “Yeah, but they’re little.” Minor then said, “watch, I’m going to bang one of those kids.” Before the cousin could say, “That’s my cousin and my brother, ” minor had already started down the ramp with a quick jerking motion on the handlebars. After minor collided with the victim, minor asked the victim if he was okay.
Another cousin testified that he heard minor say, “I’m going to bang these kids” before the victim was struck.
Minor told a sheriff’s deputy that the smaller children “were too little to be at the park and that they could get hurt.” Minor said he had said the same thing to the other kids at the top of the ramp with him, right before he rode down the ramp and hit the victim in the mouth. Minor said it was an accident. Minor thought the victim had seen him but ignored him. Minor told the victim to move but he did not have brakes on his bike, so he put his feet down but could not help but run into the victim. To summarize, minor told the deputy that he said the little kids were going to get hurt, saw the victim on the ramp, and then rode his bike right in the direction of the victim. Minor did not say that he was intentionally going down the ramp to hit the victim.
At the close of the People’s case, minor’s trial counsel contended the People had not met their burden under Penal Code section 26. Following oral argument, the trial court ruled: “I think all of the evidence in its totality satisfies Penal Code [s]ection 26. In other words, the minor did know what he was doing. His statements ahead of time showed that his actions were an intentional act. [¶] The fact that he knew that kids who were substantially younger than him could get significantly hurt from the position where they were as opposed to the position where he was; the fact that he attempted to minimize his conduct when the discussions came later with law enforcement and the fact that he stopped and attempted to apologize. All of those circumstances as a whole satisfy the spirit of the law codified in Penal Code [s]ection 26.”
Minor testified that he did not mean to run into or scare the victim, and that the collision was an accident. Minor had complained to the cousin about the little kids because someone going down a bigger ramp almost ran into one of the little kids. After colliding with the victim, minor got off of his bike and repeatedly asked the victim if he was okay, but the victim was running around crying and did not appear to hear him. Minor felt guilty, in that he “felt bad for something that [he] didn’t mean to do.”
Among the juvenile court’s findings, was that minor “intentionally went down there with the intent of unlawfully touching this other little kid with his handlebars.” The court believed that minor tried to stop but was “going either too fast or swung his hands too hard when he cranked his handlebars. And unfortunately, that side of the handlebar doesn’t have a grip on it. It’s exposed metal. And exposed metal with really any amount of speed to a five-year-old mouth is going to do some serious damage as we saw here. They were—the teeth were immediately knocked out. There was blood everywhere, and the child involved was running around like crazy because of the trauma involved.”
DISCUSSION
Minor does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence that he willfully and unlawfully used force or violence upon the victim and thereby caused serious bodily injury. (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243 subd. (d).) His sole contention is that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that he knew of the wrongfulness of this intentional action as required by Penal Code section 26. We disagree.
In pertinent part, Penal Code section 26 provides: “All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: [¶] One—Children under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness.”
“Penal Code section 26 articulates a presumption that a minor under the age of 14 is incapable of committing a crime. [Citation.] To defeat the presumption, the People must show by ‘clear proof’ that at the time the minor committed the charged act, he or she knew of its wrongfulness. This provision applies to proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. [Citation.] Only those minors over the age of 14, who may be presumed to understand the wrongfulness of their acts, and those under 14 who—as demonstrated by their age, experience, conduct, and knowledge—clearly appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct rightly may be made wards of the court in our juvenile justice system. [Citation.]” (In re Manuel L. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 229, 231-232, fns. omitted.) The term “clear proof” in Penal Code section 26 imposes the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof. (Manuel L., at pp. 234, 239.)
“On appeal, we must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment and affirm the [juvenile] court’s findings that the minor understood the wrongfulness of his conduct if they are supported by ‘substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the requisite finding under the governing standard of proof. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] The trier of fact, not the appellate court, must be convinced of the minor’s guilt, and if the circumstances and reasonable inferences justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. [Citation.] This standard of review applies with equal force to claims that the evidence does not support the determination that a minor understood the wrongfulness of his conduct. [Citation.] [¶] In determining whether the minor knows of the wrongfulness of his conduct, the court must often rely on circumstantial evidence such as the minor’s age, experience, and understanding, as well as the circumstances of the offense, including its method of commission and concealment. [Citations.] Generally, the older a child gets and the closer he approaches the age of 14, the more likely it is that he appreciates the wrongfulness of his acts. [Citations.]” (In re James B. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 862, 872-873.) However, “a minor’s knowledge of wrongfulness may not be inferred from the commission of the act itself.” (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 378.)
Minor committed battery by intentionally riding his bicycle into the victim; the only thing “accidental” about the collision was the level of force applied and harm inflicted, which minor attempted to mitigate after he commenced his collision course. Battery is an uncomplicated offense based on the very simple concept that it is wrong to hit someone else. Because minor was almost 13 years old at the time of the offense, he was not only likely to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions (In re James B., supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 873), but almost certain to understand a preschool level concept such as the wrongfulness of hitting someone else. Indeed, minor’s stated concern that the little kids could get hurt indicates that he knew colliding with them would be wrong. Additionally, minor tried to conceal the wrongful nature of his intentional act by claiming the intentional collision was an accident. Accordingly, there was substantial evidence that minor understood the wrongfulness of riding his bicycle into the five-year-old victim.
Minor asserts his claim that the collision was an accident was a consistent defense and not evidence that he minimized his actions. However, prior to colliding with the victim, minor stated he was going to “bang” one of the little kids, and he then intentionally collided with the victim. By invoking an accident defense, minor was attempting to conceal or minimize his intentional acts. In this context, his false claims that the intentional collision was an accident are indicative of his knowledge that his intentional actions were wrongful.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McKINSTER J., KING J.