Opinion
G037738
5-24-2007
In re ANTONIO Y., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANDY Y., Defendant and Appellant.
Kate M. Chandler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Aurelio Torre, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
In terminating dependency jurisdiction, the juvenile court awarded physical and legal custody of the child to his mother and denied all contact between him and father. Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in granting the no contact order. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
At the age of two, the child was taken to the hospital after suffering a seizure while living with father and his live-in girlfriend. The doctors diagnosed him with a subdural hematoma, an approximately three-week-old spiral arm fracture, second degree burns, ruptured ears, a hemorrhage in his right eye, and numerous bruises and cuts. When asked to explain these injuries, father stated the child fell a lot. The child was detained and placed in protective custody.
Father was incarcerated on charges of felony child endangerment. The criminal court issued a protective order precluding contact between father and the child to remain in effect until November 2008. Over the childs counsels objection, the juvenile court later approved monitored visitation while the father remained in local custody. Before his incarceration, father had several supervised visits with the child at the Orangewood Childrens Home.
After months in protective custody, the child was released to his mother on the condition she attend counseling and parenting education classes. Upon successful completion of her classes, social services recommended that dependency jurisdiction be terminated and that a no contact order between the child and father be issued. The court followed the recommendations and granted physical and legal custody of the child to mother and ordered no visitation for father, finding the no contact order necessary to protect the childs best interests.
DISCUSSION
Fathers sole claim is that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied him any visitation rights. We review a juvenile courts decision to enter a no contact order for an abuse of discretion. (SeeIn re Emmanuel R. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 452, 465.) "`The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the [juvenile] court. [Citations.]" (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) No abuse of discretion has been shown.
Father argues the no contact order may harm the child by making him feel guilty he did something wrong. But he has not cited any evidence the child feels any guilt over the situation. On the contrary, the child has adjusted well to being without father for almost a year, his verbal skills have greatly increased, he is not wetting his pants, plus he enjoys being with his mother and playing with his siblings.
In a similar vein, father contends the ends of justice are not served by depriving the child of any contact with his father and that it would be better for the child to have limited contact with him. The juvenile court disagreed. Disagreement with the courts decision is not a basis for reversal absent a clear showing the decision was arbitrary or irrational. (Ajaxo Inc. v. E*Ttrade Group Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 21, 45.) Father has not made that showing.
In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752 does not support fathers contention the no contact order limits his ability to fully exercise his parental rights. Although the court noted "[p]arents have the right of visitation from the fact of parenthood [citations]" (id. at p. 756), it ultimately recognized that courts "define the rights of the parties to visitation" and that "[t]he definition of such a right necessarily involves a balancing of the interests of the parent in visitation with the best interests of the child. In balancing these interests, the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion should determine whether there should be any right to visitation and, if so, the frequency and length of visitation" (id. at p. 757). The court here did just that.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.1, which father cites for the proposition that visitation shall be promoted, encouraged, and be as frequent as possible, has no application to the no contact order made here. The statute, by its terms, applies only during dependency proceedings when reunification services have been ordered. That period ended when the court terminated dependency jurisdiction and issued the no contact order.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We Concur:
SILLS, P. J.
FYBEL, J.