Opinion
NO. 09-11-00070-CV
04-19-2012
IN THE INTEREST OF A.N.M.
On Appeal from the 284th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 98-12-04096 CV
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal by the Office of the Attorney General ("OAG") of the associate judge's order dismissing its suit for modification of a child support order for lack of standing. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
A.N.M. was born on July 4, 1989. A.N.M. suffers from mental retardation. K.M. and appellee R.M. divorced in 1999, and the trial court ordered R.M. to pay child support in the amount of $725 per month. On July 10, 2007, the OAG filed a notice that it was a necessary party, stated that K.M. had assigned her support rights to the OAG because A.N.M. was receiving Title IV-D benefits, and requested that support payments be directed to the state disbursement unit. An associate judge modified the child support order to require R.M. to pay $1,237.50 per month until A.N.M. reached age eighteen or was otherwise emancipated, at which time support would decrease to $960 per month.
On March 25, 2009, after A.N.M. had reached eighteen years of age, the OAG filed a suit for modification of the support order because a psychologist determined that A.N.M. would require substantial care and personal supervision, and would be incapable of self support. On December 15, 2009, the associate judge signed a modification order, ordering R.M. to pay child support of $500 per month for an indefinite period and found that A.N.M. required substantial care and personal supervision because of her disability, was incapable of supporting herself, and her disability existed on or before her 18th birthday.
R.M. subsequently filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court for lack of standing, in which he contended that section 154.303 of the Family Code does not confer standing upon the OAG to sue to enforce support obligations after a child has reached the age of eighteen. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.303 (West Supp. 2011). The trial judge signed an order of dismissal for lack of standing on December 10, 2010. In addition, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which it concluded that the OAG's suit for modification did not include a specific assignment by K.M. to the OAG and vacated the associate judge's order of December 15, 2009. In its conclusions of law, the trial court cited Office of the Att'y Gen. of Tex. v. Crawford, 322 S.W.3d 858 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). In its sole appellate issue, the OAG argues that the trial court misinterpreted section 154.303 and therefore erred by dismissing its modification suit for lack of standing.
Because the 2011 amendment to section 154.303 is not material to this appeal, we cite to the current version of the statute.
Like the case at bar, Crawford involved the issue of whether the OAG, "in its capacity as the State's Title IV-D agency, has standing to sue to modify a child support order to provide support for adult disabled children." Id. at 859. As the Crawford court explained, chapter 154 of the Family Code, subchapter F, "authorizes court-ordered support for adult disabled children." Id. at 860. Section 154.303 provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) A suit provided by this subchapter may be filed only by:Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.303. As in Crawford, the OAG's pleadings did not indicate that it had been assigned the right to file the modification suit, and the OAG does not argue that it received an express assignment from any of the persons granted standing to sue by section 154.303. See Crawford, 322 S.W.3d at 860; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.303.
(1) [A] parent of the child or another person having physical custody or guardianship of the child under a court order; or
(2) [T]he child, if the child:(A) is 18 years of age or older;(b) The parent, the child, if the child is 18 years of age or older, or other person may not transfer or assign the cause of action to any person, including a governmental or private entity or agency, except for an assignment made to the Title IV-D agency . . . .
(B) does not have a mental disability; and
(C) is determined by the court to be capable of managing the child's financial affairs.
The Crawford court held that the OAG's general powers as the State's Title IV-D agency do not establish its standing to file suit under the specific standing requirements set forth in section 154.303. Crawford, 322 S.W.3d at 861-62. In addition, "the fact that the OAG had standing to file its original petition to enforce . . . child support obligations does not mean that it maintained standing to file a subsequent petition to require continuing support payments for adult disabled children." Id. at 862. The Crawford court held that "the OAG's standing cannot be inferred from its prior action to enforce support obligations because section 154.303 specifically provides that unless it has received an assignment, the OAG does not have standing to file suit for the purpose of establishing support for adult disabled children." Id. The OAG may assist adult disabled children with obtaining support if it obtains "a specific assignment before doing so." Id.
We agree with the well-reasoned opinion of our sister Court of Appeals in Crawford. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err by dismissing the OAG's suit for lack of standing. We overrule the OAG's sole issue and affirm the trial court's judgment of dismissal.
AFFIRMED.
________________________
STEVE McKEITHEN
Chief Justice
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.