Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, James Patrick Marion, Judge. Affirmed, Super. Ct. No. DP012361
Jennifer Mack, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Diana M.
Niccol Kording, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Salvador A.
Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen, and Aurelio Torre, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
IKOLA, J.
Diane M. (mother) and Salvador A. (father), parents of Angelica A., appeal from the juvenile court’s termination of their parental rights after a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanency hearing (the .26 hearing). Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that Angelica was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. Father contends the court’s denial of his request to continue the .26 hearing was an abuse of discretion. Mother and father join each other’s arguments.
Unless noted, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
We affirm.
FACTS
Angelica was born prematurely on September 29, 2005. Mother admitted using heroin and methadone while she was pregnant with Angelica. Mother had previously given birth to two other children who tested positive for opiates at birth and her parental rights as to these children had already been terminated. Father had a history of drug use.
In October 2005, the court placed Angelica in the custody of the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA). Because of her premature birth and medical issues, including respiratory problems, SSA referred Angelica to the Regional Center of Orange County for an assessment. Angelica was diagnosed with sleep apnea and was experiencing symptoms of drug withdrawal. According to SSA, Angelica would need “a higher level of care to monitor her physical condition.”
By April 2006, Angelica was doing “much better” and her health continued to progress. By October 2006, her eating habits had improved; she no longer required a sleep apnea or oxygen monitor; and the irritability she experienced at birth was gone. She still needed a feeding tube, and she continued to receive occupational and physical therapy. According to SSA, however, she had shown “great improvements.”
By March 2007, Angelica had been “medically cleared” from her exposure to blood borne illnesses, was not on any medications, and “no problems” were noted during her most recent doctor’s appointments. Angelica displayed some “delays” as a result of mother’s drug use during pregnancy, but Angelica’s doctor opined that she could overcome these delays over time. A prospective adoptive family had been identified and a meeting between Angelica and the family was being arranged.
Three months later, Angelica’s doctors found no abnormalities, problems or delays, and her occupational and physical therapy were scheduled to be discontinued and replaced by speech therapy. Her feeding tube had been removed. According to Angelica’s social worker, Angelica had “shown great improvement and is . . . developmentally on target for her age group.” The social worker also reported Angelica had no “mental or emotional problems” and seemed “to be a happy child, as she is constantly smiling and . . . interacting with other children as well as adults.” The social worker concluded Angelica was likely to be adopted.
Angelica underwent a neurological assessment because “autism was suspected.” SSA’s .26 hearing report, however, clearly states that the doctor who performed the assessment opined that Angelica “noted no problems or associated delays.”
The .26 hearing took place on July 23, 2007. Neither mother nor father attended the hearing. At the outset of the hearing, mother’s counsel informed the court that she had not been able to contact mother for the three months preceding the .26 hearing. Counsel for mother requested a continuance so she could “have some time to contact [mother].” Father’s counsel did not explicitly request a continuance, but did ask the court for “time to contact” father and obtain documents to support a section 388 petition. SSA and Angelica opposed the request. Counsel for SSA argued a continuance would not be in Angelica’s best interest and explained, “[n]either parent has visited this child since January. They are not here today. They have not been regularly appearing” at court hearings. The court denied mother’s request for a continuance, concluding mother had not demonstrated good cause and that a continuance would not be in Angelica’s best interest.
At the conclusion of the .26 hearing, the court determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that Angelica was likely to be adopted pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), and that no statutory exception to adoption applied. The court then terminated mother and father’s parental rights.
DISCUSSION
There is Substantial Evidence Angelica Was Likely to be Adopted Within a Reasonable Time
Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s conclusion that Angelica was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. We disagree.
At a .26 hearing, the court may: (1) terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption; (2) identify adoption as the permanency plan goal and continue the hearing for no more than 180 days to locate an appropriate adoptive home for the child; (3) appoint a legal guardian; or (4) order the child’s placement in long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1)-(5).) To terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence the child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) If the court finds the child is likely to be adopted, it must order adoption unless termination of parental rights would cause serious detriment to a child under a specific statutory exception. (Ibid.; see also In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.).)
We determine whether the record contains substantial evidence from which the court could find Angelica was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. (In re Gregory A. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1561-1562; In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 406.) The evidence must be “‘“sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.”’” (In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1205-1206.) We give the court’s adoptability finding the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolve any evidentiary conflicts in favor of the judgment. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)
Mother’s primary contention is Angelica was unlikely to be adopted because of her “significant” medical problems. The record demonstrates otherwise. After her birth, Angelica’s health improved drastically: by March 2007, she was not taking any medication and was “developmentally on target” for her age. And by June 2007, doctors who examined her noted no abnormalities, problems, or delays. The occupational and physical therapy Angelica was receiving was to be discontinued. The record establishes Angelica was in good health at the time of the .26 hearing in spite of her mother’s drug use during pregnancy. The record also shows Angelica was happy, and that she interacted well with other children and with adult caregivers. This is not a situation like those in In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 510-512, and In re Amelia S. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1060, 1063-1065, where the appellate court found insufficient evidence the minors were likely to be adopted within a reasonable time because of the minors’ severe emotional, developmental, and physical problems.
Relying on In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 253 (Kristin W.), mother contends the social worker’s “exceedingly rosy” descriptions of Angelica are insufficient to support the court’s conclusion that Angelica is likely to be adopted in a reasonable amount of time. This argument fails. As an initial matter, mother has offered no evidence to contradict the social worker’s description of Angelica. Second, mother’s reliance on Kristin W. is misplaced. In that case, the juvenile court failed to make a finding regarding the minors’ adoptability and the only evidence in the record supporting an implied finding of adoptability was the opinion of the social worker — who had not discussed adoption with the foster parents — that “‘these minors are adoptable and that they would benefit from a permanent plan.’” (Id. at p. 253.) The appellate court held the social worker’s opinion, by itself, was insufficient to support an implied finding of adoptability. (Ibid.) Here, the court made a finding regarding adoptability. And unlike the sole conclusory statement by the social worker in Kristin W. that the minor was adoptable, the social worker here conducted a thorough assessment and provided a vivid description, with supporting facts, of Angelica’s good physical and emotional health.
Next, mother contends there was insufficient evidence Angelica was likely to be adopted because the prospective adoptive family identified by SSA had not met Angelica. Mother suggests the prospective adoptive family would not want to adopt Angelica after meeting her, apparently because “autism was suspected.” But mother concedes “the neurologist ruled out autism” and her speculation regarding Angela’s wellbeing directly contradicts the .26 hearing report, where SSA reported Angelica suffered no problems, delays or abnormalities. In any event, that the prospective adoptive family had not met Angelica is not dispositive. “The issue of adoptability requires the court to focus on the child, and whether the child’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt. [Citations.] It is not necessary that the child already be placed in a preadoptive home, or that a proposed adoptive parent be waiting” as long as there is sufficient evidence that adoption will take place within a reasonable time. (In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 624; In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649 [because the focus of the adoptability inquiry is on the minor, “it is not necessary that the minor already be in a potential adoptive home or that there be a proposed adoptive parent ‘waiting in the wings’”]; see also § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)
Here, we find nothing in the record suggesting it would be difficult to find a person willing to adopt Angelica within a reasonable time, particularly when SSA had already identified a prospective adoptive family. The record demonstrates Angelica is a cute and happy toddler who socializes well and who responds well to adult attention. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence from which the court could find, by clear and convincing evidence, Angelica was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time.
The Court’s Denial of the Request for a Continuance Was Not an Abuse of Discretion
Father contends the court’s denial of his request to continue the .26 hearing was an abuse of discretion because the denial deprived him of an opportunity to gather documentation to support a section 388 petition for modification. Although father did not explicitly request a continuance at the .26 hearing, he appears to have joined in mother’s request to continue.
Mother joins father’s claim that the court improperly denied her request for a continuance, but she presents no argument to support her contention.
We review a juvenile court order denying a continuance for an abuse of discretion. (In re Elijah V. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 585.) A juvenile court may continue a dependency proceeding only if the continuance is not contrary to the minor’s best interests and the moving party demonstrates good cause. (§ 352, subd. (a); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.550.) “In considering the minor’s interests, the court shall give substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements.” (§ 352, subd. (a).) Continuances in juvenile proceedings are expressly discouraged (In re Elijah V., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 585), and “should be difficult to obtain.” (Jeff M. v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1242; see also Renee S. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 187, 197, fn. 6 [“section 352 bars continuances solely for the convenience of the parties”].)
Father had ample notice of the .26 hearing. Despite this notice, father decided not to attend the hearing, and not to inform his counsel of his whereabouts. Father also had time to collect documents to support a section 388 petition and deliver those documents to his lawyer. He declined to do so. That it would have been more convenient for father if the hearing had been continued does not demonstrate good cause. And because father did not demonstrate good cause for a continuance, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request. (In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 180.)
Father’s reliance on In re Michael R. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 687, 694 is misplaced. There, the juvenile court denied mother’s request for a continuance because it mistakenly believed it had no discretion to grant one. Here and in contrast to Michael R., the court denied the motion to continue because neither parent demonstrated good cause, not because the court believed it lacked jurisdiction.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: SILLS, P. J., RYLAARSDAM, J.