Opinion
Appellate Case No. 2013-001453 Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-219
05-06-2015
In the Interest of Johnny A., A Juvenile under the Age of Seventeen, Appellant.
Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Daniel Edward Johnson, of Columbia, all for Respondent.
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. Appeal From Richland County
Michelle M. Hurley, Family Court Judge
AFFIRMED
Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Daniel Edward Johnson, of Columbia, all for Respondent. PER CURIAM: In an appeal from an adjudication of delinquency in family court, Johnny A. argues the family court erred in denying his motion for a jury trial. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: In re Stephen W., 409 S.C. 73, 76, 761 S.E.2d 231, 232 (2014) (holding juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial in adjudication proceedings under the United States Constitution (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 530-57 (1971))); id. at 79, 761 S.E.2d at 234 ("[The] important distinctions between the family court juvenile adjudication process and the traditional criminal justice process demonstrate that the juvenile adjudication process in family court is not of a like nature or similar to the manner in which juveniles were criminally charged at the time the Constitution was enacted. As a result, the South Carolina Constitution does not entitle juveniles to a jury trial in family court adjudication proceedings."); In re Kevin R., 409 S.C. 297, 305-06, 762 S.E.2d 387, 391 (2014) (reaffirming the analysis in Stephen W. and noting there are no collateral consequences to a juvenile adjudication because an adjudication is not the equivalent of a conviction); id. at 305, 762 S.E.2d at 391 ("[A]ny assertion that juveniles should be entitled to a jury trial because they are subject to registering as a sex offender if they are adjudicated delinquent for certain sex offenses is without merit as our appellate courts have held that registering as a sex offender is a civil, non-punitive consequence."). AFFIRMED. FEW, C.J., and HUFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.