Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. J516142, Cynthia A. Bashant, Judge.
OPINION
BENKE, Acting P. J.
H.M. (H.) appeals an order of the juvenile court placing her minor son, Angel M., in Illinois with his biological father, Kenton C., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2, subdivision (a) and terminating the court's jurisdiction. H. contends the court erred by finding it would not be detrimental to Angel to place him with Kenton and by terminating its jurisdiction. She further contends the juvenile court custody orders were improper and incomplete. We affirm the orders.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2006 the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a petition in the juvenile court on behalf of one-month-old Angel under section 300, subdivision (b), alleging H.'s mental illness, medication and sleep deprivation led her to call the police for help in caring for Angel, who was born prematurely and required feedings every two hours. H. had diagnoses of bipolar disorder, postpartum depression and a history of drug abuse.
Angel's six-year-old half-sister, Stevi M., was also taken into protective custody. Stevi is not a subject of this appeal.
H. identified Kenton as Angel's father but did not know his whereabouts. After Agency located Kenton, he contacted the social worker in February 2006. He explained he met H. and her daughter Stevi on a Greyhound bus in Albuquerque in 2005, and they came to live with him in Chicago. After a few months, H. unexpectedly left Kenton. Kenton was unaware of H.'s pregnancy and did not know about Angel's birth until Agency contacted him. Kenton requested a paternity test and appointment of counsel, and said he would like to parent and obtain custody of Angel.
At a jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court sustained the allegations of the petition, declared Angel a dependent, removed him from H.'s custody and placed him in foster care. The court appointed counsel for Kenton, and following paternity testing, entered a judgment of paternity for Kenton. The court ordered an evaluation of Kenton's home in Chicago under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC).
H. was participating in services, making progress with her case plan and having unsupervised visits with Angel twice a week. However, she still had symptoms of bipolar disorder and was not ready to reunify with him. Kenton was willing to participate in reunification services, including counseling and parenting classes. In a letter to the court, Kenton requested custody of Angel.
According to a status review report, Kenton was gainfully employed, completed eight parenting classes and obtained referrals for counseling. He had six other children from a 17-year marriage. Kenton's children lived with him during the summer and alternate weekends, and he appeared to be a stable, solid and secure father. The social worker reported Kenton showed a willingness to parent Angel by following his case plan and consistently communicating with Agency and Angel's caregivers.
Agency received the ICPC report, which described Kenton's house as clean, well-maintained, organized and warmly decorated. Kenton's elderly father also lived there. During an interview with the ICPC investigator, Kenton's six children denied any physical, sexual or substance abuse in the family. Kenton admitted there had been domestic violence in his marriage. His former wife had obtained a restraining order at the time they separated in 1999, but it was later vacated. Kenton pleaded no contest in 2000 to state benefits fraud and was given probation. Kenton told the investigator he used corporal punishment with his children, but he recently learned alternative forms of discipline in his parenting classes. There were no child abuse referrals involving Kenton's children. However, a child abuse referral was made involving five-year-old Stevi in 2005 because Kenton hit her with a belt, leaving a mark on her leg.
The investigator had no doubt Kenton wanted to parent Angel, based on his involvement with his other children and the apparent strong bond between them. Kenton's income was sufficient to meet his expenses and provide for Angel's needs, but he might have difficulty paying for child care. Although Kenton appeared capable of providing adequate care for Angel, the investigator was concerned about the child abuse referral involving Stevi. Kenton felt justified in hitting Stevi with a belt, claiming she had been disrespectful. The investigator was also concerned that Kenton began living with H. so soon after they met, without considering the risks and dangers of bringing home someone he did not know well. The investigator recommended against Angel's placement with Kenton at that time, finding Kenton needed to complete four more parenting classes and engage in weekly psychotherapy to address the use of physical punishment and how to exercise better judgment in choosing a partner.
At a contested review hearing, Agency recommended six more months of services for both parents. Kenton opposed the recommendation, instead requesting the court place Angel with him and terminate jurisdiction. Angel's counsel joined in this request.
Social worker Marianne Cleveland testified Kenton had completed his parenting course, but had not participated in individual counseling as required by his case plan. Cleveland agreed with the ICPC recommendation against placing Angel with Kenton, expressing concerns that Kenton was caring for his elderly father, worked long hours, had physically abused Stevi, and exercised poor judgment in bringing H. into his home. Cleveland was also concerned about the layout of Kenton's house and Kenton's ability to provide child care for Angel. However, she did not discuss these concerns with Kenton. Although Cleveland believed there was a risk in placing Angel with Kenton, she declined to say it would be detrimental to Angel to be placed there.
Kenton testified he completed a parenting course, but was having difficulty finding a therapist without a referral from a doctor or the court. He would participate in individual therapy if Angel were placed with him. Family members were willing to help with child care. Kenton would obtain any assistance Angel might need for his delays.
Kenton further testified he fell in love with H. when he met her. He believed H. loved him, and then she suddenly disappeared. Kenton was unaware H. had any mental health or substance abuse problems, and did not believe she posed a threat to his family. Kenton explained he hit Stevi with a belt because she was disrespectful and disobedient. At the time, he believed this was an appropriate way to discipline a child, but he is now aware of the consequences of using corporal punishment. If Angel were placed with him, Kenton would abide by any requirement not to use corporal punishment.
After considering the evidence and hearing argument of counsel, the court found that although it shared some of Agency's concerns, there was no clear and convincing evidence of detriment to Angel if he were placed with Kenton. The court ordered Angel placed with Kenton with services, and continued H.'s services, including supervised visitation.
Several weeks later, Agency moved for reconsideration of the court's order placing Angel with Kenton after being notified the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services would not monitor a family without ICPC approval, and would not allow a California social worker to monitor the placement. In light of this information, Angel's counsel requested the court confirm its order placing Angel with Kenton and terminate its jurisdiction.
The court denied Agency's request for reconsideration, finding there was no evidence it would be detrimental to Angel to place him with Kenton and no need for the court to stay involved in the case. The court entered custody orders of joint legal custody of Angel to the parents, physical custody to Kenton and supervised visits for H. as arranged by the parents. The court then terminated its jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
I
Substantial Evidence Supports the Court's Order Granting Custody of Angel to Kenton and Terminating Its Jurisdiction
H. contends the court erred by granting custody of Angel to Kenton under section 361.2, subdivision (a) and terminating jurisdiction. She asserts: (1) the evidence showed it was detrimental to Angel to place him with Kenton; and (2) the court's procedural errors require reversal. In its respondent's brief, Agency agrees with H. that the evidence supported a finding of detriment, but urges reversal on the ground the court used an incorrect standard in making its findings.
A
Section 361.2 and Standard of Review
Under section 361.2, subdivision (a), the court must place a dependent child with a previously noncustodial parent who requests custody, unless the placement would be detrimental to the child's safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being. Because the noncustodial parent has both a constitutionally protected interest in custody and a statutory right to custody, there must be clear and convincing evidence of detriment to the child before the court can deny the noncustodial parent's request for custody. (In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 696; In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426.) Clear and convincing evidence requires a high probability of proof, meaning the evidence is so apparent that there can be no substantial doubt of the fact established. (In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1205.) Section 361.2, subdivision (a), with its heightened standard of proof, effectuates the legislative preference for placement with the previously noncustodial parent. (In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1132.) Thus, absent clear and convincing evidence that it would be detrimental to the child to be placed with the parent, the law requires placement with that parent. (§ 361.2, subd. (a); In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 169 [parenting is a fundamental right, and is disturbed only in extreme cases of persons acting in a fashion incompatible with parenthood].)
If the court places a child with the previously noncustodial parent under section 361.2, subdivision (a), it may either: (1) grant sole legal and physical custody to the noncustodial parent and terminate jurisdiction, or (2) grant custody to the noncustodial parent, but continue its jurisdiction and provide reunification services to either the offending parent, the noncustodial parent, or both parents. (§ 361.2, subd. (b); In re Austin P., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131.)
When the court's findings as to detriment and the need for continuing supervision are challenged on appeal, we consider the record favorably to the order and determine whether there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the findings by clear and convincing evidence. (In re Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1426; In re Austin P., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134.) In this regard, we may not reweigh or express an independent judgment on the evidence. (In re Laura F. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 826, 833.) Issues of fact and credibility are matters for the trial court alone. (In re Amy M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 849, 859-860; In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1177.) We must affirm the order even if other evidence supports a contrary finding. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53.) The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
B
Substantial Evidence Supports a Finding of No Detriment
H. contends the court's erroneous factual analysis of the potential detriment to Angel requires reversal. She asserts the court ignored evidence that placing Angel with Kenton would be detrimental to Angel's well-being, specifically, the ICPC report recommending against placing Angel with Kenton based on Kenton's criminal background and previous child welfare investigation. H. also relies on other evidence to support her argument the court's placement order was not in Angel's best interests, including: Kenton's use of physical punishment on his children; the domestic violence in his previous marriage and resulting restraining order; his inability to provide child care while he worked; his failure to participate in counseling; and his failure to visit Angel.
The statute requires the court find clear and convincing evidence of actual detriment, not "potential" detriment or "risk" of detriment. (§ 361.2, subd. (a).)
H.'s argument there was evidence of "enormous" detriment to Angel is nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence presented in the juvenile court and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. This we cannot do. (In re Laura F., supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 833; In re Amy M., supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at pp. 859-860.) Instead, "we must defer to the trial court's factual assessments. [Citation.] 'We review a cold record and, unlike a trial court, have no opportunity to observe the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses [or hear their testimony].' [Citation.]" (In re Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1427.)
At the time the court made its findings and order, the parties did not challenge Kenton's paternity status, and regarded Kenton as a nonoffending, noncustodial "parent" for purposes of applying section 361.2. H., who opposed having Angel placed with Kenton, did not meet her burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, the placement would be detrimental to Angel.
Although the ICPC report recommended against placing Angel with Kenton, the court was entitled to discount the negative information in the report because the evaluation and other evidence showed placement with Kenton would not be detrimental to Angel. According to Agency's report, Kenton is a stable, solid and secure father who showed a willingness to parent Angel by following his case plan and consistently communicating with Agency and Angel's caregivers. The evidence also showed Kenton was willing and able to provide a stable, appropriate home for Angel. Kenton completed parenting classes, has steady employment and supportive family members to help with child care. He is involved in raising his other children, with whom he has a strong bond.
The court was aware of the domestic violence in Kenton's previous marriage and the 1999 temporary restraining order, but reasonably found these were not circumstances rising to the level of detriment to Angel. (See In re Basilio T., supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at pp. 169-172 [where there was no evidence of direct harm to children from parents' domestic violence, children could not be removed based on parents' insufficient participation in counseling]; In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824 [although past conduct may be probative, evidence of harm must be based on current conditions].) Similarly, the court viewed Kenton's physical abuse of Stevi as an isolated incident not likely to recur. "[T]he past infliction of physical harm by a caretaker, standing alone, does not establish a substantial risk of harm; '[t]here must be some reason to believe the acts may continue in the future.' [Citations.]" (In re Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 824.) There were no other child welfare referrals in Kenton's 16 years of parenting. He agreed to refrain from using physical discipline with Angel, and the court expressly found Kenton understood corporal punishment was inappropriate, making the risk of abuse to Angel "very remote." In analyzing detriment, the court was entitled to find Kenton credible and give great weight to his testimony. (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 53.)
Significantly, the social worker declined to say it would be detrimental to Angel to be placed with Kenton. She admitted she did not investigate or follow up on the concerns outlined in the ICPC report or discuss them with Kenton, instead choosing to rely on the recommendations of the ICPC investigator. Despite its stated concerns, the ICPC report found Kenton was capable of providing adequate care for Angel. Adequate, not perfect, care is all that is required.
H. argues the court's placement order ignored Angel's best interests because he had special needs and critically needed substantial care and supervision. However, this argument is not supported in the record. Although Angel may have had some developmental delays due to his premature birth, Kenton testified he would obtain the assistance Angel might need for his delays. Any claim Kenton could not adequately care for Angel is speculative.
In the absence of a showing of detriment, Kenton was entitled to have Angel placed with him. (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) Substantial evidence supports the court's finding that placing Angel with Kenton in Illinois would not be detrimental to Angel's safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being. This finding, based on the evidence, furthered the Legislature's careful balance of interests reflected in the dependency law: to (1) protect Angel; (2) preserve the family and safeguard Kenton's fundamental right to raise his child; and (3) provide a stable, permanent home for Angel in a timely manner. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 446.)
C
The Court Properly Terminated Its Jurisdiction
Where, as here, the court does not find detriment, it may place the child with the noncustodial parent and terminate jurisdiction, or place the child in that parent's custody subject to the court's supervision and guidance. (§ 361.2, subd. (b).) Although the court initially stated its preference for ongoing supervision, it later learned supervision could only occur in Illinois, and ultimately determined Angel could safely be placed with Kenton without court oversight. Knowing Agency would have no way to further monitor the case, Angel's trial counsel nevertheless supported termination of the court's jurisdiction. Because the evidence supports a reasonable finding Kenton is willing and able to provide Angel with a safe, stable and permanent home, the court was not required to continue its jurisdiction. (In re Sarah M. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1486, 1499-1500 [jurisdiction properly terminated because minor was no longer at risk and no longer needed protection of juvenile court].)
When making a custody determination in any dependency case, the court's overriding consideration must be the minor's best interests. (In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 268; In re Nada R., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1179.) As a practical matter, we cannot ignore the passage of time as impacting Angel's best interests in permanency and stability. The result urged by H. and Agency—returning Angel to California with the hope of reunifying with H. sometime in the future, or delaying Angel's custody status for further juvenile court proceedings—would indeed be contrary to his best interests. Angel's trial and appellate counsel, consistent with their duties to advocate for Angel's best interests, take the position the court properly placed Angel with Kenton and terminated its jurisdiction.
H.'s fundamental rights have not been affected by the court's order placing Angel with Kenton, ordering joint legal custody to the parents and terminating its jurisdiction. (See In re Sarah M., supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1494.) H.'s parental rights to Angel remain intact. She and Kenton have agreed to visitation arrangements and the court's custody orders are modifiable in the family court. (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1).)
D
The Court Properly Considered Its Options Regarding Angel's Placement
Citing In re Austin P., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pages 1134-1135, H. contends the court erred by not temporarily placing Angel with Kenton before deciding whether there was a need for ongoing court supervision. She further contends the court failed to acknowledge and exercise its discretion regarding Angel's placement, believing its only option was to place Angel with Kenton without services.
In Austin P., this court clarified the two-step process the juvenile court must follow when a previously noncustodial parent requests custody under section 361.2, subdivision (a). (In re Austin P., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131.) We held that before the court may grant sole legal and physical custody to the parent, it must first decide whether temporary placement in the parent's physical custody would be detrimental to the child. If there is no showing of detriment, the court must then decide whether that placement should be permanent and whether the court's jurisdiction should be terminated. (Id. at pp. 1134-1135.)
Here, the court acknowledged its statutory obligation to place Angel with his nonoffending noncustodial parent absent a showing of detriment by clear and convincing evidence. (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) Finding no detriment, the court placed Angel with Kenton and then considered whether ongoing supervision was necessary. (§ 361.2, subd. (b).) Consistent with our holding in Austin P., the court complied with the two-step process required by section 361.2, subdivisions (a) and (b). (In re Austin P., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131.)
Although the court initially ordered continuing court supervision and services for both parents, it later learned the Illinois agency refused to provide supervision or services and the case could not be monitored in Illinois by Agency's social workers. Given these circumstances, Angel's counsel asked the court to place Angel with Kenton and terminate its jurisdiction. The court commented:
Under the ICPC, interstate monitoring of placements and services are purely voluntary on the part of the receiving state. (Fam. Code, § 7901, art. 5, subd. (b); In re Johnny S. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 969, 979.)
" . . . I think the reality is dependency court should not get involved and children should not be removed from parents unless there is substantial proof of detriment and I don't see that in this case. [¶] Am I worried? Yes. Does it look like it is perfect parenting? I don't know. I mean, the bottom line is I don't have a lot of information about this man, but he is the father of the child. I don't see at this point there is any evidence that it would be a substantial detriment to place the child with him and given that fact I don't think the court should stay involved in this case. [¶] I mean, I would prefer to keep an eye on things but, frankly, I am not sure how much of an eye we would have kept on it anyway. You know[,] other than making sure he goes to therapy and getting reports from the therapist, that would have been the extent of the eye we would have kept on this anyway. . . ."
Contrary to H.'s argument, the court did not "inexplicably" shift its position, but instead placed Angel with Kenton and terminated jurisdiction based on a reasonable finding its own supervision was not feasible or necessary. The record reflects the court was fully aware of its discretion under section 361.2, subdivision (b) and exercised that discretion by granting custody of Angel to Kenton and terminating its jurisdiction. (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1).)
E
H. Forfeited the Right to Challenge the Nature of the Proceedings
H. contends the court failed to conduct a proper six-month review hearing under sections 366 and 366.21, subdivision (e). She asserts the court was required to determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, returning Angel to her custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to him.
Preliminarily, we note H. did not raise this issue in the trial court. At the outset of the contested six-month review hearing, the court stated the issue was whether to place Angel with Kenton and terminate jurisdiction. The court then proceeded, without objection, to consider Agency's various reports, the testimony of the social worker and Kenton, and closing arguments from all counsel as to whether Agency met its burden of showing it would be detrimental to place Angel with Kenton in Illinois.
As a general rule, a parent's failure to object or raise certain issues in the juvenile court prevents the parent from claiming error on appeal. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502.) Application of the forfeiture rule, although not automatic, is designed to keep litigants from acquiescing and later seeking relief for error that could have been prevented or cured. (In re S.B., supra, at p. 1293; In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 412.) "The law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his [or her] legal rights and of calling the judge's attention to any infringement of them. If any other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be careful to be silent as to his [or her] objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the result would be that few judgments would stand the test of an appeal." (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416.)
Here, H. did not assert her right to a hearing under section 366.21, subdivision (e) to have the court decide whether to return Angel to her custody. H. did not argue, as she does now, that the evidence showed she was making sufficient progress and it was likely Angel would be returned to her care in the next six months for a 60-day trial visit. Rather, she argued the evidence supported a finding it would be detrimental to place Angel with Kenton. When the court made its finding of no detriment and ordered Angel placed with Kenton, H. did not object to the improper nature of the proceedings. By her silence and acquiescence, H. has forfeited her right to claim error on appeal. (In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1339.)
We note Agency did not recommend the court return Angel to H.'s custody at the six-month review hearing.
In any event, the court properly proceeded under section 361.2, subdivisions (a) and (b). Although section 361.2, by its terms, applies at disposition when the court removes a minor from parental custody, its procedures can be invoked at the six-month and 12-month review hearings. (In re Janee W. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1451.) Because Kenton was a previously noncustodial parent willing and able to immediately assume custody of Angel, and none of the parties challenged Kenton's paternity status, the court's inquiry at the six-month hearing was properly limited to deciding whether it was detrimental to Angel to place him with Kenton and whether to terminate jurisdiction.
F
Agency Forfeited the Right to Challenge the Standard and Burden of Proof Applied By the Court to Make its Placement Decision
Agency generally agrees with H. that the evidence supported a finding of detriment to Angel if placed with Kenton, but claims the court used the wrong standard of proof in making its placement decision. According to Agency, instead of requiring proof of detriment by clear and convincing evidence under section 361.2, subdivision (a), the court should have considered whether Kenton, as a mere biological father, met his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, it was in Angel's best interests to be placed with him. Agency concedes it did not bring the proper standard to the juvenile court's attention, but nevertheless asks us to exercise our discretion to consider the issue.
As we previously discussed, a party who fails to assert a right in a timely manner ordinarily forfeits the ability to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal. (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) Similarly, a party may not assert new theories on appeal that were not raised in the trial court. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 222.) The purpose of these rules "is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected." (Ibid.; In re Cheryl E. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 587, 603 [a party cannot successfully complain because the trial court did not do something it was not asked to do].) Failure to enforce the forfeiture rule is manifestly unfair to the adverse party and the court because it would permit a party to deliberately remain silent and allow the proceedings to reach a conclusion in which the party could acquiesce if favorable and avoid if unfavorable. (In re Riva M., supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 412; see also In re Kevin S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 882, 885-886 [appellant forfeited right to challenge court's order setting a selection and implementation hearing by not properly raising the issue in the juvenile court].)
Although we have discretion to excuse forfeiture, we exercise that discretion rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue. (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) This is especially true in dependency proceedings where "considerations such as permanency and stability are of paramount importance." (Ibid.)
The issue litigated in the trial court, with the concurrence of all parties, was whether to place Angel with Kenton and terminate jurisdiction under section 361.2, subdivisions (a) and (b). The court clearly stated it was making its findings by clear and convincing evidence. By not objecting, Agency has forfeited the right to argue the court erred by placing the burden on the wrong party and applying the wrong standard.
Agency's failure to argue in the trial court that Kenton was a mere biological father not entitled to custody under section 361.2 deprived the court of the ability to evaluate the critical facts and make the necessary findings regarding Kenton's paternity status. It also deprives us of a sufficient factual record from which to determine the propriety of the trial court's ruling under the standards Agency now claims should have been applied. (See In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 403.) Thus, we decline to exercise our discretion to decide Agency's forfeited claim.
Because the issue of whether a biological, rather than presumed, father is a "parent" entitled to custody under section 361.2, subdivision (a) is not squarely before us, we decline to address it.
In any event, Angel, who is not quite two years old, has lived with his biological father, siblings and extended family members for nearly one year. Reversing the court's order to allow the parties an opportunity to relitigate the issues under a different standard and burden of proof, with the unlikely result of a different outcome, would not serve Angel's best interests.
II
H. Acquiesced to the Court's Custody Orders
H. contends the court's custody orders are incomplete and improper because various forms are not attached to the orders or included in the record on appeal, and there are no parameters or additional information regarding her visitation. H. asks that we remand the matter for review and revision of these orders.
Before the court made its custody orders for joint legal custody of Angel to the parents, physical custody to Kenton and supervised visits for H., H.'s counsel reviewed the proposed orders with her and she agreed to all the specific provisions. By acquiescing, she has forfeited her right to complain about them on appeal. (In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1339.)
Further, the court's order provided for supervised visits for H. as arranged by the parents. H. and Kenton were in the courtroom and there was extensive discussion between them about the orders. If, in the future, the specifics of the visitation order come into dispute, the parents can challenge them in the family court.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, J., NARES, J.