Opinion
F04CP13009990C
04-28-2017
In re Andrihanna, J
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Honorable James P. Ginocchio, J.
The Department of Children and Families (DCF) has filed a petition to Terminate the Parental Rights (TPR) of respondent mother, Ninouska B. (Ms. B.), and respondent father, Andre J. (Mr. J.), father of Andrihanna J. (Andrihanna), who was born on October 31, 2013. The respondents were never married to each other. Both respondents were properly served and the court has jurisdiction.
Pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B), the petitioner alleged that Andrihanna was previously adjudicated as a neglected child and that Ms. B. has failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, she could assume a responsible position in the life of the child, that pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A), the child had been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child and that, pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D), there is no ongoing parent/child relationship with respect to the mother that ordinarily develops as a result of the parent having met on a continuing day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or re-establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child.
As to the father Mr. J., the petitioner alleged that, pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A), the child had been abandoned by the father in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child and that, pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D), there is no ongoing parent-child relationship which means a relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of the parent having met on a day-to-day basis, the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or re-establishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child.
A trial was held before the undersigned on November 16 and 17, 2016 and January 24, 2017. The petitioner was represented by the assistant attorney general. A court-appointed attorney appeared for the minor child, Andrihanna. A court-appointed attorney also appeared on behalf of both the mother and the father who were present during the entire trial.
The court heard testimony from various witnesses including, Collen Bush, DCF Social Worker, Elisangela Silva, DCF Social Worker, Manuela Perez, DCF Social Worker, Andrea A., maternal aunt, Vanessa P., paternal grandmother, Dr. Derek Franklin, Psy. D., Ms. B., respondent mother and Mr. J., respondent father.
Lists of Exhibits: Petitioner's Exhibit (1a)--Mother's Specific Steps 12/6/13, Petitioner's Exhibit (1b)--Mother's Specific Steps 1/24/14, Petitioner's Exhibit (1c)--Mother's Specific Steps 4/23/14, Petitioner's Exhibit (1d)--Mother's Specific Steps 7/16/14, Petitioner's Exhibit (2)--Father's Specific Steps 4/23/14, Petitioner's Exhibit (3)--Wellmore Client Program Report--11/15/13 to 2/27/14, Petitioner's Exhibit (4)--Wellmore Psychiatric Evaluation 1/17/14, Petitioner's Exhibit (5)--Psychiatric Report/Dr. Franklin dated 4/26/16, Petitioner's Exhibit (6)--Wellmore Adult Diagnostic Evaluation dated 11/5/13, Petitioner's Exhibit (7)--Wellmore Adult Discharge Summary dated 11/5/13, Petitioner's Exhibit (8)--Wellmore Treatment Service Plan, Petitioner's Exhibit (9)--TPR Social Study dated 3/17/15, Petitioner's Exhibit (13)--Addendum TPR Study dated 8/22/16, Petitioner's Exhibit (14)--Memorandum Of Hearing at Waterbury dated 5/2/14, Petitioner's Exhibit (15)--Stipulation of Facts dated 11/16/16, Petitioner's Exhibit (16)--Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 11/16/16, Petitioner's Exhibit (17)--DCF Narrative dated 11/6/13, Petitioner's Exhibit (18)--DCF Narrative dated 1/26/14, Petitioner's Exhibit (19)--DCF Narrative dated 12/3/14, Petitioner's Exhibit (20)--DCF Narrative dated 3/5/14 and Petitioner's Exhibit (21)--DCF Narrative dated 4/14/15 and 4/28/15.
Respondent Mother's Exhibit (1)--Picture of Child's bedroom in Georgia, Respondent Mother's Exhibit (2)--West Georgia Star Letter dated 11/10/16, Respondent Mother's Exhibit (3)--Bethany Christian Services Home Evaluation approval date 12/7/15, Respondent Mother's Exhibit (4)--Bridgeport Social Services letter dated 10/19/2012, Respondent Mother's Exhibit (5)--Horizons Certificate dated 5/29/12. Respondent Mother's Exhibit (6)--Strive Fairfield County Certificate dated 8/20/10, Respondent Mother's Exhibit (7)--Center for Women/Families Certificate dated 10/4/2007, Respondent Mother's Exhibit (8)--Respondent Mother's drug test and Respondent Mother's Exhibit (9)--photograph of parents and three children.
Adjudication
The hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases; adjudication and disposition. In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether the statutory ground for termination of parental rights exists by clear and convincing evidence. In re Pascacio R., 52 Conn.App. 106, 109, 726 A.2d 114 (1999). In making the adjudicatory determination, the court is limited to considering events preceding the filing of the termination petition or the latest amendment. In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 367, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995). In this case the petition for termination of parental rights was filed on March 25, 2015. It includes Ground B1, Ground A and Ground D.
The court reviewed the many documents entered into evidence. After considering all of the testimony and documentary evidence presented and having the opportunity to observe the witnesses, their demeanor on the stand, and evaluate their testimony with all other testimony, the court makes the following findings of fact by clear and convincing evidence.
Ground B1
Based upon the foregoing, this court finds that Andrihanna has been found in a prior proceeding on December 6, 2014, to have been neglected and the mother has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, she could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).
DCF has alleged as a ground for termination that respondent mother failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that she could assume a responsible position in the neglected child's life within a reasonable time. In ruling on this allegation, the court is required to consider the age and needs of the child. C.G.S. 17a-112(j)(3)(B). " Personal rehabilitation . . . refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent [and] requires the court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child." In Re Dylan C., 126 Conn.App. 71, 88, 10 A.3d 100 (2011), citing In Re Trevon G., 109 Conn.App. 782, 789, 952 A.2d 1280 (2008). In order to meet its burden of proof with respect to such an allegation, the petitioner must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent's level of rehabilitation " . . . falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date she can assume a responsible position in her child's life." (Internal quotation marks and internal citations omitted.) In Re Dylan C., Id.
In cases where the parents have made efforts to rehabilitate, courts have found that such efforts speak to the parent's own conduct and not the best interests of the child. In Re Daniel A., Jr., 150 Conn.App. 78, 89 A.3d 1040 (2014). Courts have found that despite a conviction that a parent sincerely intends to make positive strides, there was a greater conviction that it is not in the child's best interest to delay permanency to see if a parent can achieve rehabilitation sufficient to care for the child and that a delay in permanency could be damaging to a child's emotional health and development. In Re Daniel A., Jr., 150 Conn.App. 78, 89 A.3d 1040 (2014). " [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child [or children] at issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In Re Kasmaesha C., 148 Conn.App. 666, 680, 84 A.3d 1279, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 937, 88 A.3d 549 (2014). In In Re Adriana C., 153 Conn.App. 683, 103 A.3d 173 (2014), the court found that any reunification of the parent with the child constituted too large a risk for failure, with the potential for irreparable harm to the children, with little to no potential net gain for the children. In addition, the court found that the parent/child bond that presently exists between the children and the parent is overshadowed by the emotional bond and stability the children now enjoy with their foster family, and although the parent had made significant and substantial personal strides towards rehabilitation, her accomplishments did not include stable housing. The court found that in terms of the children's needs and best interests, the parent's accomplishments were " too little, too late."
DCF became involved with the mother in August 2007 due to child protection concerns, substance abuse, unaddressed mental health, inadequate parenting, unstable income, housing issues and physical neglect. (Petitioner's Exhibit 9, sec. 5.)
The evidence at trial established that Ms. B., who is 29 years old, had an extensive history of substance abuse. Ms. B. gave birth to a son, Michael, who tested positive for drugs. In 2011, the mother admitted to a DCF social worker that she was using PCP daily while the child was in her care. At that time, DCF attempted to assist the mother by making referrals for substance abuse evaluations and subsequent treatment. Mother was referred to Connecticut Renaissance and unsuccessfully discharged for non-compliance. After mother's discharge from Connecticut Renaissance, it was recommended that she attend an inpatient program. Instead, mother attended Southwest Community Healthcare Center on an outpatient basis. She continued to use illicit drugs. Once again it was recommended that mother attend an inpatient program. In 2012, she was evaluated by Crossroads, Inc., however, Crossroads would not accept her because they stated she needed a higher level of care. DCF informed mother that she should still cooperate with intensive outpatient treatment. Mother attended sporadically and continued to use illicit drugs.
In March 2012, the mother was referred to and accepted into Connecticut Valley Hospital (CVH) for inpatient care. In April, the mother left CVH against staff advice. Mother explained that she was having difficulty with other patients and she was not receiving visits with her son, Michael.
In May 2012, mother was referred to Horizons, a 30-day inpatient program. Mother left two days prior to the completion of the program, however, it was considered to be a successful completion. Mother was then referred to intensive outpatient treatment at Liberations. She did not complete the outpatient treatment and relapsed.
In June 2012, DCF closed the mother's case. Mother did not want to participate in any more services. DCF still attempted to convince mother to get help if she wanted to have her son, Michael, returned to her. Her priority at the time was finding a job and housing. She claimed that she could handle her drug problem on her own.
In August 2012, mother agreed to undergo evaluation by Southwest Community Health Center. She had tested positive for PCP. It was recommended that she attend inpatient treatment. Mother was not receptive to that plan. (See also Petitioner's Exhibit 9, sec. 11.)
In November 2012, mother's case was transferred. On June 4, 2013, the respondent mother agreed to transfer the guardianship of Andrihanna's half-brother, Michael C., to his paternal grandmother and grandfather. (Petitioner's Exhibit 15, p. 1.) In October 2013, DCF closed Michael's case.
In June 2013, mother was admitted to the Morris Foundation for inpatient treatment. DCF provided transportation for the mother. After a few days, mother left the program and moved in with Mr. J. who resided in Bridgeport.
On October 31, 2013, respondent mother gave birth to Andrihanna in Bridgeport, Connecticut. Andrihanna tested positive for illegal substances, and experienced withdrawals. (Id. at 1.)
Respondent father moved to the State of Georgia prior to Andrihanna's birth where he continues to reside today. (Id. at 1.)
On November 4, 2013, the respondent mother admitted herself to the Wellmore Inpatient Substance Abuse Treatment Program. On November 14, 2013, DCF placed Andrihanna with her maternal aunt, Andrea A. Respondent mother continued to remain and progress in the Wellmore Inpatient Treatment Program. As a result, on January 24, 2014, Andrihanna was placed, while still committed to the DCF, with respondent mother in said in-patient program. (Id. at 1.)
On or about April 22, 2014, respondent mother disclosed to DCF that she relapsed on PCP while caring for Andrihanna. On April 22, 2014, Andrihanna was removed from the respondent mother's care for a second time pursuant to an Order of Temporary Custody. Again DCF placed Andrihanna with maternal aunt, Andrea A. On April 23, 2014, DCF had to remove Andrihanna from the aunt due to an impending DCF investigation for domestic violence involving the aunt. On April 30, 2014, DCF and respondent mother agreed that she would visit Andrihanna two (2) times per week for two (2) hours each visit. On May 5, 2014, respondent mother appeared at the DCF office reporting that she had used PCP the previous three (3) days and requested to return to the Liberation Substance Abuse Program.
On June 13, 2014, DCF referred the respondent mother to Southwest Community Healthcare Center for an evaluation to determine the level of treatment that she required, but mother did not attend.
On June 25, 2014, DCF referred respondent mother to the Regional Network Substance Abuse Program for an assessment to determine the level of care she required, but respondent mother never attended the assessment. (Id. at 2.)
On July 17, 2014, the DCF again placed Andrihanna with maternal aunt, Andrea A. (Id. at 2.) On November 4, 2014, the maternal aunt, Andrea A., was hospitalized due to a drug overdose. As a result, Andrihanna was removed from said relative foster care placement and placed in a non-relative foster home where she continues to reside today. (Id. at 3.)
On or about May 29, 2014, to September 8, 2014, the respondent mother's whereabouts were unknown to DCF. (Id. at 3.)
On. September 8, 2014, DCF received a call from respondent mother advising them that she resided in the State of Georgia with respondent father, Mr. J., and she was to begin a factory job. (Id. at 2.)
On October 3, 2014, respondent mother's attorney, Juliana Romano, reported to DCF that respondent mother was employed at Direct TV. Attorney Romano had a copy of respondent mother's drug screen required by the employer. The drug test was negative for illicit substances. (Id. at 2-3.)
On November 13, 2014, respondent mother reported to DCF that she and the respondent father were employed, that she had become a Christian, and was free from illicit drugs. (Id. at 3.) During that time and pursuant to DCF records, respondent mother visited Andrihanna once. Respondent mother further reported that she did not require treatment as she was remaining free from illicit drugs on her own. (Id. at 3.)
On or about December 3, 2014, the DCF sent a letter to the respondent mother with a list of service providers that offered substance abuse treatment in the area where she resided in the State of Georgia. (Id. at 3.)
Respondent mother stated that at this time she was unable to participate in any services as she has been given an offer to participate in a job training program in phlebotomy as part of her requirement for housing. Her priority at the time was employment.
From the months of April 2016 to June 2016, Ms. B. participated in life skills classes, effective communication skills, financial management, spiritual well-being, sexual assault awareness, and social relationships, etiquette and job readiness as part of a requirement to maintain her subsidized housing at LaGrange, Georgia. In February 2016, the social worker visited the respondent's residence. The home has three bedrooms and was deemed appropriate. (Respondent Mother's Exhibits, 1 through 7.)
Respondent mother should be commended for all of her recent achievements, her participation in the various programs and her numerous certificates of recognition. However, in spite of her current achievements and progress, the court is left with the difficult and challenging task of determining whether or not she has achieved such a degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, she could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. C.G.S. § 17a-112.
In order to make an informed decision, the court must fully consider the respondent mother's history with regard to substance abuse and mental health issues.
From 2011 to 2014, DCF made numerous referrals to the respondent mother for ongoing substance abuse problems. Ms. B. was referred to and entered into approximately six to eight substance abuse programs. All of which ended in little or no success. During that four-year period, she continued to relapse and use PCP. Her track history for substance abuse treatment in Connecticut could best be described as abysmal.
Now, the respondent mother is asking the court to accept her assurances that she has successfully overcome her serious drug addiction by the simple act of moving to another state, finding religion and receiving several certificates within a 3-month period of time. These assurances come from a mother who gave birth to two children born with PCP in their systems, both experiencing withdrawal symptoms.
Respondent mother also wants the court to rely on the following information: copies of respondent mother's drug screens (dated October 3, 2014 and December 3, 2014) that were required by respondent mother's employer which were negative for illicit substances. Negative test results dated 9/6/14, 10/23/14, 2/11/15, (hair) 8/8/16 and 10/4/16. (Petitioner's Exhibit 16, p. 2.) The respondent mother's completion of a Troup County (Georgia) outpatient evaluation on September 30, 2016, which recommended no treatment and a return visit in three months and her evaluation at a facility identified as " Pathways" where a doctor there told her that she didn't need therapy or medication. (Id. at 1.)
As positive as that information may sound, the court is not persuaded that the respondent mother's substance abuse and mental health issues are permanently resolved. Instead, the court gives greater weight to the testimony and findings of Dr. Derek Franklin as they relate to the respondent mother's overall personality and substance abuse issues.
Dr. Franklin testified that respondent mother suffers from an unspecified mood disorder with features that include a general malaise and chronic depressive state. Her personality assessment features a rigid thought process, a strong need to blame others for her misfortunes, and a lack of insight as to how her actions have affected others. Dr. Franklin did not agree with the conclusion and recommendations from the Troup County Georgia Mental Health Center.
He testified that his concern was that the mother's history of cyclical PCP use was an indication that respondent mother attempted to unsuccessfully manage her mood while not addressing the PCP usage. In his opinion, she needed to do both at the same time. Dr. Franklin recommended Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT). Dialectical Behavior Therapy is an attempt to help the client understand how their behavior and moods impact negatively on events around them. That form of therapy usually requires a minimum of one year to show significant progress.
With regard to substance abuse, Dr. Franklin, in his evaluation dated March 2016, noted that the mother's substance abuse history includes PCP and cannabis. The mother used PCP to manage her mood disorder. Respondent mother claimed she has been clean and sober for a two-year period, however, with regard to PCP use, Dr. Franklin testified that PCP users can go for long periods of time before another relapse occurs.
It is also noteworthy that mother submitted a drug screen from the State of Georgia dated 12/5/16 which indicated negative findings for several illegal substances, however, the box indicating PCP use, the drug that has been the source of respondent mother's addiction, was left unchecked. The respondent mother testified that that particular test was too expensive and she could not afford the seventy (70) dollar payment. (Respondent Mother's Exhibit 8.)
When Ms. B. testified at trial, she blamed the court system, DCF, and the treatment providers in the State of Connecticut for her lack of success. She testified that the treatment provider in the State of Georgia, who after a cursory intake, recommended no further treatment, was more knowledgeable and more qualified than Dr. Franklin. It is important to note that Dr. Franklin has been conducting forensic interviews for over 30 years and all counsel of record stipulated to his credentials and qualifications.
In his report Dr. Franklin stated:
Results from the PA I and SA SS 1-3 are indicative of an intermittent but serious substance abuse problem. Because Ms. B. may achieve secondary gains from substance abuse; short-term remediation of depression, she is likely to be poorly motivated for treatment without intensive supervision. Moreover, despite past recommendations for intensive treatment, she has been resistant. It is recommended that Ms. B. be referred for inpatient substance abuse treatment. Upon successful treatment, she would be encouraged to participate in community-based AA meetings as well as obtain a sponsor to help her appropriately navigate the potential problems associated with maintaining sobriety. (Petitioner's Exhibit 5, p. 20.) Ms. B. does not have a fully developed understanding of the potential negative impact her drug abuse could have had on her daughter because she continues to be in denial about the severity of her problem. (Id. at 22.)
The evidence at trial established that Andrihanna is now 3 years old. She has been out of her mother's care for most of her life. She has been in foster placements for more than two years, and was adjudicated as a neglected child by the court on December 6, 2013. Andrihanna needs a stable and permanent home.
The evidence at trial established that mother required substance abuse treatment and counseling at the time the child left her care in 2013. Ms. B. has not engaged in any meaningful long-term substance abuse program recommended and offered by DCF, and she did not offer any proof at trial that she had otherwise engaged in any meaningful effort to rehabilitate herself with regard to these issues.
Dr. Franklin goes on to state:
Ms. B. has not successfully engaged in or completed service recommendations since 2012 and additional time will be required for her to achieve her treatment goals . . . as well as establishing a positive relationship where none previously existed. Attachment theory suggests that allowing for more time for the establishment of a parent/child relationship would be detrimental because Andrihanna is emotionally attached to her current caregivers. Emotional bonding is significantly enhanced when the child is in the immediate care of the caregiver and its absence can result in the development of serious psychological and behavioral problems. Allowing more time for the establishment of the parent/child relationship between Mr. B., Mr. J., and Andrihanna is not recommended. (Id. at 24.)
Given Andrihanna's age and need for permanency, the length of time that she has already spent in foster placements, the mother's history of failed participation in multiple substance abuse programs and the nature of her other rehabilitative efforts to date, which the court finds to be insufficient, the court finds that the respondent will not be able to parent Andrihanna within a reasonable period of time. With respect to Andrihanna, the court finds that DCF has proven the alleged adjudicatory ground of parental failure to rehabilitate by clear and convincing evidence.
Ground A and D
DCF also alleged the two additional statutory grounds of abandonment and lack of ongoing parent-child relationship in the termination petition which it filed concerning respondent mother.
As defined in the statute, abandonment means " . . . that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child." C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A). By statute, no ongoing parent-child relationship means " . . . the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child . . ." C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). In determining that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the court is also required by statute to make a finding that " . . . to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child." Id.
The respondent mother was involved with DCF since 2007. DCF has provided her with multiple services for the past eight years and she has failed to demonstrate that she can be a full-time parent to her child. Mother has a history of a transient lifestyle, unaddressed substance abuse and mental health issues. This child has been in the foster care system for most of her life due to her mother's inability to meet her own needs and to provide a safe environment for her child. (Petitioner's Exhibit 9, p. 9.)
Despite all the above cited issues with regard to the respondent mother, her relapses, and subsequent removals of Andrihanna, DCF encouraged and permitted visitation with Andrihanna. On April 30, 2014, DCF and respondent mother agreed that she would visit Andrihanna two (2) times a week for two (2) hours each visit. On May 5, 2014, respondent mother appeared at the DCF office reporting that she had used PCP the previous three (3) days and requested to return to the Liberation Substance Abuse Program. The respondent mother never followed up on the referrals and did not consistently visit her child. Moreover, from May 29, 2014, to September 8, 2014, the respondent mother's whereabouts were unknown.
Before leaving the State of Connecticut, the mother's visits with her daughter could best be described as sporadic and from the time DCF lost contact with the mother sometime in the spring of 2014, mother did not maintain contact with the DCF. Contact with DCF was finally made on September 8, 2014, when the respondent mother called DCF to inform them of her relocation to the State of Georgia.
There was no credible testimony produced at trial that respondent mother provided regular financial or emotional support for her daughter since she came into DCF care on April 23, 2014. The respondent mother has not sent any cards, gifts, or letters to Andrihanna.
Despite respondent mother's relocation to the State of Georgia and her lack of consistent visitation with her daughter while living in the State of Connecticut, DCF took extraordinary steps to arrange interstate visitation between mother and daughter.
On September 24, 2015, a visitation plan was developed in court for Ms. B. and Mr. J. to visit their child once a month. In October 2015, DCF assumed the financial costs for the transportation including purchasing round-trip bus/plane tickets, and bus tokens. Respondent mother traveled to the State of Connecticut to visit Andrihanna on the following dates, 8/24/2015, 8/31/2015, 9/15/2015, 10/29/2015, 3/28/2016, 6/28/2016 and 8/26/2016. (Petitioner's Exhibit 15, p. 5.)
From 8/1/2014 to date, DCF offered the respondent mother a total of 27 visits. Respondent mother visited Andrihanna nine (9) times excluding the overnight visits that occurred on 2/2/2016 and 2/3/2016. (Id. at 5.)
From 2/1/16 to 2/3/16, DCF brought the child to LaGrange, Georgia. DCF worked with the parents to establish dates of the visits to ensure that father would be off from work and be able to participate in the visits which would include an overnight unsupervised visit. The child, accompanied by two social workers, arrived in LaGrange on 2/1/16. On 2/1/16, the child had a supervised visit with the mother. Ms. B. informed this worker that Mr. J. was not going to be part of the visit with his daughter because he was working until 8 p.m. despite previously informing the social worker that he would be off from work. Prior to leaving the family home at the end of the visit on 2/1/16, the social worker informed Ms. B. that on the following day, Andrihanna was going to be spending the entire day and night with the family unsupervised and that she should be prepared with all supplies needed. Ms. B did not request for any supplies be provided for the visit. (Petitioner's Exhibit 13, p. 3.)
On 2/2/16, when the social worker arrived at the family home for the visit, the social worker asked Ms. B. if she had everything she needed for the child. At that time she reported that she did not have diapers for the child. The social worker questioned why mother previously stated she was ready for the child to stay overnight. Ms. B. stated that she would simply use her infant son's diapers as he wears size 5 diapers, which is the same size as Andrihanna. The social worker noted that when Andrihanna arrived, Ms. B. did not show affection towards Andrihanna or give her any kisses or hugs. She asked Andrihanna to kiss her baby brother, which Andrihanna was very happy to do. (Id. at 3.)
On 2/3/16, the social worker contacted Ms. B. in the morning to inform her that she was going to pick up Andrihanna around 9:30 am. Ms. B. reported that Andrihanna refused to eat the night before and that Andrihanna had hit her in the hand when she placed the plate of rice in front of her. Ms. B. reported that Andrihanna started to scream and cry very loud. Ms. B. was afraid that the neighbor was going to complain. She stated that she told Andrihanna if she would stop crying that she would give her the pacifier that she had taken away from the child earlier in the day. She reported that she had to put Andrihanna in a timeout. The social worker explained to Ms. B. that Andrihanna is only two years old and it is not uncommon for a child her age to have tantrums when they feel frustrated. The social worker also tried to re-explain to mother that Andrihanna is sensitive to textures and cannot tolerate certain food textures. Ms. B. stated she was not going to let her child act that way and waste food. The social worker explained to her that the Birth to Three Program provides services to Andrihanna to assist with the difficulties she has with food textures and improving her ability to eat without issues. Ms. B. stated that it is wrong that the foster mother is teaching Andrihanna to waste food and she needs to learn to not waste food. Ms. B. reported that Andrihanna slept all night and she ate the pancakes that Mr. J. made in the morning for breakfast with no issues. Upon leaving her parents' home, Andrihanna did not want to give her parents a hug or kiss, however, with the social worker's encouragement she did give Ms. B. a hug but she refused to kiss or hug Mr. J. (Id. at 4.)
While waiting in the airport, Andrihanna verbalized to this writer that " my Nina" which is what she calls Ms. B. was screaming at her and put her in a timeout. Andrihanna was very animated when explaining this, motioning with her hands up in the air. On 2/4/16, the foster mother reported to the social worker that Andrihanna had said that mommy put her in timeout, she had put her pacifier in the garbage and had given her a " pow pow on the hand." (Id. at 4.)
Due to the fact that visits to the family home were not positive for the child, DCF filed a motion for psychological evaluation and parent/child interactional which was granted by the court. Dr. Derek Franklin evaluated all parties on 3/28/16, 3/29/16, and 3/30/16. (Petitioner's Exhibit 13, p. 4.)
At the trial, Dr. Franklin testified that taking the child's pacifier and throwing it away was a part of the diagnostic criteria with regards to the mother's impulsivity. Also, he expressed concerns with regard to his observations during the visit between the mother and daughter. He testified that Andrihanna was fearful of her mother and did not want to be left alone with her. He testified that she was hysterical and having a fit, that he was actually concerned about her personal safety. The child eventually calmed down and Ms. B. did engage appropriately with her daughter.
In his evaluation, Dr. Franklin stated:
While it was clear that Andrihanna recognizes Ms. B. as an important figure and refers to her as " mommy, " her interactions can best be interpreted as guarded. Ms. B. also appeared to be a bit reserved, which may have been an artifact of the observation process. Mother would occasionally comment on Andrihanna's performance and it was clear, sensing her daughter's emotional distance, that she struggled to connect with Andrihanna. (Petitioner's Exhibit 5, p. 17.) While Andrihanna refers to Ms. B. as " mommy, " there is no overt evidence of personal attributes often associated with parent/child relationship. (Id. at 24.) Because Andrihanna has been in the direct care of her foster parent for over a year, it is likely that she has imbued in Ms. R. attributes typically associated with a primary caregiver/parent and has developed an emotional attachment. Ms. B. continues to present with an unsuccessfully remediated mood disorder and is vulnerable to drug relapse. The additional demands of parenting another child would be viewed as an additional source of stress and anxiety. (Id. at 24.) Attachment theory suggests that allowing for more time for the establishment of a parent/child relationship would be detrimental because Andrihanna is emotionally attached to her current caregivers. Emotional bonding is significantly enhanced when the child is in the immediate care of the caregiver and its absence can result in the development of serious psychological and behavioral problems. Allowing more time for the establishment of the parent/child relationship between Mr. B., Mr. J., and Andrihanna is not recommended. (Id. at 24.)
Dr. Franklin concluded that:
Based upon information from self-report, review of DCF documents, review of the court order and utilization of standardized measures, the examiner is not of the opinion that Ms. B. is capable at this time of independently caring for the emotional, physical and psychological needs of Andrihanna. Moreover, Andrihanna has no memory or positive recollection of either Mr. J. or Ms. B. and is emotionally bonded with her foster parent Ms. R. Therefore, allowing more time would only strengthen her bond with the foster parent. Moreover, there is no evidence to otherwise support removal of Andrihanna from her current caregiver and the examiner does not support such a change. (Id. at 23.)
Because Andrihanna has experienced two disruptions with her biological mother and has spent the better part of her life in foster care, it can safely be presumed that she is emotionally bonded with her foster parent, confirmed by the results from the interactive assessment. The additional time required to potentially establish a relationship with her biological parents would create undue emotional and psychological hardship for Andrihanna and a transfer of guardianship at this late stage may result in her exhibiting emotional problems. (Id. at 23.)
The child has been in foster care for more than two years, and needs a permanent and stable home. Based on the forgoing evidence, the court finds that DCF has proven clearly and convincingly that Ms. B. abandoned Andrihanna, and lacks an on-going parent-child relationship with her, as alleged in the termination petition.
DCF also alleged the two statutory grounds of abandonment and lack of ongoing parent-child relationship as to the respondent father Mr. J. in the termination petition which it filed concerning Andrihanna.
Clear and convincing evidence at trial proved that Andre J. moved from the State of Connecticut to the State of Georgia before his daughter was born on October 31, 2013. Before moving and before the birth of Andrihanna, Mr. J. called the DCF hotline to report that the respondent mother was actively using PCP and was six months pregnant.
Approximately one month after the birth of Andrihanna, DCF attempted to call to the respondent father in the State of Georgia. DCF had information that the mother and the father were living together in Bridgeport before Andrihanna's birth; that they were in a dating relationship; that the two had known each other for twelve (12) years and that mother had stated that Mr. J. was the father. Mother used his last name on the baby's birth certificate. DCF wanted to know what his plans were as to his daughter, they wanted to inform him that Andrihanna was in DCF care and determine whether he wanted to be a part of her life.
A man answered the phone and stated to the worker that she had the wrong number. It was later testified to at trial that it was indeed Mr. J. who answered the phone. He claimed that he was the one who hung up and further claimed that he was afraid to get involved.
In January 2014, DCF made contact with Mr. J., the putative father, with regard to Andrihanna. During that conversation father never denied being the child's father, never questioned paternity. During that conversation, he never asked about the well-being of the child or requested visitation.
On February 26, 2014, DCF informed putative father, Mr. J., that there was going to be a court hearing regarding Andrihanna to which he was named a party. During that conversation, respondent father never questioned paternity. The worker involved memorialized the following conversation:
Mr. J. asked what does he need to do to get his daughter in his care and he was asked if he plans on coming to Connecticut anytime soon. Mr. J. reported he plans to come to Connecticut from March 21 to March 25, 2014, and would like visitation with Andrihanna. He was informed to contact the Department so visitation can be arranged. Mr. J. was informed he should appear in court so he can get legal representation. Paternity will also need to be established and from there the Department will provide him with the services needed to assist him in caring for Andrihanna. Mr. J. was asked if he had an address that he would like to provide to the Department. He reported that he did and he provided that address to the Department. (Petitioner's exhibit 18.)
Respondent father did not visit his daughter in March of 2014 and he was defaulted for failure to appear at the court hearing.
The father, Mr. J., failed to make himself available to DCF until May 2015. On May 30, 2015, the mother filed a motion for paternity test as Mr. J. did not acknowledge paternity nor was his name on the child's birth certificate.
On June 23, 2015, a DNA test was completed and it was confirmed that Mr. J. was the biological father of Andrihanna. (Petitioner's Exhibit 13, p. 2.)
On September 24, 2015, a visitation plan was developed in court for mother and father to visit their child once a month. In October 2015, DCF assumed the financial cost for the transportation by purchasing round-trip bus/plane tickets, and bus tokens.
Since October 2015, the respondent father traveled to visit Andrihanna in the State of Connecticut on the following dates: 10/29/2015, 12/17/2015, 3/28/2016, 6/28/2016, and 8/26/2016. (Petitioner's Exhibit 15, p. 5.)
Furthermore, DCF made efforts toward reunification by offering increased visitation for the parents in order for them to establish a bond with their daughter. From 2/1/16 to 2/3/16, DCF brought the child to LaGrange, Georgia. (Id. at 5.)
Due to the father's lack of involvement with his daughter and the fact that the visit to the family home was not positive for the child, DCF filed a motion for psychological evaluation and parent/child interactional which was granted by the court.
Dr. Derek Franklin evaluated all parties on 3/28/16, 3/29/16, and 3/30/16. (Id. at 3.)
Dr. Franklin testified that Andrihanna does not regard Andre J. as a parental figure. Moreover, Andrihanna has no memory or positive recollection of either Mr. J or Ms. B. and is emotionally bonded with her foster parent Ms. R.
In his evaluation he stated:
Attachment theory suggests that allowing for more time for the establishment of a parent/child relationship would be detrimental because Andrihanna is emotionally attached to her current caregivers. Emotional bonding is significantly enhanced when the child is in the immediate care of the caregiver and its absence can result in the development of serious psychological and behavioral problems. Allowing more time for the establishment of the parent/child relationship between Mr. B., Mr. J., and Andrihanna is not recommended. (Petitioner's Exhibit 5, p. 24.) Therefore, allowing more time would only strengthen her bond with the foster parent. Moreover, there is no evidence to otherwise support removal of Andrihanna from her current caregiver, and the examiner does not support such a change. Based on the examiner's observations and record review, it is unlikely that the child has positive memories of her time with Ms. B. and certainly no recollection of a history with Mr. J. (Id. at 24.)
The biological father has not consistently visited the child since October 15, 2015, and despite being told by respondent mother that he was the father before paternity was officially established, he had no contact or concern for the well-being of his daughter the entire time that she has been in foster placement. There is no credible testimony that the father sent gifts, cards or anything.
It was clear from the respondent father's testimony at trial that he never denied being the father of Andrihanna, and more importantly, it is clear he never took a proactive role in establishing paternity and beginning reunification efforts with his daughter at a much earlier date. He was in a relationship with the respondent mother before Andrihanna was born and he was aware that respondent mother was pregnant. In fact, he took it upon himself to notify the DCF hotline that the mother was using PCP during her pregnancy. He was named as the putative father in the neglect petition and in January 2014, and he was defaulted for his failure to appear on the initial plea date.
Instead of returning to the State of Connecticut and making sure his child's needs were met, he remained in the State of Georgia and chose to remain in a state of convenient denial with regard to the paternity of his daughter. (See In re Larry D ., 170 Conn.App. 758, 155 A.3d 322 (2017).)
Mr. J. was also named as the putative father with regard to the termination of parental rights petition which was filed on March 25, 2015. On April 23, 2015, he was defaulted for his failure to appear at the plea date. The default was reopened and set aside on May 21, 2015. On May 29, 2015, the court ordered a paternity test and a judgment of paternity was entered on July 21, 2015.
From Andrianna's date of birth, October 31, 2013, to July 21, 2015, the respondent father did not visit his child once. He had too many other responsibilities at the time, including other children to support. Mr. J. has two other children from different relationships who he has not parented. Moreover, even after paternity was determined, he did not take full advantage of the monthly visitation schedules arranged for him by DCF. As of the time of the trial in November 2016, respondent father only visited with his daughter on six occasions.
Simply stated, Andrihanna was never a priority for Mr. J. He was not there for his child in those critical years of her early life.
The child has been in foster care for more than two years and needs a permanent and stable home. Andre J. has never offered a permanency plan for Andrihanna other than foster care.
Based on the forgoing evidence, the court finds that DCF has proven clearly and convincingly that Mr. J. abandoned Andrihanna, and lacks an on-going parent-child relationship with her, as alleged in the termination petition.
Pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1), the court is required to determine in a termination proceeding whether or not DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with her parents. " Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." In Re Jessica B ., 50 Conn.App. 554, 566, 718 A.2d 997, (1998).
Based on the evidence presented, the court finds that the mother, while residing in the State of Connecticut, was offered numerous referrals and services by way of specific steps. (Petitioner's Exhibits 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d.) When the respondent mother moved to the State of Georgia in July 2015, the DCF provided her with a list of programs having services she could engage in to satisfy the Department and Dr. Franklin's recommendations. Ms. B. has maintained throughout the pendency of this case that she does not require any mental health treatment or intensive substance abuse treatment. Under the totality of the circumstances, the court finds as proven by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the respondent mother and/or mother is unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1).
Clear and convincing evidence at trial proved that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify Andrihanna with the respondent father. The petitioner offered Mr. J. substance abuse assessment and treatment, domestic violence counseling, individual mental health counseling, parenting classes and visitation. The evidence established that the respondent father turned down all the program services offered by the petitioner and visited the child only on a few occasions. That evidence also prompts the court to find that Mr. J. is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
Disposition
Having determined that the petitioner has proven adjudicatory grounds for termination of parental rights against each respondent by clear and convincing evidence, the court next considers the issue of disposition. DCF must also prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests. Pursuant to the provisions of C.G.S. § 17a-112(k), the court must make and consider the following seven factual findings in conjunction with its determination on the issue of disposition.
1. The Timeliness, Nature and Extent of Services Offered, Provided and Made to the Parents and Child to Facilitate Reunification. C.G.S § 17a-112(k)(1)
The Department of Children and Families has been involved with the family since 2007, due to unaddressed severe substance abuse, mental health problems, and the inadequate parenting skills. DCF has offered and made available the necessary services to address these specific issues in a timely manner including: ongoing administrative case reviews to discuss and develop Andrihanna's case plan and the family's treatment plan, case management services to monitor progress, referrals for substance abuse and mental health services, transportation, weekly supervised visits, a referral for parenting coach, one-to-one parenting skills instructions, bus tokens, monthly bus passes to assist parents with transportation, financial assistance for the housing, and assessed relative placements. The court finds as proven by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner and/or other state agencies have offered timely, appropriate and extensive reunification services to both respondents.
2. Whether DCF Has Made Reasonable Efforts to Reunite the Family Pursuant to the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, as Amended. C.G.S § 17a-112(k)(2)
DCF has offered mother substance abuse treatment, counseling, parenting classes, a psychological evaluation and supervised visitation with her daughter. Reunification was only successful for a brief period of time, in 2014, until mother relapsed causing Andrihanna to be placed in DCF care for a second time. Ms. B. is unwilling or able to benefit from reunification services.
Father, Mr. J., is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification services. He has failed to make himself available to DCF or the court by removing himself from the State of Connecticut. He was offered a psychological evaluation and visitation with Andrihanna. He failed to attend many of the visits and did not engage in parenting services as recommended by the DCF and evaluator.
As recounted above, both respondents were offered appropriate services and visitation by DCF in an effort to reunify the child with her parents. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner made the reasonable efforts mandated by Federal law.
3. The Terms of Any Applicable Court Order Entered Into and Agreed Upon by Any Individual or Agency and the Parent, and the Extent to Which all Parties Have Fulfilled Their Obligations Under Such Order. C.G.S § 17a-112(k)(3)
The court entered orders of final steps for mother and father. Mother signed her steps while father did not make himself available to sign. There was clear and convincing evidence at trial established that the respondent father moved to the State of Georgia and had not made himself available to DCF or the court. The father, Mr. J., had not attended any of the court hearings on this case. Mr. J. had not made himself available to DCF to engage in services. Mr. J. had not contacted DCF to inquire about the well-being of his daughter nor to develop a visitation plan. While residing in the State of Georgia, Mr. J. did provide proof that he was employed.
Respondent mother did not comply with the specific steps ordered. Ms. B. moved out of the State of Connecticut on July 17, 2014. By choice, Ms. B. failed to maintain contact with her child or visit her daughter. When Ms. B. was residing in Bridgeport, Connecticut, she was inconsistent with keeping her scheduled weekly visits. Ms. B. only visited with her child three times from April 23, 2014, to July 17, 2014, while still residing in Connecticut. Ms. B. provided her sister, Andrea A., as a placement resource for her child. On July 17, 2014, Andrihanna was placed with maternal aunt, Andrea A. On November 4, 2014, Ms. A. tried to overdose on illegal drugs in her home, in the presence of Andrihanna and her two biological children. Ms. A. needed to be hospitalized and Andrihanna was subsequently placed in a DCF licensed foster home where she remains to date. Maternal aunt, Ms. A., reported that while her niece Andrihanna was placed with her, Ms. B. was not consistent in contacting her to inquire about the well-being of her child.
From 2007 to present, Ms. B. has attended several substance abuse treatment programs and mental health services and she has failed to successfully complete treatment. DCF has urged Ms. B. to address mental health and substance abuse issues but she has failed to do so. Ms. B. has not been fully compliant with meeting her goals in regard to addressing her mental health and substance abuse issues. Since Ms. B. has resided in the State of Georgia, she has faxed several drug screen reports which were done as part of her seeking employment. Those drug screens were negative.
From November 5, 2013, to April 18, 2014, Ms. B. entered inpatient substance abuse treatment at the Wellmore Women and Children Program. Ms. B. was unsuccessfully discharged from the program due to her lack of compliance. She relapsed on PCP. Ms. B. was referred to Regional Network for outpatient substance abuse treatment and she was scheduled for intake/admission on July 18, 2014, which she failed to attend. On July 17, 2014, Ms. B. decided to relocate to the State of Georgia. DCF has encouraged her to seek treatment and to address her mental health and substance abuse issues where she is residing. Mother has not complied with mental health recommendations and referrals by the DCF and evaluator.
4. The Feelings and Emotional Ties of the Child With Respect to the Child's Parents, and Any Person Who Has Exercised Physical Care, Custody and Control of the Child For at Least One Year and With Whom the Child Has Developed Significant Emotional Ties. C.G.S § 17a-112(k)(4)
Andrihanna has been placed in her current foster home since November 4, 2014. This is her third out of home placement due to her parent's actions. Andrihanna has developed a strong bond with her foster family and sees her foster mother as her psychological parent. It is believed that it is in her best interest to be adopted by her foster parent. The foster parent has been the only stabilizing adult in Andrihanna's short life and has ensured that all of her medical, emotional and basic needs are met. Andrihanna has been accepted as part of the foster parent's family. Based on the age and needs of Andrihanna, it would be unfavorable to Andrihanna to allow further time to pass in hopes of assessing if Ms. B. and Mr. J. could establish or are willing to establish a relationship with this child. The totality of the evidence established that Andrihanna is doing well in the foster home, is psychologically bonded to her foster mother, and views her as the primary parental figure in her life.
5. The Age of the Child. C.G.S § 17a-112(k)(5)
Andrihanna was born on October 31, 2013. She was just over three years old at the time of the trial. Andrihanna is attached to her foster parent who is willing to adopt her if she becomes legally free. To allow further time for Ms. B. to rehabilitate is not reasonable, given Andrihanna's need for permanency and stability in her life. Ms. B. has abandoned her daughter in the foster care system. To allow further time for Mr. J. to rehabilitate is not reasonable, given Andrihanna's need for permanency and stability in her life. Mr. J. has abandoned his daughter in the foster care system.
6. The Efforts Each Parent Has Made to Adjust Such Parent's Circumstances or Conduct or Conditions to Make it in the Best Interests of the Child to Return Such Child to the Parental Home in the Foreseeable Future, Including But Not Limited to (A) The Extent to Which the Parent Has Maintained Contact With the Child as Part of an Effort to Reunite the Child With the Parent, Provided the Court May Give Weight to Incidental Visitations, Communications or Contributions, and (B) The Maintenance of Regular Contact or Communication With the Guardian or Other Custodian of the Child. C.G.S § 17a-112(k)(6)
Ms. B. and Mr. J. have not adjusted their circumstances in order to become a part of Andrihanna's life. DCF cannot wait any longer to provide Andrihanna with the permanency she needs for a stable, loving home environment.
There is little reason to believe that further efforts toward reunification would result in the mother or father's ability or willingness to parent Andrihanna. Neither parent has taken the necessary steps to put themselves in a position to become an available parent for Andrihanna. This child has been in the foster care system since birth due to the parent's unaddressed substance abuse issues and transient lifestyle. Both mother and father abandoned their daughter in the foster care system. The court finds that although Ms. B. has made attempts at rehabilitation, she has not sufficiently adjusted her circumstances, conduct, or conditions so as to make it in the best interests of the child to return such child to the mother in the foreseeable future.
7. The Extent to Which the Parents Have Been Prevented From Maintaining a Meaningful Relationship With the Child by the Unreasonable Acts or Conduct of the Other Parent or the Child, or the Unreasonable Acts of Any Other Person, or by the Economic Circumstances of the Parents. C.G.S § 17a-112(k)(7)
The evidence presented at trial did not reveal the existence of any such acts, conduct or circumstances. The DCF social study indicates that Andrihanna's physical and emotional needs are being met by the foster parent, with whom the child has established a very positive and nurturing relationship. The foster parent is willing to adopt Andrihanna. Clear and convincing evidence at trial established that Mr. J. has not been significantly involved in the life of the child. Clear and convincing evidence at trial indicated that Ms. B. has never been prevented from having a relationship with her child. Ms. B. has historically had problems involving substance abuse, mental health issues and a transient lifestyle. These unresolved issues were directly related to the mother's inability and unavailability to parent the child for the past three years. Since 2007, Ms. B. has failed to satisfactorily complete numerous outpatient and residential substance abuse treatment programs.
Having considered all of the evidence, this court finds that the petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests of the child that the parental rights of both respondents be terminated.
It is hereby ORDERED that the parental rights of. Ninouska B. and Andre J. with respect to the child Andrihanna J. are hereby terminated. The court further ORDERS that the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed the statutory parent of Andrihanna J., and is ordered to pursue the adoption of said child as expeditiously as possible. The said Commissioner shall file all Motions for Review of Permanency Plan and quarterly status reports pertaining to this child on a timely basis as required by law until said child is adopted.
The court also ORDERS said Commissioner, and the Probate Court that processes said child's adoption, to immediately notify the Deputy Chief. Clerk of this court when Andrihanna's adoption is finalized.
Judgment may enter accordingly.
It is so ordered.