Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sup. Ct. No. JD222281
MORRISON, J.
Appellant, the father of the minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395; further undesignated statutory references are to this code.) Appellant claims the juvenile court failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) We shall affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts underlying this dependency proceeding are not relevant to the issues raised by appellant on appeal, and we address them only briefly. A dependency petition was filed in April 2005 by the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) concerning the nine-month-old minor based on the mother’s psychiatric problems and appellant’s lack of means to care for and support the minor. Initially, the minor was placed with the mother, but after an amended petition was filed in July 2005 adding allegations of physical abuse of the minor and substance abuse by the mother, the minor was detained. In December 2005, the allegations in the amended petition were sustained with further amendments not relevant here, and reunification services were ordered for appellant but not for the minor’s mother.
Appellant’s failure to participate in various aspects of his case plan resulted in the termination of his services in May 2006. At the section 366.26 hearing in April 2007, the juvenile court terminated parental rights and ordered a permanent plan of adoption for the minor.
DISCUSSION
Appellant claims the record fails to support the juvenile court’s determination that the ICWA did not apply. We find this claim without merit.
The ICWA was enacted “to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum standards for removal of Indian children from their families and placement of such children ‘in [homes] which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture, . . .’” (In re Levi U. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 195; 25 U.S.C. § 1902; Mississippi Choctaw v. Holyfield (1989) 490 U.S. 30 [104 L.Ed.2d 29].)
Among the procedural safeguards included in the ICWA is a provision for notice, which states in part: “In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention.” (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) The Indian status of a child need not be certain or conclusive to trigger the ICWA’s notice requirements. (In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460, 471.) “[P]roof of [ICWA] notice, including copies of notices sent and all return receipts and responses received, must be filed with the juvenile court.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.664(f); further rule references are to the Cal. Rules of Court.)
When appellant and the minor’s mother first appeared in court in April 2005, appellant informed the court that he had Cherokee ancestry, and the court ordered notice to the Cherokee tribes. The mother later verified she had no Indian heritage. Notice of the proceedings was sent on Judicial Council form JV-135 to the three federally recognized Cherokee tribes -- the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians, the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma and the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians -- as well as the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Sacramento. Responses from the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians stated that the minor was not eligible for enrollment in either tribe. The record does not contain a response from the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma.
In his opening brief, appellant claims the juvenile court erred by finding the ICWA did not apply because the record does not establish adequate inquiry or proper notice. Appellant’s argument is based, in part, on the absence of documentation in the record concerning ICWA notice and responses from the tribes.
However, following the filing of appellant’s opening brief, the record on appeal was augmented to include material that had been missing from the trial court’s file concerning the notices provided to the tribes and the responses received. Nevertheless, in appellant’s reply brief, he “reaffirms all points of argument contained in [his] opening brief”, specifically addressing only one issue: the failure to address notice to the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma to the tribal agent for service of notice that is designated in the federal register. (See 70 Fed.Reg. 13518 (Mar. 21, 2005).)
With regard to this latter claim, appellant is correct that ICWA notice must be sent to the agent for service designated by the tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (a)(2).) The designated tribal agent for the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma is, and was at the time that ICWA notice was sent in this matter, “Chadwick Smith, Principal Chief.” (70 Fed.Reg. 13518, 13526 (Mar. 21, 2005).) Although ICWA notice was sent to the designated address for the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma and was addressed to “PRINCIPAL CHIEF,” it did not include the name “Chadwick Smith.” However, it reasonably can be presumed that Chadwick Smith is the Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that notice went to the wrong tribal entity. To the contrary, the record contains a return receipt indicating the tribe received the ICWA notice. Accordingly, we conclude the error in omitting the name of the principal chief in the address to the tribe was harmless.
Appellant also complains that the signature appearing on the return receipt from the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma included “no designation as to his authority to receive mail on behalf of the designated [tribal agent].” However, there is no requirement that the individual who signs the return receipt for ICWA notice sets forth his or her authority to do so.
In his opening brief, appellant complains that the juvenile court erred by failing to order the mother and him to complete Judicial Council form JV-130 (form JV-130), which directs a parent to indicate whether he or she may have Indian ancestry and whether the child or parent may be a member or eligible for membership in an Indian tribe. Rule 5.664(d)(3) requires the juvenile court to order a parent to complete this form at the first appearance in a dependency proceeding.
Appellant is correct that the juvenile court erred by failing to order completion of form JV-130, but appellant suffered no prejudice from the error. The parents provided information concerning their Indian heritage when they first appeared in court and, based on their oral responses, the juvenile court ordered notice to be provided to the Cherokee tribes. The parents’ responses provided the same information as would have been provided on the form. Accordingly, the failure to comply with rule 5.664(d)(3) was harmless.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P.J., BUTZ, J.