Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. JW05-6886
Reardon, J.
The juvenile court denied appellant Andres S.’s motion to suppress evidence after sustaining the San Francisco District Attorney’s petition declaring him a ward of the court for illegal possession of a dirk or dagger. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a)(4).) Appellant urges we reverse the judgment because the circumstances leading to his detention and patdown search cannot survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny against unreasonable searches and seizures. We affirm the judgment.
I. FACTS
On April 3, 2007, San Francisco Police Officers E.R. Balinton and John Zachles, who were in plain clothes and driving an unmarked vehicle, observed appellant and six to eight individuals congregating on the corner of Florida and 22nd Streets—an area known for having “a history of Nortenos gang activity, [and] drug sale [and] usage night and day” including violence-related crimes. The officers recognized two individuals in the group who were wearing red tee-shirts—indicative of Norteno gang colors—as Nortenos gang members. After the officers made eye contact with the group, the group dispersed into various directions. Appellant walked westward on 22nd Street. During his retreat from the group, appellant peered back at the officers, looked forward, clutched the right side of his waistband, and again glanced at the officers. Subsequent to appellant’s actions as he walked away from the officers, the officers approached appellant, believing he was concealing a weapon or contraband. The officers displayed their badges and asked appellant, “What are you holding on to?” Officer Balinton patsearched appellant around the right side of his waistband where he felt the handle of a knife. He lifted appellant’s shirt and confiscated a knife with a seven-inch blade from the right side of his hip area.
The San Francisco District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition, charging appellant with possession of a dirk or dagger. The juvenile court denied appellant’s motion to suppress evidence and redeclared the wardship petition, determining that the maximum period of confinement was five years and two months, committed him to the chief probation officer for out-of-home placement, and ordered that he be placed in a 90-day shelter.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Detention
Appellant challenges the juvenile court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered during his interaction with Officers Balinton and Zachles. He argues that the circumstances prior to the detention did not rise to the level of constitutionally mandated reasonable suspicion such as to warrant his subsequent detention.
1. Standard of Review
On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we independently review the evidence in a light favorable to the trial court’s ruling, upholding its express or implied findings of fact if they are validated by substantial evidence. (In re Lennies H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1236.) In doing so, we evaluate the trial court’s findings of fact to discern whether they support the conclusion that the search or seizure was reasonable. (Ibid.; see People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) This standard of review is “equally applicable to juvenile court proceedings.” (In re Lennies H., supra, at p. 1236.)
2. Fourth Amendment Principles
Consistent with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a police officer may detain a person for questioning or other limited investigation without a showing of probable cause to arrest the person. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 21; see Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) However, when the officer accosts an individual and restrains his or her freedom to walk away, a detention has occurred. (Terry v. Ohio, supra, at p. 16.) “A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.) Objective reasonableness lies when the facts are such that any reasonable police officer in a similar position, utilizing her or his training and experience, would suspect that the person in question is involved in the same criminal activity or association. (People v. Aldridge (1984) 35 Cal.3d 473, 478.)
3. Analysis
In the underlying matter, the undisputed facts, when aggregated, legitimize appellant’s detention. First, appellant was voluntarily congregating in a group with known Nortenos gang members. This voluntary association in an area known for gang-related activity is relevant to the inquiry into the existence of reasonable suspicion. (See Maryland v. Pringle (2003) 540 U.S. 366, 372-373.)
Second, Officers Balinton and Zachles, relying on their training and experience in the area, identified 22nd and Florida Streets as a high-crime area known for drug, gang, and violence-related crimes. Appellant’s and the group’s presence on this corner, constituting insufficient evidence alone, is nevertheless relevant in assessing their possible criminality under the totality of the circumstances. (Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 124; People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 240-241.)
Third, appellant’s and his companions’ evasive conduct immediately following their sighting of the officers is fertile evidence to support a reasonable suspicion for a detention. (People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 233; see Florida v. Rodriguez (1984) 469 U.S. 1, 6.) Even though there may be an innocent motive for a person’s evasive conduct upon seeing police officers, it is still a relevant consideration for establishing reasonable cause to detain him or her. (People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 233.)
Fourth, reasonable suspicion for a detention is further buttressed after the officers observed appellant clutch his waistband when he walked away from them. (See In re Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1240-1241.) While appellant contends that he was merely pulling up his heavy pants, this innocent explanation does not preclude a police officer from employing his or her training and experience to infer that such a hand motion—reasonably suspicious of a gesture to conceal a weapon—offers a further compounding ingredient of criminal conduct. (Ibid.)
Thus, taken together, we find that the foregoing circumstances established reasonable suspicion to detain appellant.
B. Patdown Search
Appellant challenges the constitutional propriety of Officer Balinton’s patdown search around his waistband, resulting in his confiscation of a knife with a seven-inch blade. He argues that, under the circumstances, Officer Balinton failed to establish a sufficient quantum of reasonable suspicion to justify the scope of the search.
Law enforcement officers may conduct a patdown search incident to a detention under circumscribed conditions. An officer may conduct a patdown search to determine if a person is carrying a weapon after he or she observes suspicious behavior—prompting reasonable suspicion—indicative of someone who is armed and dangerous to the officer or others. (Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 24; see Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S. 366, 373.) The officer’s patdown search is justified by the need to “pursue an investigation without fear of violence,” not necessarily to unearth evidence of a crime. (Adams v. Williams (1972) 407 U.S. 143, 146.) If the search extends beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it exceeds the allowable parameters of a Terry stop, resulting in suppression of the fruits of the search. (Minnesota v. Dickerson, supra, 508 U.S. at p. 373.)
Officer Balinton’s patdown search of appellant’s waistband area did not violate his Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches. The underlying circumstances, in conjunction with appellant’s behavior, justify the constitutionality of the officer’s patdown search to ensure that appellant was not armed and dangerous. We rely on the same justifications that supported the finding of a legal detention—(1) appellant’s presence in a high-crime area; (2) congregation with individuals identified as gang members; (3) evasive conduct following his notice of the officers; (4) peering back toward the officers while clutching his waistband; and (5) evasive activity exhibited by the group as a whole. These circumstances surpass the requisite threshold of reasonable suspicion to warrant a patdown search for weapons incident to a legal detention.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Ruvolo, P.J. Rivera, J.