Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Carol Isackson, Judge, No. J509804A
IRION, J.
Francisca S. appeals the jurisdictional and dispositional orders concerning her son, Andres N. She contends substantial evidence did not support the orders because she is able to provide Andres with appropriate care, and there were available alternatives to removal of Andres from her custody. We affirm the orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 20, 2008, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) petitioned on behalf of 16-year-old Andres under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (c), alleging he was at substantial risk of serious emotional damage and required mental health treatment which Francisca had been unable to provide. The petition alleged that in September 2008 Andres was hospitalized after he tried to throw himself into oncoming freeway traffic, and that in November 2008 he was hospitalized again because he became violent and tried to take an overdose of his sister's medication.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
When the Agency first recommended residential services for Andres in 2004, Francisca agreed with the recommendation, but later changed her mind and declined the services. After the September 2008 episode, Andres was assessed for mental health services and residential treatment again was recommended; however, Andres did not begin treatment but, instead, returned home.
Andres was hospitalized at the Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Services (CAPS) facility at UCSD on November 7, 2008, after he became agitated, pushed his two-year-old sister and took some of his other sister's medication.
The director at CAPS stated:
"Andres has a history of bipolar disorder, [is] currently depressed, and has not been attending school for several months now. He came to our unit because of a depressed mood and suicidal ideation. Since his arrival on our unit he has been doing fairly well, his mood is stabilizing and we have continued his medications to treat his underlying mood symptoms. As a treatment team we feel that Andres needs a higher level of care once he is discharged from our facility and would benefit from a residential facility where he could get more consistent structure in his life, take his medications and begin attending school again."
Andres told CAPS staff he felt hopeless and was overwhelmed. He explained he was under stress because "of all the services like CPS, other workers wanting me to be in residential and wanting me to go to school." He said, "I couldn't stand it any more; I would prefer to die than go to residential." The court ordered Andres detained at CAPS.
At the jurisdictional hearing the social worker recommended Andres be placed in a residential treatment program. She said he had done well during his stay at CAPS and she believed he continued to need a structured, controlled environment. The social worker acknowledged Andres's treating psychiatrist was no longer recommending residential treatment, but she disagreed with his recommendation because it was predicated on Andres's performance in a highly structured setting and did not take into consideration the entire situation. Specifically, the social worker noted that since May 2008, Andres had attempted suicide four times. Previous day treatment programs had failed because Francisca did not follow through with the services necessary for such programs to succeed. Andres did not take his medication regularly when he lived with Francisca, and he refused to go to school. Francisca did not agree with the school district's recommendations and she did not cooperate when Andres was offered home-based services. The social worker opined Francisca had shown a pattern of agreeing to services but, when told by Andres that he did not want the services, then refusing them.
Andres testified he was currently doing well and attending school. He said he earlier stopped going to school because of stress and because he did not like the school. Andres said he and Francisca, together, made the decision to stop services. While Andres acknowledged he did not take his medications regularly when he lived with Francisca, he testified that he would cooperate this time were he allowed to return home. Andres said he had learned a lot at CAPS and would not make the mistakes he made previously. Andres did not think he would benefit from a residential treatment program.
One of Andres's treating doctors, who worked under the supervision of Andres's psychiatrist, testified he recommended day treatment for Andres because Andres had improved while in the hospital and did not want residential treatment. He said that based on his conversations with Andres and Francisca, he did not think a day treatment program would pose a risk to Andres's younger siblings.
Francisca testified Andres was first diagnosed with mental illness in 2000, when he was seven years old. She said Andres had an Individualized Education Program (IEP), attended special classes at a regular school and did well through ninth grade. However, after he began attending high school he no longer liked school and, beginning in May 2008, refused to attend. Francisca said the social worker upset Andres by talking about residential treatment and that was the reason he ran out onto the freeway in September. Francisca did not believe Andres needed to be in residential treatment or that there would be a risk to him being home. She said if home care were unsuccessful, she would ask for help. Francisca testified she always ensured Andres took his medication.
At the close of testimony and argument, the juvenile court found the allegations of the petition to be true, but continued the disposition hearing to allow the Agency to investigate treatment options. The court found Andres's multiple suicide attempts showed he was suffering from severe emotional problems; Francisca's efforts to help him had not been sufficient; and Francisca often acquiesced to what Andres wanted, regardless of what was best for him. Subsequently, the Agency reported the progress that had been made in securing a day treatment program for Andres.
At the dispositional hearing, Francisca's counsel stated Francisca agreed with the plan that was in place. The court adjudged Andres a dependent and ordered that he be placed in a licensed group home, but granted the Agency discretion to place him with Francisca when he was enrolled in an appropriate day treatment program.
DISCUSSION
I
Substantial Evidence Supports the Jurisdictional Order
Francisca contends substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional order. Citing In re Alexander K. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 549, she argues the evidence showed she was willing and able to provide the services and resources necessary to address Andres's emotional needs, but the Agency disagreed with her treatment plan. We disagree.
A reviewing court must uphold a juvenile court's findings and orders if there is substantial evidence in the record to support them. (In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1036-1037.) Determinations of the credibility of witnesses and resolutions of conflicts in the evidence are for the trier of fact. (In re Tanis H. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1226-1227.) "[W]e must indulge in all reasonable inferences to support the findings of the juvenile court [citation], and we must also '... view the record in the light most favorable to the orders of the juvenile court.' " (In re Luwanna S. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 112, 114, quoting In re Biggs (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 337, 340.) The appellant bears the burden to show that the evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
Section 300, subdivision (c) provides, in part, that a child who comes within the following description may be adjudged a dependent child of the court:
"The child is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of the parent...."
Juvenile court intervention is warranted "when the child is suffering serious emotional damage due to no parental fault or neglect, but the... parents are unable... to provide adequate mental health treatment." (In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's findings that Andres was suffering serious emotional damage while in Francisca's custody and that Francisca was unable to provide him with consistent, adequate medication and mental health treatment. While Francisca clearly loved Andres and tried to provide him with adequate care, when Andres said he did not want to participate in mental health treatment or go to school, Francisca acquiesced. The record substantiates that Francisca routinely would not follow the treatment recommendations for Andres from the school district and from mental health services officials. Andres's testimony established that Francisca did not compel him to participate in services if he did not want to do so and, because she did not drive, he could avoid having to go to school by simply missing the bus. Andres also admitted he did not take his medications regularly when living at home, and when he was feeling "major stress," he did not listen to Francisca. In contrast, Andres made substantial improvement when he was in the controlled environment of CAPS, regularly taking his medication and participating in treatment. Substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional orders.
The holding of In re Alexander K., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th 549 does not help Francisca's position. There, the juvenile court made findings regarding a young child's reactions to his father. The reviewing court held those findings did not support juvenile court jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (c) because section 300, subdivision (c) seeks to protect a child against parental behavior that causes or is at risk of causing severe emotional damage to the child, and the court's findings focused on the child's behavior, not on the father's treatment of his son. Here, the circumstances are completely different. Andres was suffering emotional damage and Francisca was unable to provide adequate mental health treatment.
II
Francisca Forfeited Her Appellate Challenge to the Dispositional Order. Furthermore, Any Challenge to the Order Is Now Moot.
Francisca asserts the dispositional order must be reversed because substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's finding that Andres was at risk of harm. She also argues there were available alternatives to removal of Andres from her care.
Francisca, however, forfeited her arguments regarding the dispositional order because she acquiesced to the order during the hearing. At the hearing Francisca's counsel stated: "Your honor, we would be submitting on the report. [Francisca] is in agreement with the plan that's in place." By expressly agreeing to the plan, Francisca acquiesced to the recommendations. (In re Richard K. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 580, 589.) She has forfeited the issue for appeal.
Moreover, the issue has become moot. An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief. (In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1315-1316.) Here, this court can grant Francisca no relief regarding Andres's placement since he has been enrolled in a day treatment program and placed back in her care.
We grant the Agency's request to augment the record with the a certified copy of the Agency's ex parte report, filed April 23, 2009, reporting Andres was placed back in Francisca's care on March 24, 2009, upon confirmation of his enrollment at a day treatment program. We deny the Agency's motion to dismiss the issues concerning disposition.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McDONALD, Acting P. J., AARON, J.