Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco Super. Ct. No. JW076362
Jones, P.J.
Andre C. appeals from a disposition placing him on probation. He contends the underlying jurisdictional order is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 14, 2007, near 10:15 p.m., Nicholas Torres and Christina Thornell were walking home with some friends after a night on the town in San Francisco. As they passed a park on Fulton Street, someone peered out at them from behind a building. When Torres and Thornell passed the building, a group of young men began to follow them. Thornell became “very afraid.” When Torres turned around to look, one of the men, later identified as Theodore T., approached and ordered Torres to “[t]urn around. Don’t fucking look at me.” Theodore had his hand in his pocket and appeared to be holding a gun. Another of the men, later identified as appellant, pressed against Torres’s right side and said, “Give me your wallet.” Appellant had his hand in his pocket at the time. Afraid that appellant might have a gun, Torres did as he was told.
Thornell was standing nearby. She had been prevented from leaving by a group of people who were standing on the second floor balcony of an adjoining housing complex and who were shouting and throwing things at her. Thornell believed the group was associated with the robbers. Another young man, later identified as David H., walked behind Thornell and said, “Give me your purse.” Thornell looked directly at David and held her purse out to him. He told her to “leave it on the ground.” Thornell dropped her purse. Torres saw appellant pick it up.
The robbers ordered Torres and Thornell to “[g]et out of here.” The group on the balcony resumed throwing objects to force them to leave. Torres and Thornell fled to a friend’s house and called the police.
Two San Francisco police officers responded to the call. They drove to the area indicated where they saw a group of juveniles. When the officers stopped to investigate, the juveniles ran off. One of the officers found Torres’s wallet on the ground near to where the juveniles had been standing. The other officer chased the juveniles into a nearby housing complex and detained five of them. Appellant, David H., and Theodore T. were among those who were detained. The officer found Thornell’s keys just a few feet away from where the group was detained.
Torres and Thornell were brought to the group to conduct a “cold show.” Both of them identified appellant as one of the men who had just robbed them. Torres said appellant was the one who took his wallet and who picked up Thornell’s purse. Torres said he specifically remembered the design that was on the back of appellant’s pants. Thornell identified David H. as the man who had demanded her purse. However, she said appellant was one of the people on the balcony who had thrown things at her. Thornell said she was not as confident of her identification of appellant because he was so far away and she could only see him above his chest.
Based on these facts, petitions were filed alleging appellant, David H. and Theodore T. came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court because they committed two counts of second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c).) The case proceeded to a jurisdictional hearing where the court found the allegations as to all three young men to be true. The court explained the differing recollections of Torres and Thornell as follows: “I am not saying that [appellant] didn’t go up after he grabbed the wallet. I can’t say that [appellant] didn’t come down and grab the purse. I don’t know. [¶] But I know in terms of discrepancies, [Thornell] never saw the person she described as [appellant] more than from the chest down [sic]. [¶] She said after she left the purse, she did not look back. Mr. Torres is coming and saying let’s go. [¶] Presuming he is looking in her direction. [¶] But I am not going to make that one way or the other. I don’t think there is a clear conflict to me that it has to be one way or the other, but I am not making any determination. [¶] I think that the identification by Mr. Torres was clear in terms of the wallet taking. [¶] I think the identification is very clear with regard to [David H.] taking the purse, and I think it is very clear from Mr. Torres that [Theodore T.] came up from behind, and they were part of this group and all acting in concert to commit the robbery. [¶] So I find each one of the minors guilty of both charges on the Petitions that are filed, the 212.5’s as alleged. They are guilty of both counts as to all three minors. [¶] I will base it on the aiding and abetting theory as well as the testimony of the witnesses in this case.”
At disposition, the court declared appellant a ward of the court and placed him on probation.
II. DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the evidence presented at the jurisdictional hearing was insufficient to support the conclusion that he robbed Torres and Thornell.
The standard of review we apply is familiar. “In assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court’s task is to review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) The substantial evidence standard requires that we not reweigh the evidence and presume every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) “Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. [Citation.] Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction. [Citation.]” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) We do not substitute our evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of the trier of fact. (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 361.)
Applying those standards we conclude the evidence here was more than sufficient to support the jurisdictional findings.
Robbery is defined as the felonious taking of personal property from another against his or her will by means of force or fear. (People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 415.) Here, there is ample evidence that appellant took property from Torres and Thornell against their will by means of force or fear. Torres testified that appellant took his wallet and Thornell’s purse. Both victims testified that they relinquished their property because they were afraid the robbers were armed. Clearly, the evidence was sufficient.
The evidence was sufficient even under Thornell’s version of the crime. Thornell said appellant was part of the group on the balcony who kept her from fleeing by throwing objects at her. Thornell said she believed those on the balcony were associated with the group that was robbing her. Those who aid and abet in the commission of a crime are considered to be principals in the commission of that crime. (Pen. Code, § 31.) The trial court could reasonably conclude that even if appellant was on the balcony, he aided and abetted those on the ground below who actually took Torres’s wallet and Thornell’s purse.
None of the arguments appellant makes convince us the evidence was insufficient. First, appellant argues the evidence was inadequate because the versions of the crime presented by Torres and Thornell conflicted. However, appellant has not cited any authority that holds a conviction must be reversed if it is based on conflicting testimony and case law is directly to the contrary. As our Supreme Court stated recently, “Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.]” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.)
Next, appellant argues the court’s conclusion that there was no conflict between Torres’s testimony and Thornell’s testimony was unreasonable because it was impossible for appellant to be in two places at the same time. The court said it was possible that the versions of the incident presented by Torres and Thornell did not conflict. However, the court also said it was not making any finding on that issue because it was finding the robbery allegations to be true under the theory that appellant was either a principal or an aider and abettor. Long established case law holds that a defendant can be found guilty under alternate legal theories. (See People v. Gonzales (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1248, 1251-1255 & cases cited therein.) The court’s legal conclusion on this point was correct.
Appellant next argues, “nothing of Thornell’s identification of appellant as an aider and abettor to the robbery inspired confidence that her identification was accurate....” Appellant notes that Thornell only saw appellant at night, from the chest up, and then only for a few seconds. While it may have been difficult for Thornell to identify appellant given the circumstances, it was an identification she was able to make. It was for the trial court to determine whether that identification was worthy of belief. (People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 403.)
Next, appellant argues that Torres’s identification was unreliable because it was based solely on the pants appellant was wearing that had a unique design on the back. Appellant notes that all the defendants were wearing pants that had designs on the back. Appellant overstates the record on this point. Torres did state that one of the factors he used to identify appellant was the pants he was wearing. However, it was only one of several factors. Furthermore, when Torres was questioned on this point at trial, he testified that he recognized appellant’s pants, but he did not recognize the pants the other defendants were wearing on the night of the robbery. It was for the trial court to determine if Torre’s recollection was convincing. (People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 403.)
Appellant also contends that his identification by Torres was “grossly inaccurate” because Torres estimated appellant’s height as being 5’7” or 5’8” while he was in fact 5’3’ or 5’4’ at the time of the crime. The discrepancy in question, three to four inches, is minor and cannot reasonably be characterized as a gross inaccuracy. In any event, what appellant cites as his true height is simply an estimate provided at trial by one of the police officers who arrested him. It is entirely possible that Torres, not the officer, provided the most accurate estimate. It was for the trial court to determine which of those estimates was correct. (People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 403.)
Finally, appellant cites People v. Jiminez (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 75 for the proposition that the eyewitness identifications here were unreliable. The defendant in Jiminez was convicted of robbing a bank, and the issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred when it admitted certain DNA evidence. After ruling the evidence should have been excluded, the court turned to the issue of prejudice. (Id. at p. 81.) Applying a beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the court ruled the admission of the DNA evidence was prejudicial even though appellant had been identified by several eyewitnesses. (Id. at p. 82.) In reaching that conclusion, the court cited what it described as the dangers inherent in eyewitness identification. (Id. at p. 82.)
Here, we are not dealing with DNA evidence and we are not called upon to evaluate the possible prejudicial effect of improperly admitted evidence. Jiminez is not controlling.
We conclude the trial court’s jurisdictional finding is supported by substantial evidence.
III. DISPOSITION
The disposition is affirmed.
We concur: Simons, J., Bruiniers, J.