Opinion
No. COA12–195.
2012-07-3
In the Matter of A.M.M.
Jamie L. Hamlett for petitioner-appellee Alamance County Department of Social Services. Pamela Newell for guardian ad litem.
On writ of certiorari to review order entered 26 May 2011 by Judge Bradley Reid Allen, Sr. in Alamance County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 June 2012. Jamie L. Hamlett for petitioner-appellee Alamance County Department of Social Services. Pamela Newell for guardian ad litem.
Leslie Rawls for respondent-appellant father.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
Respondent father (“respondent”) appeals from the trial court's adjudication and disposition order adjudicating A.M.M. (“Amy”) a neglected juvenile, and granting guardianship to Amy's maternal grandmother. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the trial court's order.
Amy is a pseudonym used to protect the privacy of the juvenile.
Amy and her older sister Amanda resided with respondent. Their mother is deceased. On 9 March 2010, Alamance County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) received a report alleging that Amanda had received a swollen eye or nose bleed as a result of inappropriate discipline administered by respondent. DSS requested that respondent consider a kinship placement outside the home for Amanda, and respondent voluntarily placed Amanda with her maternal grandmother. Amy was left in the home and a safety plan put into place.
Amanda is a pseudonym used to protect the privacy of the juvenile.
On 24 June 2010, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging Amanda was abused and neglected. On 18 August 2010, the matter came on for an adjudication hearing. Amy was scheduled to testify at the hearing, and during the lunch recess DSS received information about an incident between Amy and respondent the previous night. The trial judge, with the attorneys present, spoke to Amy on speakerphone in his chambers. Amy informed the judge that respondent had broken her cell phone and iPod, and that he had yelled at her and was angry at her because she would not say what he wanted her to say in court. Amy informed the judge that her cell phone and iPod were in the dumpster outside the home. Amy told the judge she was afraid of what her father might do when he returned home from court. The judge ordered DSS to go and retrieve Amy from the home. Respondent's attorney was ordered to accompany DSS. In light of these events, the adjudication hearing in Amanda's case was ceased and a mistrial was declared.
Later in the day on 18 August 2010, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging Amy was neglected. On that same date, respondent was served with a copy of the juvenile petition and the trial court conducted a nonsecure custody hearing. After the hearing, the trial court granted nonsecure custody of Amy to DSS.
On 6 October 2010, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the nonsecure custody order alleging the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to order the removal of Amy from the home before the filing of a petition. Respondent further alleged insufficient service of process in violation of his due process rights. The trial court denied respondent's motion to dismiss.
The case involving Amy came on for hearing on 5 May, 6 May, and 13 May 2011. By order entered 26 May 2011, the trial court adjudicated Amy neglected and granted guardianship of Amy to her maternal grandmother. Respondent filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the adjudication and disposition order. We allowed respondent's petition for writ of certiorari.
Respondent argues the adjudication and disposition order should be vacated because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when the case was not instituted pursuant to the statutorily-mandated procedures. Respondent contends the trial judge placed himself into the role that the legislature granted to DSS by investigating and making the decision about taking Amy into custody when he ordered DSS to pick up Amy on 18 August 2010. We disagree.
Under the Juvenile Code, “[a]n action is commenced by the filing of a petition in the clerk's office when that office is open or by the issuance of a juvenile petition by a magistrate when the clerk's office is closed, which issuance shall constitute filing.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–405 (2011).
All reports concerning a juvenile alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent shall be referred to the director of the department of social services for screening. Thereafter, if it is determined by the director that a report should be filed as a petition, the petition shall be drawn by the director, verified before an official authorized to administer oaths, and filed by the clerk, recording the date of filing.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–403(a) (2011). Here, although the trial judge directed DSS to pick up Amy and bring her to court, it was an authorized representative of the director of DSS who signed and verified the petition. We conclude that the trial judge did not interpose himself into the statutorily-mandated role of DSS. This argument is overruled.
Respondent further argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We disagree.
“A trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over all stages of a juvenile case is established when the action is initiated with the filing of a properly verified petition.” In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 593, 636 S.E.2d 787, 792 (2006). In this case, a properly verified juvenile petition was filed on 18 August 2010 at 4:27 p.m. The trial court obtained subject matter jurisdiction from that point. See In re L.B., 181 N.C.App. 174, 187, 639 S.E.2d 23, 29 (2007) (holding that even though nonsecure custody order and summons were issued before juvenile petition was signed and verified, court gained subject matter jurisdiction upon subsequent signing and verification of petition). Thus, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the nonsecure custody order as it was entered after the juvenile petition was filed. Accordingly, this argument is overruled. The order of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed. Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).