Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. Nos. 74136, 74137
Reardon, J.
At the 12-month review hearing in the dependency of Amanda A. and Aaron A., the juvenile court found that returning the children to their mother, appellant Marie F.-A., would create a substantial risk of detriment. Two months later, the juvenile court returned the minors to Marie’s custody. On appeal, Marie challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support the juvenile court’s refusal to return her children at the 12-month hearing. As the children were returned to Marie’s custody after that time, we dismiss her appeal as moot.
The father is not a party to this appeal. We are familiar with the issues facing this family, which have been before us in the past. (See In re Kimberly D. (Dec. 15, 2005, A110528) [nonpub. opn].)
I. BACKGROUND
In April 2005, respondent San Mateo County Human Services Agency filed juvenile dependency petitions on behalf of Amanda and Aaron A., alleging that their mother, Marie F.-A., had failed to protect the children from regular verbal and physical domestic violence in the home. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b).) The agency’s petitions were sustained by the juvenile court.
In August 2006, a 12-month review hearing was held. The juvenile court found that return of the children to Marie’s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to them. Thus, it ordered that the children’s out-of-home placement continue. It did allow both Amanda and Aaron to have overnight visitations with their mother beginning later that month. Marie filed a timely notice of appeal from this ruling in August 2006. In October 2006, two months after denying Marie’s request to return Amanda and Aaron to her, the juvenile court did return the minors to her custody. This raises the question whether Marie’s appeal from the earlier refusal to return the minors is now moot.
We take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s order returning the minors to Marie in October 2006. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a); In re Salvador M. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1422.) We also note that in April 2007, the children were again detained and removed from Marie’s custody. They were placed with an aunt and uncle.
II. MOOTNESS
A question becomes moot when, during the pendency of an appeal, events transpire that prevent a court from granting any effectual relief. (See Lester v. Lennane (2000)84 Cal.App.4th 536, 566; see also Consol. etc. Corp. v. United A. etc. Workers (1946) 27 Cal.2d 859, 863.) In a dependency case, the question of mootness is decided on a case-by-case basis. (In re Dani R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 402, 404.) An action that was originally based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot because of subsequent acts. As a reversal in such a case would be without practical effect, the appeal must be dismissed. (Ibid.; see 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 642, pp. 669-671.)
For example in Dani R., a mother appealed from a judgment denying reunification with her son, claiming that she had been denied reunification services. The juvenile court later granted the mother’s petition for reunification. The appellate bcourt held that the appeal became moot once her motion was granted. (In re Dani R., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 406; see In re Pablo D. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 759, 761.) The facts in this appeal are comparable. Even if we held in her favor on appeal, Marie would receive no meaningful relief since the juvenile court had already returned her children to her. Thus, her appeal has become moot. (See In re Dani R., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 406.)
III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order returning Amanda and Aaron to Marie’s custody renders this appeal moot. The appeal is dismissed.
We concur: Ruvolo, P.J., Sepulveda, J.