Opinion
No. 111,113.
2014-11-21
In the Interest of A.M., A Child Under 18 Years of Age.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; Harold E. Flaigle, Judge.Michael E. Lazzo, of Wichita, for appellant natural father.Anita Settle Kemp, of Wichita, for appellant natural mother.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; Harold E. Flaigle, Judge.
Michael E. Lazzo, of Wichita, for appellant natural father. Anita Settle Kemp, of Wichita, for appellant natural mother.
Roger B. McDaniel, of Kansas Department for Children and Families, of El Dorado, for appellee.
Before STANDRIDGE, P.J., LEBEN and POWELL, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
POWELL, J.
A.M.M. (Mother) and C.L.M. (Father) appeal from the district court's order terminating their parental rights to their daughter, A .M. The parents argue the district court abused its discretion by its suggestion and subsequent order permitting the State to reopen its case to present additional evidence to support the termination of their parental rights. Father also claims there was insufficient evidence presented to support the district court's termination findings. We disagree and affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
Mother and Father have two daughters. The older daughter, K.M., was removed from the parents' custody in February 2012 in a private child-in-need-of-care (CINC) proceeding in Marion County, Kansas. Father and K.M. were living with Father's mother (Grandmother), and Mother was living in Oklahoma. Grandmother filed a private CINC petition because she was providing K.M.'s care most of the time; she reported Father was irresponsible and did not parent K.M. and Father was reluctant to take K.M. for medical treatment. That case is not part of this appeal. This appeal involves the second daughter, A.M.
In August 2012, Mother gave birth to A.M. in Sedgwick County, Kansas; DNA testing later confirmed C.L.M. as A.M.'s father. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) received an intake about the family based upon the hospital staff's concerns. Mother had an extensive history of mental health issues, and the nurses were concerned about the lack of running water in the family's home and Mother's reports of domestic violence.
The DCF investigation revealed concerns about Mother's willingness or ability to take care of A.M. The social worker interviewed Mother twice while she was in the hospital. Mother told the social worker she had been sexually abused as a child and Father had been in foster care between the ages 12 to 18. Mother admitted to smoking marijuana several times while she was pregnant and reported Father smoked marijuana regularly. Mother had been taking medications for 6 months for schizoaffective disorder and had characteristics of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder but considered herself currently stable. Mother refused the social worker's offer of a substance abuse evaluation but agreed to services from DCCCA Family Preservation (DCCCA).
Mother also told the social worker that Father had forced her to have sex and had once cut the tires of her car when she threatened to leave him. Although he had never hit her, she did not feel safe going home with him. She also admitted she had been violent toward Father when she had not been taking her medication. Mother agreed that she and A.M. would go to a domestic violence shelter when they were released from the hospital. Two days after leaving the hospital, Mother's views apparently changed; she denied any domestic violence between Father and her and told the social worker that after talking to Father she was anxious to get back with him. She also reported that Father agreed to participate in DCCCA services.
At the social worker's request, Father purchased additional infant supplies and restored running water to the house. Although he previously had refused DCCCA services with K.M., Father agreed to accept those services now. Father confirmed that Mother had been violent toward him in the past but things were much better after Mother started taking medication. Father denied sexually abusing anyone, but he admitted that he was removed from his home when he was 11 because he and his 6–year–old brother were sexually “experimenting.”
Two DCCCA workers were assigned to work with the family. During the initial meeting after Mother and A.M. returned to the home, Father spent considerable time discussing how unfair it was that K.M. had been taken away from them and he and Mother should not be required to comply with court orders. During a second meeting, Mother was warned against breastfeeding A.M. in the parents' bed at night because of the risk that A.M. might be smothered. Although the parents agreed, the situation occurred repeatedly. Social workers also learned from Mother's physician that she should not be breastfeeding A.M. while taking psychotropic medication. However, the parents continued to insist on the breastfeeding of A.M.
In subsequent visits, things did not fare better. DCCCA staff asked both parents to undergo mental health assessments, and they asked Father to complete a drug and alcohol assessment. Mother missed a healthy babies class, and neither parent had enrolled in domestic violence classes. Moreover, Mother had not yet scheduled A .M. for her 2–month vaccinations. Notwithstanding DCCCA's requests, Mother continued to breastfeed A.M. while taking her medication.
By December 10, 2012, neither parent had signed up for domestic violence classes, and Father had not yet scheduled mental health or drug and alcohol assessments. Mother continued her history of stopping her medication and was still experiencing hallucinations. Although Mother was beginning to attend her mental health treatments more regularly, the therapist found Mother's progress to be minimal. Mother continued to breastfeed against doctors' advice, the parents had made little progress in completing assessments or classes that had been ordered, and Mother again wanted to leave Father.
In light of the parents' history and concerns of ongoing issues, DCF requested that a CINC petition be filed and A.M. be removed from the family home and placed in DCF protective custody. On December 13, 2012, the court issued an ex parte order of protective custody placing A.M. in DCF custody, ordering her removal from the home, and ordering supervised visitation for Mother and Father; the CINC petition was filed on December 17, 2012. As part of its January 7, 2013, Order of Temporary Custody, the district court directed both parents to complete anger management classes, domestic violence classes, hair follicle testing, age-appropriate parenting classes, random urinalysis testing, and substance abuse evaluations. In addition, the court ordered Mother to undergo individual therapy and complete a psychological examination and ordered Father to undergo a clinical interview and assessment as well. A month later, A.M. was adjudicated a CINC as to Mother and by default as to Father because Father did not appear for the adjudication hearing.
In the months that followed, the parents' compliance with court orders was inconsistent. In June 2013, the State filed a motion to terminate both parents' rights. The State alleged Mother was unfit for a number of reasons, including her history of mental illness, the parents' history of domestic violence, and her failure to adjust her circumstances to meet the needs of her child. The State alleged Father was unfit because of mental illness, his history of drug use and failure to complete UA and hair follicle testing, and his failure to focus on the needs of A.M.
An evidentiary hearing was held on September 3, 2013. The witnesses included a substance abuse counselor, a psychologist, two visitation workers, and two permanency employees. The substance abuse counselor testified that she evaluated Father in April 2013. Father reported to the counselor that he experimented with alcohol and marijuana when he was 17 but quit using both (other than social drinking) when he was 18. Father did not report current usage of substances; however, he did say he last used marijuana 3 months before the evaluation. Based upon Father's self-reported information, the counselor stated Father did not meet the criteria for substance abuse treatment.
Father completed the court-ordered clinical assessment; however, Father refused to allow the psychologist to release her report until the case manager repeatedly insisted. The psychologist testified that Father denied or minimized the allegations included in the CINC petition. Father claimed he did not have any mental health issues. Father insisted he had repeatedly undergone periodic psychological assessments while in foster care as a teenager, and he claimed he had above-average intelligence. Other than Mother, Father had little social support because he had severed most of his ties with his own family. Father also denied any responsibility for the removal of his children from the home, believing he was a victim of the situation and nothing he did was responsible for the child's removal. He believed he and Mother were perfect parents.
Ultimately, the psychologist diagnosed Father with narcissistic personality disorder with paranoid features, meaning Father had a pervasive pattern of grandiosity and need for adoration; typically, such a person lacks empathy for others. The paranoid feature was based on Father's thought processes that Grandmother and the State were plotting against him. The psychologist did not recommend therapy for Father but only because research showed that persons not motivated to change did not do well in therapy.
The visitation supervisors both testified Father did not seem to want to spend time with A.M. during the visitations. Mother always interacted with A.M. during the visitation and brought age-appropriate toys. Mother also fed A.M. and changed her diaper. When Father did interact with A.M., he cuddled her, kissed her, and hugged her, but this was not often. Although Father would play with A.M. occasionally, in most visits, Father only briefly engaged with A.M. and usually sat and watched Mother and A.M. together. When the supervisor reminded Father that he was missing his opportunity to interact with A.M., he seemed to prefer arguing about the case and spent most of his time repeating to the social worker how the removal of K.M. and A.M. was unfair and how they were victims of the system. Mother also asked Father to stop arguing, to spend time with the child, and to help her. On several occasions, their arguments would distract both of them from watching A.M. Occasionally, Father would be on the phone during the visitation.
The visitation supervisors noted other problems. The parents were regularly late to visitations by at least 10 minutes and occasionally failed to bring supplies because they spent the money on something else, i.e., energy drinks for Father. Father also missed three visits; he called Mother during one of these visits and argued with her on the phone. The social workers never saw much of a bond between Father and A.M. Mother was always excited and interacted with the child, and A.M. bonded with her. However, Mother would become easily frustrated if the child got into something or was not being still during a diaper change. Father repeatedly reported that his family was perfect and demanded new caseworkers and attorney to work with them.
Visits continued to be supervised because of Father's ongoing anger, repeated difficulty in calming him down, and his consistent failure to submit hair follicle or UA samples to confirm he was not using drugs. At the end of May or early June 2013, workers saw some improvement; both parents attended most of the visits and both interacted appropriately with A.M. Unfortunately, this improvement lasted only for couple of weeks; thereafter, the parents relapsed into their prior bad behavior.
The parents were not consistent with complying with the court's orders. For example, Mother provided documentation regarding her monthly disability benefits, and Father reported that he worked nearly every day and long hours for a cable communications company. However, Father never provided any pay stubs to show he was gainfully employed. Mother completed anger management classes and domestic violence classes, but Father did not believe he should be required to take anger management or domestic violence classes. Of the seven hair follicle tests requested of each, Mother completed only one test and Father completed only one test; the results of both tests were negative. Of the nine requested urinalysis tests, Mother completed two and Father complete one; the results of those tests were also negative. Both parents did complete psychological evaluations, substance abuse evaluations, and parenting classes.
Mother's mental health was an ongoing concern as well. Mother had completed some individual therapy but missed several appointments and was not able to schedule any additional appointments because she was late on her payments. The case manager did not receive any documentation from Mother's doctors about her medication status, although Mother provided verbal updates. Mother admitted that if she was not on her medication, she could be very violent. Mother had been hospitalized three times during her life for mental health issues, once as recently as 2012. During her May 2013 psychological assessment, mother reported that her relationship with Father was not good; he was verbally abusive, and she only stayed with Father because she could not take care of the girls by herself. Mother minimized any responsibility on her part for her children's removal from the home. The psychologist noted that Mother had stopped taking one of her medications, Lithium, without telling her medication manager.
Case workers testified that A.M. was happy in her foster home and had bonded with both Grandmother and K.M. One case manager testified that she did not believe reintegration was possible because both parents would need nearly constant in-home services and regular check-ins, both parents needed to go to therapy together to improve their communication, and Father needed parenting skills in the event Mother failed to take her medication.
Ultimately, termination was recommended for a variety of factors, including lack of documentation that Mother was taking her medication on a regular basis; Father's failure to complete domestic violence classes; the parents' lack of individual therapy; no proof Father was employed or how much money he made; and Father's inability to see anything from the child's perspective or put A.M. first.
Following the testimony, the district court took the matter under advisement. When it reconvened on October 4, 2013, the court found the parents were unfit due to mental or emotional illness, reasonable efforts had been made to rehabilitate the family and those efforts had been unsuccessful, and the parents had failed to adjust their circumstances or conduct to meet the needs of the child. The court also found, based upon the entire record, the parents had had ample opportunity to change.
However, the court indicated it was not prepared to terminate the parents' rights at the time because it found no trial testimony that termination of parental rights would be in the best interests of A.M. If such evidence had been presented, the court would have granted the motion to terminate. The court then offered the State the opportunity to review the record and point out the evidence supporting its claim that termination was in the best interests of the child. The judge stated: “In the absence of that, I think you'll need to ... re-open the case by Motion to Present Additional Evidence....” The court scheduled the matter for a hearing later that month.
At the October 29, 2013, hearing, the State informed the court it was prepared to recall one of its witnesses to testify about the best interests of the child. Both the court and the parties were concerned about whether the prior findings established only present unfitness. The court ultimately stated it believed the State had presented sufficient evidence regarding both present and future unfitness. Mother wanted a separate hearing to address the issue because the State did not advise her that it would be proffering additional evidence at this hearing. Father opposed giving the State another chance to reopen its case when it had a full opportunity to present evidence at the initial hearing. Father's counsel conceded, however, that the State could file a new motion to terminate and, in the meantime, reintegration efforts could continue.
The court allowed the State to proceed. The State recalled Dan Beeson, the most recent case manager. Beeson testified it was in A.M.'s best interests for her parents' rights to be terminated in order for her to have permanency. He testified that Grandmother, who had been caring for the child, could adopt her. Beeson testified that Mother had a good relationship with Grandmother and could still maintain a relationship with A.M. Beeson testified that, based upon his observations, A.M. had a limited bond with Mother and no bond with Father due to his ongoing lack of interaction with her. He did not see the parents' unfitness likely to change in the future because of each parent's mental health issues.
After a short recess, the court reconvened. After reviewing the documents and information from all the hearings, the court noted that Mother's mental condition was controlled by medication. However, she reported she stayed with Father only because she could not take care of the children by herself. Due to Father's belief he did not need treatment for his mental condition, his condition was unlikely to change. Because of Mother's inability to raise A.M. and Father's lack of interest in the actual day-to-day raising of the child, the court found clear and convincing evidence established the parents were unfit, such unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, and it was in A.M.'s best interests to terminate their rights.
Both parents timely appeal from the initial journal entry.
Did the District Court Abuse Its Discretion in Permitting the State to Reopen Its Case?
On appeal, both Mother and Father challenge the district court's actions in “inviting” and then permitting the State to reopen the record to present additional testimony regarding the best interests of A.M. Specifically, Mother alleges the court went beyond the legal framework and abused its discretion in permitting the State to reopen its case when it had ample opportunity to present all of its evidence in the initial hearing.
Father argues that based on the court's initial bench ruling—the parents were presently unfit—the court should have denied the State's motion to terminate. Father notes the court found no evidence pertaining to the best interests of the child and was silent as to whether the parents could change in the foreseeable future, two of the necessary elements required to be proved by the State. Father argues on appeal that the district court erred in (1) not permitting more evidence on whether the parents would likely change in the foreseeable future; and (2) allowing the State to present additional evidence on the best interests of the child. While he argued the State failed to carry its burden of proof, significantly, Father conceded before the district court that even if the court denied the State's request to reopen the case, the State could immediately refile another motion to terminate and repeat the process. Neither party requested the opportunity to put on additional evidence about future fitness or best interests.
We find no error here. First, it appears that the district court mistakenly believed that someone must specifically testify that it is in the best interests of the child to terminate parental rights: “I am not prepared to terminate the rights at this time ... because in my review of the record, I could not find testimony ... that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of this child.” While the district court must make that finding based upon the evidence presented, there is no requirement that testimony specifically address it. The court can make its own conclusions based upon the evidence presented regarding parental fitness and other circumstances.
Second, even if some further testimony on best interests was needed, a trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a party may reopen its case to offer additional evidence. See State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181, 204–05, 284 P.3d 977 (2012); McDaniel v. Jones, 235 Kan. 93, 114, 679 P.2d 682 (1984). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion only if the action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) is based on an error of law; or (3) is based on an error of fact. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Services Co., 296 Kan. 906, 935, 296 P.3d 1106 (2013). We find no abuse of discretion here.
At the outset, we note the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2201 et seq. (the Code) neither explicitly provides for nor bars the district court from reopening a case for additional evidence. K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2267(a) requires the court set a hearing on a motion to terminate parental rights promptly after such a motion is filed, and the court may continue the proceeding only if it is in the best interests of the child. In addition, the Code must be liberally construed to carry out the policies of the State which include making the ongoing “physical, mental and emotional needs of the child decisive considerations in proceedings” and to “dispose of all proceedings under this code without unnecessary delay.” K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2201(b)(3), (4).
Reopening a case may be permitted even if the case has been submitted to the factfinder for consideration. State v. Norton, 292 Kan. 437, 440, 254 P.3d 1264 (2011). In general, when permitting a party to reopen a case, our Supreme Court set forth the factors the district court must consider as part of its decision:
“ ‘In exercising its discretion, the court must consider the timeliness of the motion, the character of the testimony, and the effect of the granting of the motion. The party moving to reopen should provide a reasonable explanation for failure to present the evidence in its case-in-chief. The evidence proffered should be relevant, admissible, technically adequate, and helpful to the jury in ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the accused. The belated receipt of such testimony should not “imbue the evidence with distorted importance, prejudice the opposing party's case, or preclude an adversary from having an adequate opportunity to meet the additional evidence offered.” [Citation omitted.]’ “ State v. Murdock, 286 Kan. 661, 672–73, 187 P.3d 1267 (2008).
Under these factors, the parents have failed to establish any abuse of discretion. While admittedly the State failed to explain why it neglected to explicitly ask its witnesses about A.M.'s best interests, there was considerable testimony presented during the original hearing which would allow a reasonable inference it was in A.M.'s best interests to terminate her parents' rights. This included the testimony of the case managers that both parents suffered from significant mental illnesses that were not being adequately addressed by either of them and that A.M. had bonded with Grandmother and K.M., whereas her bonding with Mother was minimal and with Father essentially nonexistent.
Moreover, there is no dispute that this “new” evidence was relevant, admissible, and helpful to resolve the legal issues. The testimony included explicit statements of best interests by coalescing evidence from the initial hearing. Additionally, neither parent requested, after the evidence was presented, an opportunity to present additional evidence to respond to the best interests issue. While Mother did request a continuance before the new evidence to prepare for an additional evidentiary hearing, neither parent argues on appeal what additional evidence they could have presented to counter that belatedly presented by the State.
In light of the Code's directive for prompt adjudications, considering issues in light of “child time,” and the district court's duty to safeguard the best interests of A.M., it would be contrary to our state's policies to require the State to refile and relitigate the case. See K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2201(b). This would only serve to keep A.M., who had been placed apart from her parents for all but 4 months of her life, in limbo for additional time.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to reopen its case under the circumstances.
Were the District Court's Findings Supported by Clear and Convincing Evidence?
Father contends there was not clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of his parental rights. Mother's argument focuses solely on the district court's decision to permit the State to reopen its case. Mother argues there was insufficient evidence of a clear and convincing nature to justify the termination of her parental rights to A.M. because the State failed to present evidence at the initial hearing that Mother's “present unfitness” was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future or that it was in A.M.'s best interests for her rights to be terminated. Mother apparently does not contest the court's original finding that she was currently unfit as a parent.
We have already found the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State to present new evidence. Because Mother essentially fails to argue the merits of the question, we could reject her arguments for that reason alone. Friedman v, Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts, 296 Kan. 636, 645, 294 P.3d 287 (2013) (point raised incidentally in brief and not argued therein is deemed abandoned). In considering the parents' claims of a lack of evidence to support termination of their rights on the merits, a careful review of their briefs establishes each parents' claims of fitness were based on the theory that each parent made up for the shortcomings of the other; thus, as a couple, their rights should not have been terminated. We disagree.
Once a child has been adjudicated a CINC, “the court may terminate parental rights or appoint a permanent custodian when the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit by reason of conduct or condition which renders the parent unable to care properly for a child and the conduct or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.” K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269(a). In making such a determination, the court, among other things, is to consider:
“(1) Emotional illness, mental illness, mental deficiency or physical disability of the parent, of such duration or nature as to render the parent unable to care for the ongoing physical, mental and emotional needs of the child;
(2) conduct toward a child of a physically, emotionally or sexually cruel or abusive nature;
(3) the use of intoxicating liquors or narcotic or dangerous drugs of such duration or nature as to render the parent unable to care for the ongoing physical, mental or emotional needs of the child;
(4) physical, mental or emotional abuse or neglect or sexual abuse of a child;
(5) conviction of a felony and imprisonment;
(6) unexplained injury or death of another child or stepchild of the parent or any child in the care of the parent at the time of injury or death;
(7) failure of reasonable efforts made by appropriate public or private agencies to rehabilitate the family;
(8) lack of effort on the part of the parent to adjust the parent's circumstances, conduct or conditions to meet the needs of the child; and
(9) whether the child has been in extended out of home placement as a result of actions or inactions attributable to the parent and one or more of the factors listed in subsection (c) apply.” K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269(b).
If the child is not in the physical custody of a parent, as was the case here, the court is also to consider:
“(1) Failure to assure care of the child in the parental home when able to do so;
(2) failure to maintain regular visitation, contact or communication with the child or with the custodian of the child;
(3) failure to carry out a reasonable plan approved by the court directed toward the integration of the child into a parental home; and
(4) failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of substitute physical care and maintenance based on ability to pay.” K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269(c).
Importantly, Kansas law provides that the existence of any one of the factors listed in K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269(b) and (c) may, but does not necessarily, establish grounds for termination of parental rights. K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269(f).
When reviewing a district court's findings on this point, our standard of review is clear: The district court's findings must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269(a). We determine whether such evidence could have convinced a rational factfinder such facts were highly probable by clear and convincing evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the State. In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. 686, 705, 187 P.3d 594 (2008). In making this determination, we do not weigh conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or redetermine questions of fact. 286 Kan. at 705.
As the district court articulated, there was ample evidence from the initial hearing to find Mother was unfit and her condition was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Mother had an ongoing mental health condition that, she admitted, could make her violent if she was not taking medication. While her visitations went well and she clearly loved her daughter, Mother reported in her June 2013 evaluation she had stopped taking one of her prescriptions without advising her physician. Moreover, while she had completed various classes, Mother failed to keep up with her medication management program or mental health therapy. Mother also admitted she wanted to leave Father but only stayed because she knew she could not care for the child on her own. Based upon Father's reactions to her requests for help with A.M. during visitations, the record supports the conclusion that Mother likely would not receive significant support from Father in the actual day-to-day care for the child.
Father contends he held steady employment, promptly completed the drug and clinical assessments, and complied with most of the court's orders. He further contends the caseworkers' primary concerns were with Mother's mental health and his attitude led to him being treated unfairly. He contends the only reason he was considered unfit was because the case workers did not like his rudeness and intensity. Father also contends he was making progress and was not given enough time to adjust his circumstances.
But despite Father's claim of steady employment, the record contains no documentation to establish he was, in fact, steadily employed. When A.M. was born, the family home had no running water. The parents appeared at visitations on a variety of occasions without supplies, saying they could not afford them.
Father emphasized his drug assessment found him to be a low risk for drug dependence and his clinical assessment did not recommend any therapy. However, the drug assessment was based only upon Father's self-reported use of drugs and alcohol. Contrary to Father's statements to the evaluator, Mother reported Father regularly used marijuana. Though the UA and hair follicle tests Father submitted to were negative, Father failed to provide UA or hair follicle samples on the majority of the occasions requested.
As for his clinical assessment, Father completed that assessment without a referral from the caseworkers but initially refused to allow it to be released to the court. The assessment, once finally obtained, revealed a narcissistic personality disorder with paranoid features diagnosis. The only reason the clinician did not recommend therapy was simply because Father did not believe he had any problems or needed to change and, consequently, therapy would have been of little benefit. We also note that contrary to Father's assertions, the record does not reveal any evidence that Father ever attended any therapy sessions.
Finally, while it is true that Father's rudeness would not be a basis for termination, it was a symptom of his personality disorder and reflected on his ability to parent. During much of the case, Father's focus was typically on himself, and he besieged caseworkers during the once a week hourly visitations with A.M. with complaints about the unfairness he felt rather than making any effort to bond with his daughter. While Father apparently believed Mother should be the primary caretaker, his unwillingness to engage with his daughter not only prevented bonding but also was sufficient to establish he would not likely be able to care for A.M. if Mother became incapacitated.
We conclude the record supports the district courts unfitness findings and that such unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.
Was Termination of Mother's and Father's Parental Rights in A.M.'s Best Interests?
As the decision to terminate a parent's rights is a discretionary one once unfitness has been established, we review the district court's decision to terminate the parents' rights under an abuse of discretion standard, meaning we may reverse only if no reasonable person would agree with the district court. In re R.S., 50 Kan.App.2d ––––, 2014 WL 5408429 (No. 111,027, filed October 24, 2014), Slip op. at 14.
We find the State presented sufficient evidence it was in A.M.'s best interests to terminate her parents' rights. A.M. had been in out-of-home placement for 10 months of her young 14–month life. Although Mother made great strides in attempting to bond with A.M., that did not make up for the shortcomings in ensuring her mental health and medication management remained stable. Mother's ongoing ambivalence about remaining with Father was significant in light of her own belief she could not cope without his presence. Father's actions repeatedly reflected his narcissistic tendencies and his inability to focus, other than for short periods, on his child. Moreover, A.M. had bonded with her caretaker, Grandmother, who was also caring for her sister.
The district court did not err in terminating the parents' rights, and we affirm its judgment.