In re A.M.

52 Citing cases

  1. In re Adoption by Jessica M.

    2020 Me. 118 (Me. 2020)   Cited 6 times

    In general, we review the denial of a motion to continue for an abuse of discretion. In re A.M. , 2012 ME 118, ¶ 14, 55 A.3d 463. "When due process is implicated, we review such procedural rulings to determine whether the process struck a balance between competing concerns that was fundamentally fair." Id.

  2. In re Benjamin W.

    2019 Me. 147 (Me. 2019)   Cited 3 times

    The court denied the motion, finding that the father's absence was the result of his own voluntary conduct. SeeIn re A.M. , 2012 ME 118, ¶ 19, 55 A.3d 463. In the resulting termination judgment, the court also noted that the father failed to make any post-trial offer of proof as to what "additional relevant information [he] might have ... provided."

  3. In re M.B.

    2013 Me. 46 (Me. 2013)   Cited 36 times
    Holding that parents in a termination of parental rights proceeding "are not entitled to closing argument as a matter of right"

    [¶ 29] Although the parents had avenues through which they could have sought immediate redress from the trial court, they chose to proceed directly to this Court, and they did so without alleging how the purported error affected the underlying judgment. See In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 25, 55 A.3d 463;see also Greaton v. Greaton, 2012 ME 17, ¶ 7, 36 A.3d 913. The parents failed to avail themselves of mechanisms through which the trial court could have provided relief, seeM.R. Civ. P. 59(e), 60(b), failed to demonstrate how the outcome would have been different had the court considered their briefs, see In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 25, 55 A.3d 463, and they are not entitled to closing argument “as a matter of right,” Coppersmith, 2001 ME 165, ¶ 7, 786 A.2d 602.

  4. In re Kaylianna C.

    2017 Me. 135 (Me. 2017)   Cited 4 times

    "When due process is implicated, we review such procedural rulings to determine whether the process struck a balance between competing concerns that was fundamentally fair." In re A.M. , 2012 ME 118, ¶ 14, 55 A.3d 463 (quotation marks omitted).[¶9] Due process is a "flexible concept that calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."

  5. In re Adden B.

    2016 Me. 113 (Me. 2016)   Cited 8 times
    Concluding that a father's absence due to illness was not "involuntary" in part because the court questioned the credibility of his assertion that he was ill

    As applied to a termination hearing, “balancing the interests, where significant rights are at stake, due process requires: notice of the issues, an opportunity to be heard, the right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, the right to respond to claims and evidence, and an impartial factfinder.” In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 16, 55 A.3d 463 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 8] The father contends that his absence was “involuntary” due to his illness.

  6. Violette v. Violette

    2015 Me. 97 (Me. 2015)   Cited 14 times
    Concluding that there was no clear error when the trial court made a finding of a business's value without the benefit of expert testimony

    [¶ 15] We review factual findings for clear error, which exists only if “there is no competent evidence in the record to support” the finding, the finding “is based on a clear misapprehension by the trial court of the meaning of the evidence,” or if “the force and effect of the evidence, taken as a total entity, rationally persuades to a certainty that the finding is so against the great preponderance of the believable evidence that it does not represent the truth and right of the case.” In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 29, 55 A.3d 463 (quotation marks omitted). “Factual findings should not be overturned in an appellate proceeding simply because an alternative finding also finds support in the evidence.

  7. Barrow v. Al Jaber

    107 A.3d 616 (Me. 2014)

    Further, neither the proceedings nor the order violated Al Jaber's rights to substantive and procedural due process. See In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶¶ 15–16, 55 A.3d 463; 19–A M.R.S. § 4006(6) (2014); 19–A M.R.S. § 4007(6) (2014); M.R. Civ. P. 55(a). [¶ 2] Although we dispose of Al Jaber's claims summarily, we write to reiterate that it is the responsibility of incarcerated litigants, such as Al Jaber, to initiate a request for arrangements to participate in court hearings.

  8. In re M.

    2020 Me. 99 (Me. 2020)   Cited 2 times

    A litigant is not denied due process if she fails to take advantage of available procedural mechanisms that are designed to protect against an erroneous deprivation of life, liberty, or property. See In re A.M. , 2012 ME 118, ¶¶ 23-27, 55 A.3d 463 (concluding that a parent was not denied due process by her inability to attend a termination of parental rights hearing given that "[s]he made no effort to seek relief through [other] means" despite "the availability of procedural mechanisms designed to safeguard [her] right[s]"); see also Putnam v. Albee , 1999 ME 44, ¶ 8, 726 A.2d 217 ("[T]he inability of a party to obtain a transcript may be a proper basis for vacating a judgment. Such relief, however, will only be appropriate when the appellant has diligently pursued [her] rights.

  9. In re Raul R.

    2019 Me. 94 (Me. 2019)   Cited 1 times
    Allowing participation by an incarcerated parent at a termination hearing "in person, by telephone or video, through deposition, or by other means that will reasonably ensure an opportunity for the parent to be meaningfully involved in the hearing"

    [¶11] "When incarceration is not involved and a parent fails to appear, courts generally discern no abuse of discretion or violation of due process in proceeding with the hearing if the parent's absence was occasioned by circumstances voluntarily created by that parent." In re A.M. , 2012 ME 118, ¶ 19, 55 A.3d 463. When, on the other hand, "a parent is known to be incarcerated in advance of a hearing, the court must, upon request by the parent, provide a meaningful opportunity for the parent to participate in the hearing whether in person, by telephone or video, through deposition, or by other means that will reasonably ensure an opportunity for the parent to be meaningfully involved in the hearing." Id. ¶ 20.

  10. In re Shayleigh S.

    2018 Me. 165 (Me. 2018)   Cited 3 times

    See In re M.B. , 2013 ME 46, ¶ 34, 65 A.3d 1260 ; see also Greaton v. Greaton , 2012 ME 17, ¶ 7, 36 A.3d 913 ("In appealing a judgment, it is not enough to challenge procedural errors allegedly made by the trial court without also showing actual error in the judgment."); In re A.M. , 2012 ME 118, ¶ 25, 55 A.3d 463 ("The mother's failure to explain on appeal how her absence or the officer's testimony [concerning her absence] could have affected the trial or its outcome is relevant in determining on appeal whether she has been deprived of due process.").[¶ 12] The mother's testimony, including her testimony about the choking incident involving S.S., was substantively the same as what S.S. said in camera and was subject to cross-examination by the father.