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In re A.M.

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Mar 4, 2011
No. D056720 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2011)

Opinion


In re A.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.M., Defendant and Appellant. D056720 California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, First Division March 4, 2011

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. J216384, Amalia L. Meza and Dwayne K. Moring, Judges.

AARON, J.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant A.M. appeals from a judgment entered pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. A petition was brought against A.M. alleging that he stole victim Rodrigo L.'s cell phone and displayed a pocketknife to Rodrigo when Rodrigo tried to recover the cell phone from A.M. After a bench trial, the trial court found true the allegations that A.M. committed one count of robbery and one count of using a deadly weapon, both for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang. The court declared A.M. a ward of the court, placed him on probation, and placed him in the custody of his parents.

On appeal, A.M. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's true findings that he was the individual who committed the offenses, and that a deadly weapon was used in the commission of robbery. A.M. asserts that because the victim testified only that A.M. looked "similar" to the person who stole his cell phone, there is insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that A.M. was the perpetrator of the crimes. He further argues that because the victim testified that he saw only the handle of a knife, there is insufficient evidence to establish that A.M. used a deadly weapon.

We conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings. The victim clearly identified A.M. as the perpetrator on the night of the incident, and also testified that the object that the perpetrator displayed during the robbery was a pocketknife. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual background

On November 15, 2009, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Rodrigo was riding on the trolley. He had his cell phone in his hands. A.M. knocked the cell phone out of Rodrigo's hands and picked it up. When Rodrigo attempted to get the cell phone back from A.M., A.M. pulled a pocketknife out of a pocket and displayed the handle of the knife to Rodrigo. A.M. told Rodrigo that he was "Southeast, " i.e., that he was affiliated with a local criminal street gang.

When the trolley stopped, A.M. fled with his friend. Rodrigo, Rodrigo's brother, and a friend followed A.M. and the other individual until the pair ran into a house. Rodrigo's friend then called the police.

At approximately 7:00 p.m., San Diego Police Officers Joseph Peralta and Houshawn LeGrand responded to Rodrigo's call. The officers spoke with Rodrigo, his brother and the friend. Rodrigo described the suspect as a Hispanic male, 17 to 19 years old, wearing a blue hooded sweatshirt and dark pants. The boys told the officers that they could point out the house that the suspect had entered.

The officers had the three boys sit in the back of the police car as they drove toward the house. On the way there, they passed a house at which a Hispanic male was sitting on the porch. One of the officers asked Rodrigo if the man on the porch was the person who had stolen his cell phone; Rodrigo said he was not. However, when another individual came out the front door of the house in question, Rodrigo yelled, " 'That's him. That's him.' "

Officers Peralta and LeGrand detained both of the men in front of the home, and conducted a curbside lineup. After the officers admonished Rodrigo, he identified A.M. as the person who had taken his cell phone, stating, " 'Yeah, that's him.' " Officer LeGrand asked Rodrigo why Rodrigo believed that A.M. was the thief. Rodrigo replied, " 'It looks exactly like him. His face is the same.' " Officer LeGrand then mentioned that the clothing that A.M. was wearing was a little different from the clothing that Rodrigo had described the suspect as wearing. Rodrigo responded, " 'That's him. I'm positive that's him regardless of the clothing.' " The officers then arrested A.M.

Neither Rodrigo nor the other witnesses identified the individual who had been sitting on the front porch of the home as having been involved in the incident.

Although the officers recovered a cell phone, it was not Rodrigo's. The police never did recover Rodrigo's cell phone. Officers did not search the home.

At trial, Rodrigo testified that A.M. looked similar to the person who took his cell phone, but said that he was not completely sure that A.M. was in fact that person. Rodrigo also testified that on the night of the incident, after the officers had detained A.M., Rodrigo had told the officers only that the suspect in custody "looks like him" or that A.M. looked "similar" to the person who had taken his cell phone.

On redirect examination, Rodrigo testified that on the night of the robbery, he thought that A.M. was the person who stole his phone.

Detective Arthur Perea testified as a gang expert at trial. Detective Perea testified that on at least two prior occasions, A.M. had identified himself to police as an active member of the South East San Diego criminal street gang. It was Perea's opinion that A.M. was an active member of the South East San Diego street gang at the time of the offense, and that he remained an active member at the time of trial.

B. Procedural background

On November 17, 2009, the San Diego County District Attorney filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that A.M. committed robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 1) and theft (§ 487, subd. (c); count 2), and that he used a deadly weapon (§ 417, subd. (a)(1); count 3). The petition further alleged that A.M. committed all of the offenses for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1), (d)).

Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

On January 8, 2010, the trial court found true the allegations in counts 1 and 3, as well as the accompanying gang allegations. The court dismissed count 2 without making a finding on the count, after concluding that the offense charged in count 2 was a lesser-included offense of count 1.

On January 26, the trial court declared A.M. a ward of the court and placed him on probation, in the custody of his parents.

A.M. filed a timely notice of appeal on January 28, 2010.

III.

DISCUSSION

A.M. contends that there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to find that he was the individual who stole Rodrigo's cell phone, or that he used a deadly weapon, i.e., a pocketknife, in committing the offense.

A. Legal standards

The same standard of review that applies to challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in adult criminal proceedings governs a minor's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings of the juvenile court in a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 proceeding. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809; In re Oscar R. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 770, 773.) We review the entire record to determine if it contains substantial evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) "Evidence, to be 'substantial' must be 'of ponderable legal significance... reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.' [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 576.)

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and presume in support of the jurisdictional findings the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 576-577.) We resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the judgment, and indulge in every reasonable inference that the trier of fact could draw from the evidence. (People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.) While we must ensure that the evidence supporting the order is substantial, it is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of witnesses and the truth or falsity of the facts on which a determination depends. (People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303.)

B. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings

1. There is substantial evidence to support the finding that A.M. is the person who committed the offense

A.M. contends that "[t]he purported identification of Appellant by victim Rodrigo L. is so weak that it is not evidence that is reasonable, credible or of solid value." According to A.M., because Rodrigo "consistently gave testimony that Appellant looked 'similar' to the person that took his cell phone, " and failed to make a positive in-court identification of A.M., the evidence was insufficient for the court to make a true finding that A.M. is the person who took Rodrigo's cell phone.

We conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding. "Identification of the defendant by a single eyewitness may be sufficient to prove the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of a crime. [Citation.] Moreover, a testifying witness's out-of-court identification is probative for that purpose and can, by itself, be sufficient evidence of the defendant's guilt even if the witness does not confirm it in court. [Citations.] Indeed, 'an out-of-court identification generally has greater probative value than an in-court identification, even when the identifying witness does not confirm the out-of-court identification: "[T]he [out-of-court] identification has greater probative value than an identification made in the courtroom after the suggestions of others and the circumstances of the trial may have intervened to create a fancied recognition in the witness' mind. [Citations.]..." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 480.)

Officer LeGrand testified that when Rodrigo saw A.M. on the night of the robbery, Rodrigo said, " 'That's him.' " According to Officer LeGrand, when he asked Rodrigo why Rodrigo thought A.M. was the person who had taken his cell phone, Rodrigo said, " 'It looks exactly like him. His face is the same.' " Even when LeGrand questioned Rodrigo about the fact that the clothing that A.M. was wearing was different from the clothing that Rodrigo had said the suspect had been wearing, Rodrigo again asserted, " 'That's him. I'm positive that's him regardless of the clothing.' " Although Rodrigo did not independently identify A.M. in the courtroom, nor confirm that he remained certain of his initial identification, he did not disavow his initial identification of A.M.

Rodrigo's out-of-court identification of A.M. as the person who took his cell phone is sufficient, by itself, to prove that A.M. was in fact that person. In addition, Rodrigo told the officers that the person who took his cell phone had identified himself as being affiliated with "Southeast, " and a detective testified at trial that A.M. was an active member of the South East San Diego criminal street gang. This evidence further supports Rodrigo's original identification of A.M. as the perpetrator of the offenses against him.

In sum, there is substantial evidence from which the trial court could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that A.M. is the person who stole Rodrigo's cell phone.

2. There is substantial evidence to support the finding that A.M. used a deadly weapon

Although A.M. concedes that a pocketknife can be a deadly weapon, he argues that there is insufficient evidence from which the trial court could have determined that he "brandished [a knife] at all." A.M. contends that because Rodrigo "only obtained a momentary glimpse of a small object inside the pocket of the sweatshirt, " and because Rodrigo "never described the color, shape, size or material that the object was made of, " Rodrigo's testimony cannot constitute sufficient evidence "that a knife was brandished."

Our review of the record establishes that there is substantial evidence that A.M. did, in fact, display a knife to the victim. At trial, Rodrigo testified, "And I tried to get close to him to take the phone from—well, he put it in his pocket, I got close to him, and he pulled out, like, a knife." Asked to describe the knife, Rodrigo said, "Well, it was small, like a pocketknife." Rodrigo was then asked, "Was it open or closed?" to which he responded, "You couldn't see because all he showed me was the handle." Later, during cross-examination, defense counsel asked Rodrigo how far he was from the perpetrator when Rodrigo approached him. Rodrigo replied, "At first, very close. But once he pulled out the knife, I moved away a bit."

A.M. argues that because Rodrigo saw only the handle of an object, there is insufficient evidence from which one could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the object in question was, in fact, a knife. However, Rodrigo testified unequivocally that the object that he saw A.M. display was a knife. The court was entitled to give this testimony significant weight. The fact that Rodrigo did not see the blade of the knife does not render his testimony insufficient to support a true finding that A.M. used a knife in the commission of the robbery. (See People v. Jacobs (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 375, 380 [although victim never saw a gun, jury could reasonably find that defendant had a gun based on evidence that defendant said he had a gun, the victim heard what he believed was the sound of the cocking of the hammer, and a gun was subsequently discovered inside stolen car in which defendant was the sole occupant].)

In addition to Rodrigo seeing the handle of the pocketknife, A.M. told Rodrigo that he belonged to the South East San Diego gang at the time he displayed the object. This constitutes additional circumstantial evidence from which one could reasonably infer that A.M. displayed a deadly weapon in concert with claiming a gang affiliation in order to scare Rodrigo and prevent him from trying to retrieve his cell.

We conclude that Rodrigo's testimony was sufficient evidence from which the court could determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that A.M. displayed a pocketknife to Rodrigo.

IV.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

WE CONCUR: McDONALD, Acting P. J., O'ROURKE, J.


Summaries of

In re A.M.

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Mar 4, 2011
No. D056720 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2011)
Case details for

In re A.M.

Case Details

Full title:In re A.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division

Date published: Mar 4, 2011

Citations

No. D056720 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2011)