Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. No. RIJ108894,Robert M. Padia, Temporary Judge. Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.
Rich Pfeiffer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.M.
Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant C.M.
Joe S. Rank, County Counsel, and Carole A. Nunes Fong, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Karen J. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.
OPINION
RICHLI, Acting P. J.
J.M. (Father) and C.M. (Mother) appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to two-year-old A.M. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. On appeal, Father claims (1) the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to maintain the sibling relationship pursuant to section 16002; (2) the court erred in failing to order sibling visitation when terminating parental rights; and (3) minor’s counsel had an actual conflict of interest and therefore should have been removed. Mother contends (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition; (2) DPSS failed to follow section 16002 and preserve and maintain the sibling relationship; and (3) the disentitlement doctrine applies to reverse the judgment terminating parental rights. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
Both parents join in and adopt the arguments presented by the other party to the extent they inure to their benefit.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.M. came to the attention of DPSS in October 2005 when a referral was received alleging domestic violence between the parents. The police report indicated that Father pushed Mother in the chest, grabbed her by the throat, and disconnected the telephone when Mother attempted to call the police.
Mother’s older daughter, A.D., who is not a party to this appeal, was removed from Mother’s custody in November 2004 on grounds of neglect and failure to support. In regard to A.D., DPSS had received referrals beginning in October 2003 for general neglect and domestic violence between A.D.’s parents. Mother’s parental rights as to A.D. were eventually terminated.
Following investigations, an amended section 300 petition on behalf of A.M. was filed on March 28, 2006. Pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 300, the petition alleged that Mother and Father had a history of domestic violence; that Mother had a history with DPSS in that A.M.’s sibling was a dependent, Mother had made minimal progress toward having the sibling placed with her, and DPSS was recommending terminating Mother’s reunification services in A.D.’s case; that Mother had continued to reside with Father, who had continued to be physically abusive to her; that Father had a criminal history, including sexual intercourse with an underage female; and that Mother was on probation and was recently arrested for violating her probation. Under subdivision (j) of section 300, the petition alleged that A.D. had been abused and/or neglected pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), thereby placing A.M. at risk of suffering similar harm.
At the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the allegations in the section 300 petition were found true as amended. A.M. was declared a dependent of the court and was left in her parents’ custody on a family maintenance plan. The case plan approved and ordered by the court required Mother to participate in counseling and a domestic violence program.
After further investigation, DPSS had determined that A.M. was not at risk in Mother’s care, as Mother had taken a parenting class, was participating in therapy, was testing negative for drugs, and had a stable residence.
On June 23, 2006, the social worker made an unannounced visit to Mother’s apartment. The social worker entered the apartment after calling for Mother, receiving no response, and finding the security door unlocked. The social worker found then one-year-old A.M. alone on the floor, playing with a soda bottle, and the home in disarray. Mother did not arrive on the scene for 15 minutes. The social worker called the police, who cited Mother for neglect, removed A.M., and placed her in protective custody.
By that time, Father had moved out of the home due to another domestic violence incident, and Mother had obtained a restraining order against him.
On June 27, 2006, a section 387 petition was filed, alleging that the previous disposition had been ineffective in protecting A.M.
The jurisdictional/dispositional hearing on the section 387 petition was held on July 20, 2006. Father was present; Mother was not. The allegations in the section 387 petition were found true. A.M. was adjudged a dependent of the court, and the parents were ordered to participate in their case plans. Mother’s case plan required that she participate in an alternatives to domestic violence program. The class was to be considered completed with the receipt of a certificate of completion signed by the instructor of the class. Mother was also required to participate in individual, group, and family therapy with an approved counselor.
By the time of the six-month review hearing on September 28, 2006, review and addendum reports documented Mother’s failure to regularly attend counseling and to follow up on referrals given to her by the social worker. Mother told the social worker that her attorney suggested seeing a therapist through her medical insurance. The social worker requested the name and telephone number of the therapist, but Mother failed to provide this information. Mother also failed to fulfill the domestic violence aspect of her case plan. Father also failed to regularly participate in his case plan.
In an addendum report filed January 18, 2007, the social worker recommended terminating the parents’ services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. Father had been arrested, and Mother and Father had continued to engage in domestic violence. In addition, Mother had failed to return to therapy and believed it was the therapist’s responsibility to call her. Even though Mother had a restraining order against Father, she moved across the street from his home and apparently continued to have contact with him.
A March 5, 2007, entry in the delivered service log indicated that placement of A.M. in the adoptive home of her sibling had been explored; however, A.D.’s prospective adoptive parents were unable to take A.M. (Mother’s parental rights as to A.D. were terminated in February 2007, when A.M. was 20 months old.)
The contested six-month review hearing was held on March 19, 2007. Following the presentation of the evidence, wherein both Mother and Father testified as well as the social worker, the juvenile court found that the extent of the progress made by the parents toward alleviating or mitigating the causes that made placement necessary had been unsatisfactory. The court then terminated reunification services to the parents and set a section 366.26 hearing.
In the section 366.26 report filed July 6, 2007, the social worker recommended parental rights be terminated and adoption as the most appropriate permanent plan. A.M. was in good health and was meeting her developmental milestones. She had been placed with her foster/adoptive parents in April 2007, and they wished to adopt her. She was considered a valued member of the foster family; she was loved and well cared for, and the prospective adoptive parents were capable of meeting her emotional, physical, developmental, and financial needs. A.M. had referred to her prospective adoptive parents as “mommy” and “daddy,” and her anxiety level had noticeably decreased.
In April 2007, following the termination of services, the parents had moved to Colorado without notifying DPSS. Father was on parole at that time, was considered a “parolee at large,” and was eventually extradited to California. Prior to leaving, Mother and Father had had several supervised visits with A.M. and had cancelled several others. The visits were appropriate, and the parents were affectionate with A.M. The parents visited A.M. again in July 2007. Although A.M. appeared to be happy to see Mother, she was not distressed when the visit ended. The social worker observed that A.M. did not appear to be very bonded to her parents, as she showed no distress when visits ended. A.M. continued to call her prospective adoptive parents “mommy and daddy” and was thriving in this placement. The prospective adoptive parents were amenable to ongoing contact with the biological family.
Mother filed a section 388 petition on September 7, 2007, to vacate the permanency planning hearing and reinstate reunification services, which will be discussed in more detail, post. There were no attachments to the petition.
In November 2007, the social worker reported her efforts to reach the ICPC (Interstate Compact for Placement of Children) coordinator regarding the status of the ICPC in Colorado on behalf of A.M.’s paternal grandmother. The social worker was verbally informed by the State of Colorado that the ICPC had been denied. The social worker also reported that she had had no contact with Mother or Father in several months. The parents had failed to call, write, or demonstrate any concern about A.M.’s welfare. The last visit Mother had had with A.M. was on September 19, 2007. DPSS had no new information regarding the parent’s alleged change in lifestyle and recommended that the section 388 petition be denied. Father remained on parole, Mother remained on probation for petty theft, and the parents had continued to fail to provide DPSS with their current address.
At the November 14, 2007, section 388 hearing, Mother presented a letter that was ordered filed, counsel presented argument, and Mother made a statement to the court. Mother essentially made excuses for her noncompliance with her case plan. After reading and considering the evidence, the court denied the section 388 petition, finding that Mother’s circumstances were changing rather than changed, and that Mother had not shown it would be in A.M.’s best interests to grant the requested relief.
The contested section 366.26 hearing was also held on November 14, 2007. Mother and Father both testified. Mother testified that the siblings were visiting with each other while in their prospective adoptive homes or foster care. Father’s counsel argued the sibling exception under former section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(e) (which is now subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v)) to adoption and claimed that DPSS did not make efforts to maintain the sibling bond. No mention was made of any of duties of the court or DPSS under section 16002. Mother’s counsel joined in Father’s counsel’s argument and urged the court to apply the beneficial and sibling relationship exceptions to adoption. Following presentation of evidence, the court terminated the parents’ parental rights and authorized a referral to mediation for a postadoption contract. Minor’s counsel requested that A.M.’s sibling’s prospective adoptive parents be involved in mediation. This appeal followed.
For the sake of clarity, we will refer to the exceptions to termination of parental rights under their former designations, which were in effect at the time parental rights were terminated.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Section 16002
Father argues DPSS failed to maintain the sibling relationship. (§ 16002.) Mother joins in and adopts this argument. We disagree.
Section 16002 reflects the legislative policy in favor of maintaining the continuity of the family unit and strengthening family ties by ensuring that siblings be placed together when removed from their homes. (§ 16002, subd. (a).) Thus, the agency is required to “make a diligent effort” in all out-of-home placements to maintain sibling relationships. (§ 16002, subd. (b).) In this regard, if siblings are not placed together in the same home, the social worker is required to “explain why the siblings are not placed together and what efforts he or she is making to place the siblings together or why those efforts are not appropriate.” (§ 16002, subd. (b).) Further, when placement of siblings together in the same home is not possible, diligent effort is required to provide for ongoing and frequent interaction among siblings. (Ibid.)
The statute expresses a legislative goal but does not create a mandatory duty. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 627, 641-642.) It simply requires “diligent efforts.” Such efforts were made in this case. Although DPSS does not document the visits between A.M. and her sister, the sisters were having contact. At the section 366.26 hearing, in response to whether she knew if A.M. saw her older sister, Mother testified, “From what I am told from what my mother says, they have seen each other, the foster parents are cooperating with each other, which is kind of surprising, for the other foster parent.” Mother also stated that she was “glad that they are being able to see each other.” The lack of information in the record regarding these visits is presumably due to the fact that DPSS did not need to supervise these contacts. Furthermore, DPSS explored the option of placing A.M. in the same adoptive home as her sister; however, the sibling’s prospective adoptive parents were unable to take A.M. Contrary to Father’s contention, appropriate steps were taken to attempt to place the children together and to facilitate visitation.
The record before us demonstrates the social worker made “diligent efforts” to keep the children together and to maintain sibling visitation. The fact there were difficulties was not the fault of DPSS. In any event, at no time prior to the section 366.26 hearing did either Father or Mother object to the placements or the lack of consistent sibling visitation. Thus, any error was waived. (In re Anthony P. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 635, 641-642.) In Anthony P., the court held that “[a]ppellant has waived her right to assert error as to sibling visitation on appeal by not properly raising the issue below. No objection was interposed in superior court premised upon: the alleged failure to ‘maintain[] sibling togetherness and contact’ (§ 16002, subd. (b)); the purported failure to ‘provide for ongoing and frequent interaction among siblings until family reunification is achieved’ (§ 16002, subd. (b)); or the supposed failure to state reasons for the suspension of sibling interaction. (§ 16002, subd. (c).) Hence, any objection to the absence of an order providing for sibling visitation has been waived.” (Id. at p. 641.)
As noted, ante, Father’s counsel did argue at the section 366.26 hearing that the sibling exception applied and that DPSS did not make efforts to maintain the sibling bond; however, no mention was made of the duties of the court or DPSS under section 16002.
B. Failure to Order Sibling Visitation
Father also claims, and Mother joins, that the court failed to make an order for sibling visitation following the termination of parental rights, citing In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415. In Cliffton B., the court referred to the statutory provisions dealing with sibling contact after parental rights are terminated. (§ 16002, subd. (e).) That section only requires DPSS to take steps to facilitate ongoing sibling contact and to educate adoptive parents on the importance of such ongoing contact. (§ 16002, subd. (e).) Nothing in the statute imposes a mandatory duty on the court to order sibling visits, notwithstanding the legislative policy.
Section 16002, subdivision (e), provides that, “[i]f parental rights are terminated and the court orders a dependent child to be placed for adoption, the licensed county adoption agency or the State Department of Social Services shall take all of the following steps to facilitate ongoing sibling contact . . .: [¶] (1) Include in training provided to prospective adoptive parents information about the importance of sibling relationships . . . and counseling on methods for maintaining sibling relationships. [¶] (2) Provide prospective adoptive parents with information about siblings of the child. . . . [¶] (3) Encourage prospective adoptive parents to make a plan for facilitating postadoptive contact between the child . . . and any siblings . . . .”
Recent decisional law holds that the sibling relationship is unaffected by a termination of the parent/child relationship. (See In re Miguel A. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 389, 394.) Thus, so long as the dependency case remains open (until the adoption is finalized), minors’ counsel can seek orders for sibling visitation. Here, the juvenile court authorized a referral to mediation for a postadoption contract and granted minor’s counsel’s request that A.M.’s sibling’s prospective adoptive parents be involved in the mediation.
Neither the provisions of section 16002, subdivision (e), nor section 366.29 imposes any obligation upon the juvenile court to enter orders for sibling visitation. As noted above, here, the parties agreed to refer the matter to mediation, which the court did order. In re Cliffton B., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th 415 is inapposite. The case does not hold that the failure to order posttermination sibling visitation is error; rather, it states that the juvenile court has discretion to make interim visitation orders but does not make it mandatory to do so or reversibly erroneous to decline. The court here manifestly did “consider” the issue and referred the matter to mediation.
To the extent that Father focuses on the court’s failure to affirmatively order sibling visitation in the interim between the termination of parental rights and the adoption, he has failed to demonstrate any error. As noted, sections 16002, subdivision (e), and 366.29 address postadoptive sibling contact. The court was not obligated to make provisions for such contact, but it did exercise its discretion to refer that matter to mediation. A.M. and her prospective adoptive parents were amenable to consensual sibling contact with A.D. Nothing in the court’s orders interfered with any such arrangement. In any case, no one requested interim, as opposed to postadoptive, visitation. The court can hardly be faulted for failing to order what was never requested.
C. Disentitlement Doctrine
Mother argues that the doctrine of disentitlement prevents DPSS from advocating a permanent plan of adoption because of DPSS’s failure to arrange sibling visitation or maintain and facilitate the relationship between A.M. and her sibling. Father joins in and adopts this argument. We conclude that the disentitlement doctrine does not apply.
At the outset, we note that neither parent raised the issue of a lack of sibling visitation or the disentitlement doctrine below. Therefore, they have waived the issue. (In re Anthony P., supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 641.)
Notwithstanding the waiver, the disentitlement doctrine does not apply here to bar DPSS from advocating a permanent plan of adoption. Under the disentitlement doctrine, “[a] party to an action cannot, with right or reason, ask the aid and assistance of a court in hearing his demands while he stands in an attitude of contempt to legal orders and processes of the courts of this state. [Citations.]” (MacPherson v. MacPherson (1939) 13 Cal.2d 271, 277; see also In re Kamelia S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1227-1229.) In other words, “a court may refuse assistance to a party who fails to comply with a court order . . . .” (In re C.C. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 76, 84.)
Here, nothing in the record indicates that DPSS had “an attitude of contempt to legal orders” or that it failed to comply with a court order. The record does not show that any specific orders were made by the juvenile court with respect to sibling visitation. Nonetheless, visits between the siblings did occur. Thus, it cannot be assumed that because DPSS did not report on visits between A.M. and her sister that sibling visitation was not occurring. The fact that A.M. was having visits with her sister and that her prospective adoptive parents were open to visits and ongoing contact with her biological family demonstrate the opposite. Therefore, although the record is devoid of any information regarding these visits, the record indicates that the social worker complied with the court’s orders and that visitation was occurring between the siblings.
We reject Mother’s claim that she and Father were unable to prove the existence of the sibling exception found in former section 336.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E), because DPSS failed to arrange and facilitate sibling visitation. The Court of Appeal in In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1006-1010, considered and rejected this argument. The court explained, “Unlike the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights, under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E), a parent is not required to show as an element of proof that the siblings have maintained regular contact and visitation. Instead, the parent must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination of parental rights would cause ‘substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship.’” (Id. at p. 1007.) The court further noted, “[U]nlike section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), the Legislature does not require the juvenile court to consider as an element of proof whether a dependent child has maintained regular visitation and contact with a sibling when it determined the applicability of subdivision (c)(1)(E). [Citation.] Thus, an erroneous denial of sibling visitation does not compromise the procedural due process rights of a parent seeking to prove the sibling relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E), by foreclosing a parent’s ability to meet the elements of proof required by statute.” (Id. at p. 1010.)
D. Conflict of Interest
Father argues the judgment terminating parental rights must be reversed because counsel for the two minors had a conflict of interest. Mother joins in and adopts this argument.
A single attorney may represent all siblings unless, at the time of appointment, an actual conflict of interest exists among them or it appears from circumstances specific to the case that it is reasonably likely an actual conflict will arise. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 58.) A conflict arises where minors’ counsel seeks a course of action for one child with adverse consequences to the other. (In re Barbara R. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 941, 953.)
Father argues that an actual conflict of interest existed when minors’ counsel failed to raise the issue of sibling visitation; he speculates that “it is possible A.M.’s attorney may have known the caretakers were not willing to continue meaningful visits between siblings.” We find no actual conflict of interest in the present matter. The record shows that the siblings were having contact and that there was no issue between the minor’s respective prospective adoptive parents. In addition, contrary to Father’s claim, A.M.’s prospective adoptive parents were in favor of continued visits between A.M. and her sibling. Hence, if the visits were going well and were beneficial to both minors, there was no need for minors’ counsel to raise the issue of sibling visitation or withdraw from her presentation. Father has not shown that there were any concerns to raise.
Further, Father could have raised his concerns prior to the selection and implementation hearing, but he did not. Moreover, both Mother and Father testified at the selection and implementation hearing, affording them an additional opportunity to complain of alleged lack of visits or failure of counsel to raise the visitation issue. Any problems with visitation were waived by failing to bring them to the court’s attention prior to the selection and implementation hearing. (In re Anthony P., supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at pp. 641-642; see also In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222.)
E. Mother’s Section 388 Petition
Mother argues that the court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition because she proved changed circumstances and new evidence, which demonstrated reunification was safe and in A.M.’s best interests. Father joins in this argument.
Section 388 provides for modification of existing juvenile court orders upon a showing of changed circumstances and a showing that the proposed modification may promote the child’s best interests. (§ 388, subds. (a), (c).) The burden of proving the changed circumstances and that the modification would promote the child’s best interest lies with the party who seeks the modification. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) The petition is addressed to the discretion of the juvenile court, and its decision will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. (In re S.M. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1119.) Thus, when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court. (Stephanie M., at pp. 318-319.)
In her section 388 petition, Mother stated that she wanted the court to change its order terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing; she was requesting that services be extended to her and that the court not proceed with the section 366.26 hearing. As change in circumstances, Mother alleged that she had shown stability by continuing to maintain employment and housing and that she and Father had resumed their relationship and were “working together to put themselves in a position to provide a nurturing and caring home” for A.M. Mother also alleged that the change in the court’s order would benefit A.M. because Mother had been able to benefit from the programs in which she had participated and was “in a position to be a nurturing parent” to the child. She further claimed that she had a bond with A.M. and sought an opportunity to prove to the court that she could “be a responsible parent.” However, Mother presented no evidence in support of her section 388 petition at the hearing, nor did she attach any supporting documents to her petition. She merely made an unsworn statement to the court and her attorney presented argument and submitted a letter, which was not relevant to her change of circumstances claim or the best interests of A.M., to the court.
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the section 388 petition, as Mother had failed to show changed circumstances, new evidence, or that a changed order would be in A.M.’s best interests. While Mother claimed to have shown stability, she provided no evidence to establish that she had her own residence, was self-supporting, or had otherwise achieved the stability that would have allowed her to provide a home for A.M. Other than her self-serving statements, there was no evidence that she was financially independent or that she and Father had addressed the domestic violence and neglect issues that formed the basis of this dependency. Mother did not claim that she was participating in programs or services under her case plan or that, since services were terminated, she was participating in programs to address the domestic violence and neglect issues. In fact, the parents had failed to provide their current address to DPSS even though they were aware this information needed to be provided promptly. There was no evidence to show that either Mother or Father had participated in, let alone completed, the requirements under their case plan. At best, as the court pointed out, Mother was in the process of changing her circumstances, but they had not changed.
Additionally, Mother was unable to demonstrate that a changed order was in the best interests of the child. As in any custody determination, a primary consideration in determining the child’s best interests is the goal of assuring stability and continuity. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) “When custody continues over a significant period, the child’s need for continuity and stability assumes an increasingly important role. That need will often dictate the conclusion that maintenance of the current arrangement would be in the best interests of that child.” (Ibid.) Hence, one moving for a change of placement bears the burden of proof to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is new evidence or that there are changed circumstances that may mean a change of placement is in the best interests of the child. (Ibid.; see § 388; In re Audrey D. (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 34, 45.)
This is a difficult burden to meet in many cases, and particularly so when, as here, Mother had a lengthy history of neglecting her children and domestic violence issues, which resulted in her failing to reunify with her older child. After the termination of reunification services, a parent’s interest in the care, custody, and companionship of the child is no longer paramount. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) Rather, at this point, the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) In fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interests of the child (id. at p. 310); such presumption obviously applies with even greater strength when the permanent plan is adoption rather than foster care. A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, what is in the best interests of the child. (Stephanie M., at p. 317.)
Thus, in In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, the denial of the parent’s section 388 petition, made at the time of the section 366.26 hearing and seeking to modify the order terminating reunification services, was upheld. The reviewing court noted that “[a]t the point of these proceedings—on the eve of the section 366.26 permanency planning hearing—the children’s interests in stability was the court’s foremost concern and outweighed any interest in reunification. [Citation.]” (Edward H., at p. 594.) The court concluded that the prospect of an additional six months of reunification to see if the mother would and could do what was required to regain custody would not have promoted stability for the children, and thus would not have promoted their best interests. (Ibid.)
Here, Mother made no such showing. Love alone does not support Mother’s contention that it would be in A.M.’s best interests to change the court’s order. Rather, as noted above and as the record shows, if the orders were changed, A.M. would not have any stability and permanency. The court properly denied Mother’s section 388 petition.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GAUT J., MILLER J.
Section 366.29, subdivision (a), provides: “When a court . . . orders that a dependent child be placed for adoption, nothing in the adoption laws of this state shall be construed to prevent the prospective adoptive parent or parents of the child from expressing a willingness to facilitate postadoptive sibling contact. With the consent of the adoptive parent or parents, the court may include in the final adoption order provisions for the adoptive parent or parents to facilitate postadoptive sibling contact. . . . ”