Opinion
No. 338839
01-09-2018
In re ALLEN/TROUP, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED Ingham Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 14-000458-NA; 14-000459-NA; 14-000460-NA Before: O'CONNELL, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and SWARTZLE, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent, the minors' mother, appeals as of right an order terminating parental rights to three of her children. The trial court found statutory grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (3)(g), and (3)(j), and determined that termination was in the best interests of the children, MCL 712A.19b(5). We affirm.
The father of two of the children is deceased, and the third child does not have an identified legal father.
I. BACKGROUND
The trial court took jurisdiction over the children in May 2014 because respondent was in an abusive relationship, exposing the children to violence. In addition, respondent did not have a regular income and could not maintain a stable residence.
After a psychological evaluation, the psychologist determined that respondent needed 12 to 18 months of intensive psychotherapy. Respondent's case service plan required her to address her emotional instability, parenting skills, and domestic relationships. Throughout the rest of 2014, respondent demonstrated marginal progress, but she ended up in jail in Texas in late October 2014 on an outstanding warrant.
Respondent was first arrested in Ingham County on outstanding warrants. Respondent was thereafter transferred from the Ingham County jail to Texas for a prior felony charge.
Throughout 2015, respondent struggled to comply with the service plan and benefit from services. Although she demonstrated signs of progress at times, her ability to maintain housing and employment for significant periods of time was inconsistent. In June of 2015, she went to jail again for unpaid child support.
This child support pertains to a child who is not involved in this case. --------
Respondent was unable to attend individual therapy and counseling sessions regularly for over a year because of problems with her insurance coverage. Accordingly, in March 2016, the trial court dismissed the first petition to terminate respondent's parental rights, determining that the agency had not made reasonable efforts toward reunification because it failed to make individual therapy and counseling available to respondent.
By September 2016, the children returned to respondent's home through the Intensive Neglect Services Program on the condition that respondent attend individual counseling. Respondent continued to demonstrate inconsistent patterns with the services provided, including therapy and counseling, and struggled to maintain housing and employment for longer than a few months at a time. On January 17, 2017, respondent left the state with the children, in violation of the trial court's order that the children not leave the state without authorization, so the trial court held respondent in contempt and ordered respondent to serve 120 days in jail.
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) subsequently filed a supplemental termination petition. On May 10, 2017, the trial court terminated respondent's parental rights.
II. ANALYSIS
A. REASONABLE EFFORTS
Respondent first argues that DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. We review for clear error the trial court's fact findings regarding whether DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. In re LE, 278 Mich App 1, 18; 747 NW2d 883 (2008). "When reviewing the trial court's findings of fact, this Court accords deference to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005).
Generally, DHHS "must make reasonable efforts to rectify conditions, to reunify families, and to avoid termination of parental rights." In re LE, 278 Mich App at 18. DHHS must report those efforts to the trial court. In re Plump, 294 Mich App 270, 272; 817 NW2d 119 (2011). The trial court must determine whether the agency made reasonable efforts "to prevent the child's removal from the home or to rectify the conditions that caused the child to be removed from the home." Id.
In this case, respondent maintains that DHHS's reunification efforts were inadequate because she should have immediately been put on medication, she could not participate in services while she was in jail, and she did not have timely and consistent access to therapy when she was released from jail. We disagree.
The trial court was cognizant of respondent's interrupted insurance coverage and need for psychotherapy when it dismissed the first termination petition in March 2016. Consequently, the trial court did not hold respondent responsible for DHHS's failure to make reasonable efforts to provide respondent with therapy and counseling. After dismissal of the first petition, however, respondent's attendance at therapy was sporadic. When the trial court allowed respondent to change therapists because of the distance she traveled to get to her therapist, the agency found respondent a new therapist, but she failed to respond to the therapist's attempts to contact her. Therefore, her failure to attend and benefit from therapy was attributable to her own lack of communication and her apparent reluctance to attend the sessions. Under these circumstances, the trial court's determination that reasonable efforts were made was not clearly erroneous.
B. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent next argues that the trial court erred by finding statutory grounds for termination. "To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground under MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established." In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). This Court reviews a trial court's "decision that a ground for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence" for clear error. In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 271; 779 NW2d 286 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A decision is clearly erroneous if we are "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re Williams, 286 Mich App at 271 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In this case, the trial court terminated respondent's parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (3)(g), and (3)(j). Those subdivisions provide:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
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(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.
1. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) AND (3)(g)
The trial court did not clearly err when it found clear and convincing evidence to support termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (3)(g) for the same reasons. Respondent argues that she tested negative for drugs for more than two years and that the caseworker sabotaged her effort to obtain subsidized housing. Respondent further contends that therapy and medication were beneficial and that she found employment that would allow her to pay for housing. On the contrary, the record shows that respondent was unable to maintain suitable housing and steady employment and failed to improve her emotional instability.
Respondent demonstrated inconsistent progress throughout the course of the proceedings. In the first half of 2014, respondent voluntarily participated in services and made some progress by attending individual counseling and domestic violence support groups. By October 2014, respondent had only attended four of ten therapy sessions offered to her since June of 2014.
In January 2015, following her release from jail in Texas, respondent tried to renew services and participated in parenting time visits with the children, but respondent's progress was poor. By June 2015, respondent skipped several therapy sessions because she was in jail and because she did not show up for scheduled sessions even after her release from jail. Although respondent's disrupted insurance coverage limited her access to therapy during that time, she also prevented the children from working with a therapist because she believed that the therapist lied when she testified at a motion hearing for expanded parenting time. The therapist had explained to the trial court that the children were fragile and had intense anxiety. The therapist believed that respondent's unpredictability increased the children's anxiety and raised concerns about what would happen if a caseworker was not present during parenting times. In addition, when DHHS arranged for respondent to meet with a therapist located near respondent, respondent did not work with that therapist.
By September 2016, respondent had limited care of all three children, but the children did not do well in her care. The two older children were suspended from school during their first week back with respondent, they collectively missed 47 days of school, and school administrators questioned whether respondent was giving the children their medication because of changes in their behavior. Additionally, the children told caseworkers that their mother told them not to talk about what happens at home.
Respondent worked only sporadically over the course of three years preceding termination. Some of respondent's work was "under the table," and on two occasions, once in 2015 and once in 2016, caseworkers identified respondent's phone number linked to prostitution and escort services.
Respondent also maintained housing only sporadically throughout the proceedings. At times, she had suitable housing, but she was evicted from one of her apartments. At the time of the final termination hearing, in May 2015, respondent did not have stable housing, testifying that she had to give the landlord $300 before she could move into the apartment she found.
Respondent contends that domestic violence triggered the proceeding, but she has not been in an abusive relationship since then. Although the record contains no evidence that respondent has returned to an abusive relationship, respondent demonstrated continued emotional instability in other ways. For example, she may have engaged in prostitution, and she took the children out of the state in violation of a court order. These actions showed that respondent was unable to put the children's emotional needs before her own and that she did not rectify the conditions that led to adjudication within a reasonable period of time.
All of these circumstances support the trial court's determination that respondent failed to provide proper care and custody and there is no reasonable expectation that she will be able to within a reasonable time. Similarly, these circumstances are a continuation of the conditions that led to the adjudication. Respondent had over three years to rectify these conditions. Although respondent showed progress at times, her overall failure to improve during that time supports the conclusion that the conditions that led to adjudication continued to exist and that there is no reasonable expectation of rectification within a reasonable amount of time.
2. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)
The trial court did not clearly err when it found clear and convincing evidence to support termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Respondent maintains that her emotional state improved with therapy. The record, however, shows that respondent demonstrated a pattern of tumultuous and erratic behavior throughout the proceedings.
A parent's unsuccessful struggle with an anger-management problem is sufficient to support a trial court's finding that the children are reasonably likely to be harmed in the parent's care. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). In this case, respondent used profanities with a caseworker in the presence of the children when the caseworker told respondent that she could not have unsupervised visitation with the children. Respondent took the children and left the state in violation of a court order. Respondent prevented the children from working with a therapist out of spite. Respondent felt that the children were overmedicated and may not have given them their medication, which may have caused behavioral changes at school. Respondent also directed profanities at the judge and the law clerk. Respondent demonstrated her continued emotional instability in the children's presence and in decisions she made that adversely affected the children. Consequently, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that respondent's behavior would likely emotionally harm the children. In sum, the trial court adequately found statutory grounds for termination.
C. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN
Finally, respondent asserts that termination was not in the children's best interests because she had a demonstrated bond with her children and her parenting mistakes did not have any lasting impact on them. We disagree.
We review for clear error a trial court's decision regarding the best interests of the children. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 40. Once the trial court finds statutory grounds for termination, it must determine whether termination would be in the children's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). In determining the child's best interests, "the court may consider the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court weighed the children's need for permanency, stability, and finality more heavily than testimony showing that the children were bonded with respondent. Although respondent demonstrated some consistency in regard to her parenting skills, her act of absconding with the children supports the trial court's determination that respondent "cannot be trusted as a parent" and made the children's lives a "chronic roller-coaster." Respondent exposed the children to a tumultuous home environment and failed to address her own emotional needs over the course of three years. Respondent failed to make enough progress with her parenting skills, housing, and employment to fulfill the children's needs for permanency, stability, and finality. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests.
We affirm.
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle