Opinion
No. 336283 No. 336285
08-10-2017
In re ALLEN, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 07-470130-NA Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and GLEICHER and O'BRIEN, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondents appeal as of right from the trial court order terminating their parental rights to all seven of their minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j). We affirm.
The initial petition in this case was filed after a March 2013 visit to respondents' home by child protective services (CPS) found it to be dirty, unsanitary, without adequate food, and otherwise unsafe. In addition, the children were all suffering from strep throat and lice but were not receiving any medical care. At that time, they ranged in ages from 7 months to 8 years.
Respondents had previously been involved with CPS in 2007 and had received services in 2012 after the youngest child was born positive for cocaine and morphine.
At the time of termination in December 2016, they ranged in age from 4 years to 12 years.
Following the preliminary hearing, the court assumed temporary jurisdiction over the children and placed them with their maternal grandmother. The matter was adjudicated on June 27, 2013, and a parent-agency plan was instituted. Over the next 22 months extensive services were provided to respondents, and there were numerous dispositional review hearings, the results of which reflected respondents' fluctuating compliance. In April 2016 a termination petition was filed, and the trial court ordered termination of respondent's parental rights after a lengthy evidentiary hearing.
A termination petition was initially filed in February 2016, but the trial court ordered that petition dismissed after it appeared that respondents were not properly served with it and suggested that petitioner re-file the petition.
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing evidence. In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 632-633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). The trial court first found that termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), which provides for termination if the conditions that led to the initial adjudication continue to exist 182 days after the initial dispositional order and "there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age." The conditions that led to the adjudication in this case were respondents' inability to provide the children with a safe home environment and with necessary medical care. At the time of termination, there was clear and convincing evidence that respondents were still unable to provide a suitable home for their children and that there was not a reasonable likelihood that they would be able to do so at a reasonable point in the future given the children's ages.
We review the trial court's decision for clear error. MCR 3.977(K). A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).
In July 2013 the respondents were living in a motel and reported by the maternal grandmother to be on the run because of a dispute with a drug dealer. In October 2013 petitioner reported to the court that the respondents had not completed their court-ordered drug screens and had been arrested for home invasion and were in jail. Respondent-father was released on bail on December 23, 2013 but as of the dispositional hearing on January 23, 2014, had not attempted to visit the children since his release. Respondent-mother was held in pretrial detention even longer.
Nevertheless, at the April 15, 2014 review hearing, the court noted that respondents had each made progress. Respondent-mother had been compliant with services, and her drug screens since release from jail had been negative. Respondent-father had also come into compliance, and his drug screens were negative, except for marijuana for which he had medical marijuana certification due to a disability. They were visiting the children, and respondent-mother was looking for work. Nevertheless, they had not made any progress in finding housing, and some of the services produced only limited benefit.
There was concern, however, that respondent-father may have been transporting the children in his car when under the influence of marijuana.
At the July 9, 2014 dispositional hearing, the court was advised that the children had been removed from their grandmother's home due to intra-sibling difficulties. The children were, therefore, placed in three separate foster homes. Respondents were compliant at that time with drug testing and classes, but neither had employment, and they had not obtained housing. At this hearing, the trial judge advised respondents that he would allow them some additional time to obtain housing. The situation was largely unchanged as of the review hearing in March 2015, and services continued to be provided.
Unfortunately, due to their criminal histories, respondents were not eligible for public housing.
The record is somewhat confusing, but it appears that respondents may have briefly obtained housing in May or June, 2015, and during that time frame, respondent-mother had obtained employment at a local McDonald's restaurant. However, in July 2015, respondents were convicted of the 2013 home invasion charges and were sentenced to prison. Respondent-father's earliest opportunity for parole is June 2024, and respondent-mother's earliest opportunity for parole is December 2018. Their maximum terms run to 2030.
During the termination hearings on June 13, 2016, August 3, 2016, and November 18, 2016, respondents presented testimony from the father's third cousin, Lawrence Laforet and presented testimony from his wife on the June 13, 2016 hearing. The Laforets testified that they were willing to take care of the children and adopt them. They also testified to their willingness to care for the children in a guardianship arrangement. The Laforets had applied for foster parent licensure, and while their home had been approved only for five children, they stated that they planned to make physical changes to the home so as to have room for all seven, and seek approval again. Respondents testified that they hoped the Laforets could act as guardians to the children at least until respondent-mother was released from prison.
The trial court reviewed the history of the case noting respondents' areas of compliance and progress but also noting areas of non-compliance and that the housing barrier had persisted for nearly three years. The court noted that even assuming that respondent-mother was released at the conclusion of her minimum term, at best it would still be mid-2019 before she could demonstrate compliance with the parent-agency agreement post-release so as to be considered for reunification. By that time, the children would have been in foster care for over 6 years. Nor was there any guarantee that the Laforets would be willing to continue a guardianship until that time, or beyond it, if respondent-mother was not released at that time.
The trial court did not clearly error in determining that respondents had not resolved their inability to provide suitable housing for their children, the condition that initially led to adjudication. And, contrary to respondents' contention, the present case is not comparable to In re Mason, 486 Mich App 142; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). There, the Supreme Court determined that "[t]he mere present inability to personally care for one's children as a result of incarceration does not constitute grounds for termination" and that trial courts must consider the possibility that a parent can provide care through a relative. Id. at 160, 163-165. However, the respondent in that case was only a few months from being released from prison at the time of termination. Id. at 150. In this case, Respondents, at the time of termination, were, respectively, at least two years and eight years away from being released. Moreover, prior to their incarceration they had failed to provide a home for their children for over three years. Finally, the Laforets, as third-cousins once removed, do not qualify as relatives under MCL 712A.13a(1)(j), had only recently been approved as a foster home, and still had not been approved to house all seven children. The trial court considered the fact that respondents had offered the Laforets as a possible placement when making its decision but determined given the record in this case that the statutory grounds had still been met by clear and convincing evidence. We find no error in this determination.
Because only one statutory ground is necessary to support terminating parental rights, In re Powers Minors, 244 Mich App 111, 118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000), we need not address respondents' contention that the trial court erred in finding statutory grounds to support termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). --------
The trial court also did not clearly err in determining that termination of both respondents' parental rights was in the best interests of the children. MCL 712A.19b(5); MCR 3.977(K). The children's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, and the children's need for permanency, stability, and finality are all factors for the court to consider in deciding whether termination is in the best interests of the children. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). These children had been without a family environment for an extended period of time due to criminal activity and drug use on the part of their parents. They deserve permanence and stability not several more years of uncertainty especially given their ages. Indeed, the trial court specifically found that guardianship was not in the best interests of the children because it did not provide the permanency that termination of parental rights and adoption could offer.
Affirmed.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien