Even information on the face of the record indicating that additional liens could exist between the same parties was not enough for the court to impute notice to the subsequent purchaser as a matter of law. See also Mukamal v. Hernandez ( In re All Star Mortgage), 411 B.R. 774, 780 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009) (holding that the trustee could not have been on notice of an unrecorded note and mortgage because recorded lis pendens did not refer to note or mortgage or mention the holder's name, even when creditor who recorded lis pendens knew of note and mortgage). Although Florida courts could adopt a rule of notice comparable to the Georgia rule, the rule appears inconsistent with current Florida law.
Therefore, Corus had no constructive notice of these unrecorded liens. See, e.g., Mukamal v. Lima (In re All Star Mortgage Fin. Corp.), 411 B.R. 774, 780-81 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 2009) (trustee had no constructive notice of equitable liens not recorded in public records). In regards to actual notice, the Original Purchasers argue that CCV had actual notice of the equitable lien because of (1) two voidability provisions in the contract and (2) the Florida Statutes.
See, e.g., In re All Star Mortg. Fin. Corp., 411 B.R. 774, 780 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009) ; In re Spring Creek Invs. of Dallas, N.V., Inc., 71 B.R. 157, 159–60 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987). Importantly, notice may be implied only if the party sought to be charged with notice has a duty to make further inquiry. SeeFlack , 148 Tex. at 500, 226 S.W.2d at 632 ; Exxon Corp. v. Raetzer , 533 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).