Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. JJ15543, Donna Groman, Judge. Affirmed.
Tanya Dellaca, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Charles S. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CHAVEZ, J.
Defendant and appellant Alexander M. (defendant) appeals the juvenile court’s adjudication of a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that he committed forcible rape of Cindy C. (Cindy) in violation of Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(2). The juvenile court found the offense to be a felony, sustained the petition and declared defendant a ward of the court. Defendant was placed on home probation and ordered to “participate in Caltrans for 30 days or in the alternative, 30 days county jail or PAAWS, graffiti removal or MTA clean-up.”
Defendant contends the juvenile court committed prejudicial error by limiting the scope of defense counsel’s cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and by denying a motion to admit evidence of past physical abuse by Cindy’s parents and of her brother Juan’s propensity for violence. Defendant maintains this evidence was relevant to determine whether Cindy lied about the crime because she was afraid of her parents or of Juan. Defendant further contends the juvenile court’s refusal to permit such evidence deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to present a defense.
The juvenile court’s limitation on the scope of cross-examination and its denial of defendant’s motion was not an abuse of discretion, nor did it violate defendant’s constitutional rights. We therefore affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
1. Factual Background
Defendant and Cindy had dated for a year but had never had sexual intercourse. They broke up approximately two weeks before August 3, 2007, but remained in contact with one another. Defendant was a good friend of Cindy’s older brother, Juan, and occasionally spent the night at the family home in Juan’s room.
At approximately 5:00 p.m. on August 2, 2007, defendant approached Cindy’s mother, Raquel, and asked her what time she was going to work that evening and whether Cindy’s father was also going to work. Raquel confirmed that both parents were working that evening. During this conversation, Raquel noticed that defendant was pale and appeared nervous.
At approximately 2:30 a.m. on August 3, 2007, Cindy was at home cleaning the kitchen. Her older sister Amy and her younger siblings had gone to bed. Juan had left the house earlier that night and was not at home.
Cindy heard a noise coming from Juan’s bedroom. She opened the bedroom door to investigate and saw defendant standing naked inside the room with the lights on. Defendant’s eyes were pink, and Cindy thought he looked “weird, ” and “not normal.”
Defendant pulled Cindy into the room and onto Juan’s bed. He held Cindy’s arms above her head and began to undress her. Cindy repeatedly told defendant to stop and struggled against him by hitting him on the chest with her closed fists. Defendant responded by shaking Cindy forcefully, causing her to hit the back of her head on the headboard of the bed. When Cindy continued to struggle, defendant punched her in the face.
After defendant removed Cindy’s sweat pants, he digitally penetrated her and then attempted penile penetration. Cindy repeatedly told defendant to stop and that he was hurting her. Defendant refused to stop and continued until he achieved penetration. Cindy screamed and called for help. She continued to struggle and succeeded in pushing defendant off of her after squeezing his testicles and kicking him.
At that point, Juan entered the bedroom and saw defendant naked and leaning over Cindy. Juan was extremely angry. He yelled at defendant and called Cindy a “whore.” He then grabbed a machete from his closet and chased defendant out of the house. Juan returned to the bedroom and began yelling at Cindy again. He threw objects around the room including the mattress, which he threw outside. When Cindy told him that defendant had raped her, Juan left the house and drove around the neighborhood looking for defendant in order to beat him up.
Juan’s shouting woke Amy, who found Cindy crying in Juan’s bedroom. Cindy asked for her mother, and Amy telephoned their mother. After Cindy’s mother arrived, Cindy called the police with her mother present. The police arrived less than an hour later, but Cindy refused to speak to a female officer or to a counselor.
Cindy was admitted to the emergency room at approximately 5:00 a.m. on August 3. Page Courtemanche, a forensic nurse, observed a facial contusion on Cindy’s right cheek, and another contusion on the back of her head. Cindy was crying and complaining of pain to her cheek and head.
Courtemanche then conducted a physical examination of Cindy that was documented on videotape. Cindy was in significant pain and was unable to tolerate much of the examination. Courtemanche observed that Cindy had erythema, redness, and tenderness in the vaginal area. Cindy told Courtemanche that defendant had attempted penile-vaginal penetration several times, but she was unsure whether defendant’s penis had fully penetrated her. Courtemanche testified at trial that Cindy’s vaginal injuries were consistent with Cindy’s version of the events.
Cindy’s mother saw defendant again in September 2008. Defendant approached her and said, “forgive me.” Cindy’s mother responded that what defendant had done was wrong and that the matter “was in the hands of the law.” Defendant then said that had he been “in a good condition, he would not have done anything, ” and that he wished she had punished him instead of the law.
Cari Caruso, a forensic nurse and sexual assault nurse examiner, testified at trial for the defense. Caruso viewed Courtemanche’s videotaped examination of Cindy and the related documents and testified that the video could not definitively show whether there had been penetration. Caruso further testified that she did not observe any vaginal tears or abrasions, and that Courtemanche’s observations could also have been consistent with consensual intercourse.
2. Relevant Procedural Background
At the trial, defense counsel asked Cindy during cross-examination whether her parents had physically abused her in the past. The court sustained the prosecutor’s objection that the question was irrelevant. Defense counsel argued that evidence of prior physical abuse was relevant to whether Cindy had lied out of fear that her parents would harm her if they learned she had engaged in consensual sex.
Defense counsel then filed a motion to admit evidence that Cindy’s parents had physically abused her in the past, and that Juan had a propensity for violence. Defense counsel argued that the evidence she sought to admit would be limited to witness testimony about past instances of abuse and would not include external reports or court documents. The prosecutor responded that she knew of no allegations of past abuse, apart from a Department of Children and Family Services complaint that had been deemed to be unfounded. She argued that she would need additional discovery and time to respond to defense counsel’s motion. The court denied the motion, citing Evidence Code section 352 as the basis for doing so.
The juvenile court subsequently allowed defense counsel to cross-examine Cindy about whether her parents were strict and whether they would be upset if they knew she was having sex. Defense counsel was also permitted to ask Cindy about Juan’s temper, whether Juan had screamed at her in the past, and whether she had ever seen him involved in physical fights.
The court also allowed defense counsel to cross-examine Juan about how he became enraged when he saw defendant naked in the bedroom with Cindy and began screaming and cursing at them. Defense counsel elicited testimony from Juan that immediately thereafter, he grabbed a machete from his closet and chased defendant out of the house. Defense counsel also elicited testimony from Juan that after Cindy told him what had happened, he drove around the neighborhood looking for defendant in order to beat him up. The court did not allow defense counsel to ask Juan whether he had grabbed defendant’s mother by the neck and told her he was going to kill defendant. The court also stopped defense counsel from questioning Amy about whether she had seen Juan’s machete, or whether she had seen him involved in physical fights in the past.
DISCUSSION
I. No Abuse of Discretion
A trial court has broad discretion to exclude impeachment evidence under Evidence Code section 352. That statute provides: “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s rulings on relevance and the exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code section 352. (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 578.) Under this standard, a trial court’s decision will not be disturbed absent a showing that the court exercised its discretion in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124-1125.)
The juvenile court’s decision to limit evidence concerning Juan’s propensity for violent and angry behavior was not a clear abuse of discretion. There was extensive testimony about Juan’s violent reaction to discovering defendant and Cindy in his bedroom. In addition, the juvenile court allowed defense counsel to question Cindy about Juan’s temper, whether Juan had screamed at her in the past, and whether she had ever seen him involved in physical fights.
The limitations imposed by the juvenile court concerned incidents that were not relevant to Cindy. For example, the juvenile court precluded defense counsel from questioning Amy about whether she had seen Juan in physical fights in the past. Defense counsel was also precluded from cross-examining Juan about whether, while driving around the neighborhood looking for defendant, he encountered defendant’s mother, grabbed her by the neck, and threatened to kill defendant. Whether Juan engaged in other violent conduct not witnessed by Cindy was not relevant to whether that conduct caused Cindy to be afraid of him. “Although wide latitude should be given to cross-examination designed to test the credibility of a prosecution witness, ‘[t]he statute empowers courts to prevent criminal trials from degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral credibility issues.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 946.)
The juvenile court’s exclusion of evidence that Cindy’s parents had physically abused her in the past also was not an abuse of discretion. Defendant claims this evidence was relevant to whether Cindy lied about the crime because she was afraid her parents would abuse her if they knew she had engaged in consensual sex. The juvenile court did not, however, foreclose all inquiry into this subject. Defense counsel was permitted to question Cindy about whether her parents were strict, and if they had ever discussed with her whether it was permissible for her to be having sex. There was also evidence that contradicted defendant’s theory concerning Cindy’s fear of her parents. Immediately after the crime, Cindy asked for her mother.
The juvenile court determined that granting defense counsel’s motion would unduly delay the trial. The motion was not filed until the second day of Cindy’s testimony. It did not specify the evidence defense counsel sought to elicit, nor did it identify the witnesses counsel had interviewed in order to obtain the information. In response, the prosecutor argued that the motion should have been filed before the trial commenced, and that additional time and discovery was needed in order to respond to the motion. Given these circumstances, the trial court’s denial of the motion was not an abuse of discretion.
II. No Constitutional Violation
“The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’” (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678.) “‘[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby, ‘to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’” (Id. at p. 680, quoting Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 318.)
Not every restriction on a defendant’s desired method of cross-examination, however, is a constitutional violation. “‘Within the confines of the confrontation clause, the trial court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-examination that is repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of marginal relevance. [Citation.]... [U]nless the defendant can show that the prohibited cross-examination would have produced “a significantly different impression of [the witnesses’] credibility” [citation], the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in this regard does not violate the Sixth Amendment.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 372.)
Defendant failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights. Defendant was given ample opportunity to cross-examine Cindy and the other prosecution witnesses, including extensive cross-examination concerning the circumstances of the crime and Juan’s violent reaction to it. The juvenile court’s refusal to allow defense counsel to inquire about past instances of alleged abuse by Cindy’s parents was not a violation of defendant’s rights to due process, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, or to present a defense.
III. No Prejudicial Error
Even assuming the trial court erred by refusing to allow defendant to cross-examine witnesses about past instances of alleged abuse by Cindy’s parents and other incidents of violent behavior by Juan, we would conclude that any such error was harmless under federal and state standards of constitutional law. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
The record does not support the likelihood that Cindy lied about having consensual sex out of fear of her parents. Cindy asked for her mother immediately after the incident. The physical evidence contradicts defendant’s claim of consensual intercourse. Cindy sustained contusions to her head and face, consistent with her testimony that defendant had hit her head against the headboard and punched her in the face during his efforts to subdue her. There was also evidence of bruising, redness, and tenderness in Cindy’s genital area that was consistent with blunt force trauma or forced sexual penetration. Cindy was in considerable pain following the attack, such that she could not tolerate a pelvic examination by the forensic nurse. There was also evidence that defendant himself expressed remorse for his actions by subsequently apologizing to Cindy’s mother and telling her he would not have done anything that night had he been “in a good condition.”
In light of the evidence, it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached, and any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: BOREN, P. J., ASHMANN-GERST, J.