Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK73035. Marguerite D. Downing, Judge.
Kimberly A. Knill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey F. Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MALLANO, P. J.
Rachel S. (Mother) appeals from the March 1, 2010 jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court adjudging minors Alex S. and Adrienne S. dependents of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm) and (b) (failure to protect). The juvenile court also declared Alex a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to section 300, subdivision (e) (severe physical abuse). Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. We conclude the evidence that Alex sustained two separate skull fractures indicative of abuse while in the care, custody, and control of Mother and Mauricio S. (Father) is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. We affirm the orders of the juvenile court.
Unless otherwise designated, statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
BACKGROUND
Mother and Father, who do not live together, are the parents of Alex, born in May 2008, and Adrienne, born in July 2009. In an earlier dependency matter, on May 20, 2008, Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (a) (serious physical harm) and subdivision (b) (failure to protect) on behalf of Alex. On August 21, 2008, the juvenile court sustained the petition under section 300, subdivision (b), finding that Mother and Father had ongoing domestic violence incidents that remain unresolved and placed Alex at risk of harm. Father waived reunification services. Reunification services were ordered for Mother. Mother and Father were granted monitored visitation to Alex, who had been placed in a foster home since May 16, 2008. On February 19, 2009, the juvenile court ordered Alex home in Mother’s care, with Father’s visits to remain monitored.
On March 17, 2009, Alex was taken to the hospital for a seizure and a high fever. The doctors told Mother the seizure was the result of an ear infection which caused the high fever. On May 21, 2009, Alex fell and hit his head on a toy and was taken to Los Angeles Metropolitan Medical Center (Metropolitan), where it was determined he suffered a contusion and laceration to his occipital scalp. A computerized axial tomography (CAT) scan revealed no abnormal extraaxial collections or fracture with bone algorithm. He received staples to close the wound. On August 20, 2009, the juvenile court terminated the case with an order granting Mother sole physical and legal custody and requiring Father to have monitored visits.
The current matter came to the attention of DCFS on November 3, 2009, as a result of a referral alleging physical abuse by Father. On that day, in response to a 911 call by Mother that Alex was experiencing a seizure, paramedics transported him to the emergency room at Harbor-UCLA Medical Center (Harbor-UCLA). A CAT scan revealed that he had suffered two skull fractures. When interviewed by DCFS that day, Mother had no explanation for the skull fractures sustained by Alex but stated that he had fallen on a toy in May 2009 and received treatment for an ear infection in October 2009. She admitted being the primary caretaker of Alex and informed the social worker that he was her only child.
Attending physician Dr. Shari Ahoo stated to DCFS on November 3, 2009, that the cause of the seizure was presently unknown, and further testing would be conducted to determine the origin of the seizure. On November 4, 2009, Dr. Melissa Egge, a board certified pediatrician and fellow in child abuse at Harbor-UCLA, told DCFS that the CAT scan of Alex revealed that he had sustained nonaccidental fractures on the right side of his head and on the left rear of his head.
On November 9, 2009, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (e), and (j) (abuse of sibling) on behalf of Alex and Adrienne. The petition alleged that Alex sustained a left occipital fracture and a right parietal fracture of his skull and that he suffered a seizure. The petition alleged as to section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), that the injuries were consistent with nonaccidental trauma and “would not ordinarily occur except as a result of deliberate, unreasonable and neglectful acts by [Mother and Father, ] who had care, custody and control of the child.” As to the section 300, subdivision (e) allegation, the petition alleged that Mother and Father “knew or reasonably should have known that the child Alex was being physically abused and the parents failed to take action to protect the child.”
The juvenile court ordered Alex and Adrienne detained on November 9, 2009.
The jurisdictional hearing commenced on January 13, 2010. The juvenile court received into evidence DCFS’s detention report, jurisdiction/disposition report, medical records from Metropolitan, medical records from Harbor-UCLA, and a last-minute information for the court.
The jurisdiction/disposition report
During the scan consultation on November 3, 2009, Mother reported that she had woken Alex from his nap at 3:00 p.m. to eat dinner when she noticed that his eyes were deviated outward in opposite directions and his arms were shaking. She called 911 and ran cold water over him, believing that he was having another febrile seizure. In the emergency room, Mother reported that Alex had sustained a skull fracture on May 21, 2009. Afterward, she stated that he did not have a previous skull fracture. Mother also reported that a bruise on Alex’s left cheek was sustained when he ran into a door at the pediatrician’s office on October 31, 2009. But none of the staff could verify her statement.
On November 12, 2009, Mother told DCFS and law enforcement personnel that she never left the minors with anyone. She then stated that on November 3, 2009, she left the minors with Father for 10 minutes and was driven by her friend Greg to the Department of Social Services to drop off an assistance form. She returned to find that Alex was seizing. When DCFS was unable to reach Greg at the telephone number provided by Mother, Mother told DCFS that she did not get a ride from Greg but drove herself along with her friend Chrysta to drop off the form. She told DCFS that she did not tell the truth initially because she did not want to admit that she drove without a license. On her return, she found Father giving Alex CPR. Alex appeared to be seizing, “with ‘his... hands shaking and the eyes stuck to the back of his head.’” She then called 911. Mother then admitted she left the minors home with Father for two hours.
On November 17, 2009, Mother told DCFS that she had withheld information from the hospital staff about having another child, Adrienne, because she feared that he would be detained. Mother also stated that she had called Father to ask him to take care of Adrienne so she could drop off the assistance form. Father arrived at 1:00 p.m. and told her that she could leave Alex with him while she dropped off the assistance form. When she returned she found Father giving Alex CPR. She saw his eyes rolling and called 911. At the hospital, Father told her that after preparing food in the kitchen for Alex, he went to the bedroom and found Alex seizing. Mother also stated that she sometimes left Alex with his former foster mother, Linda M., who told her to have his eyes checked because he bumped into things at her house. Mother denied that Alex bumped into things at her own house. Mother then admitted that she left the minors under the care of Father while she went trick-or-treating with her nieces for a period of two to two and one-half hours.
After law enforcement officers interviewed Mother, they arrested Father for child abuse. Father waived his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 474, and told law enforcement personnel that he was overwhelmed with his life and “‘lost it’” when Alex was crying. Father stated he became upset and hit Alex once across the back of his head with the back of his right hand.
Dr. Egge reported that Alex sustained acute skull fractures to the right parietal-occipital and left occipital bones. Swelling over both fractures indicated the injuries were recent. There was a history of inflicted trauma by Father, who reported punching Alex in the back of his head prior to his seizure. Dr. Egge reported that it was unlikely that a single punch could cause an occipital skull fracture and that there were at least two direct impact forces to Alex’s head. She also reported that the bruising on Alex’s left cheek and lower gingiva were highly suspicious for inflicted trauma, and that a bruise on his left lower back might be consistent with inflicted trauma.
On November 19, 2009, Dr. Egge told DCFS that the results of the CAT scan performed on November 3, 2009, indicated that Alex had sustained two skull fractures. Dr. Egge’s review of the May 2009 head injury showed that Alex had sustained no skull fractures or bleeding in the brain at that time. She opined that the two skull fractures were caused by two direct impacts to his head. She believed the injury was indicative of child abuse because there was no history to explain the fractures.
The hospital social worker, Catherine Crowley, told DCFS that Mother had informed her she had only one child. When Crowley asked Mother why she had lied about her younger child, Adrienne, Mother stated, “‘[Y]ou all find out everything anyhow so why should I bother to tell you anyways.’” Although Mother seemed to blame Linda M. for Alex’s injuries, she still wanted Alex placed at Linda M.’s house.
On November 4, 2009, Linda M. told DCFS that Alex had a tendency to run into walls and objects. On November 24, 2009, Linda M. told DCFS that during Alex’s stay with her, he never had any marks on him, but he would sometimes scratch himself. He did not stumble, fall, or hit his head while at her house.
Hearing testimony
Dr. Egge testified that the May 2009 CAT scan showed no skull fracture. She testified that the November CAT scans revealed that Alex had sustained a right parietal occipital fracture that extended into the backbone and a left occipital fracture. The CAT scan also showed swelling in the scalp over each fracture, indicating that the skull fractures had occurred recently. Dr. Egge also reviewed the magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan which showed a small non-hemorrhagic contusion of the right parietal lobe inside the right skull fracture, indicating a bruise on the brain. The bruising indicated that the trauma was recent. The electroencephalogram showed that there was “slowing” on the right side of his brain in the area near the skull fracture.
Dr. Egge testified that seizures with a fever, or febrile seizures, are relatively common in children under six and are resolved without medication. Usually there are no long-term consequences. She opined that Alex, who did not have a fever when he was admitted to the hospital, had suffered an impact seizure, which requires medication. Alex received anti-seizure medication in the emergency room and throughout his week-long hospital stay.
Dr. Egge testified that it would take a great deal of force to fracture the parietal skull and even more to fracture the occipital bone. She testified that the occipital bone is denser and stronger than the parietal bone and is protected by the child’s neck. Children rarely break or fracture the occipital skull. She opined that a single blow to Alex’s head could not have caused both skull fractures because they were located on opposite sides of the head. She opined that while a single hard blow from a fist could have caused the skull fracture to the right side, more force than a blow from a hand would be required to cause the occipital skull to fracture. She stated that occipital skull fractures often occur when a child falls onto a hard surface such as concrete, from a height of three or four feet. She concluded that Alex’s injuries were the result of two impacts. Dr. Egge opined that the fractures were indicative of child abuse based on the lack of history, the physical examination, the findings on the CAT scan, the findings on the MRI, and consultation with her supervising colleague. Also, the bruise to Alex’s left cheek and the bruise on his gum line were in locations suspicious for child abuse. She testified that Mother’s statement that Alex had sustained the bruise on his left cheek when he ran into a door at the pediatrician’s office could not be confirmed by the staff. She also stated that Mother had denied having another child.
Mother testified that she left the minors in Father’s care for two hours when she went to the social services building. When she returned, Adrienne was asleep and Father was doing CPR on Alex in her bedroom. Mother called 911 while Father removed Alex’s clothes and put a cold rag on his head. Mother admitted lying when she said she did not leave Alex with Father because she knew that visitation with Father was supposed to be monitored. She also stated that she left Alex with Father for only one hour on Halloween night. She testified that Alex had a seizure on October 16, 2009, while being cared for by Linda M. She also stated that Alex tended to fall a lot.
Mother’s expert witness, Dr. James Grogan, testified that Alex’s two fractures occurred from two separate incidents. He believed the fractures could not have been inflicted by a fist or openhanded blow, although a fracture could have been sustained if Alex had been hit and consequently fell on the floor. The parietal fracture was probably sustained from a collision with a flat object, such as a fall on a floor, or a flat object striking Alex’s head. He noticed a small amount of swelling at the site of the parietal fracture, which indicated the injury occurred five to seven days before the seizure. He opined that the occipital bone fracture was probably caused by a firm object striking the skull. He saw no evidence of soft tissue swelling at the site of the occipital fracture and therefore opined the occipital fracture was older than the parietal skull fracture. Dr. Grogan testified that he could not determine whether the fractures were intentionally or accidentally inflicted. Dr. Grogan opined that because there was no evidence of a bleed or acute hemorrhage, and because Mother had reported to the emergency room that she thought Alex might be having a febrile seizure, Alex likely had a febrile seizure on November 3, 2009.
The jurisdictional and dispositional orders
The juvenile court declared Alex and Adrienne dependent children of the court under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). The juvenile court also declared Alex a dependent child of the court under section 300, subdivision (e). The juvenile court found “by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to [section 361, subdivision (c)] that there is a substantial danger if these children were returned home to their physical health, safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and that there are no reasonable means by which they may be protected without removing them from their mother’s physical custody.” The juvenile court ordered reunification services, monitored visitation, and counseling for Mother and Father.
The section 300, subdivision (j) allegation was dismissed in the interests of justice.
DISCUSSION
Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (e) on the basis that DCFS did not establish that “Alex’s injuries were the fault of his parents, rather than caused by an accident.” We disagree. The evidence that Alex sustained two skull fractures indicative of abuse while in his parents’ care was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings.
A. Standard of Review
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that the minor is a person described in section 300 must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 355; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.684(f).) “‘“When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence, that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. [Citation.] In making this determination, all conflicts [in the evidence and in reasonable inferences from the evidence] are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. [Citation.]”’ [Citation.] While substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must rest on the evidence; inferences that are the result of speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding. [Citation.]” (In re Precious D. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1258–1259.)
B. Section 355.1 Presumption
Section 355.1, subdivision (a) provides: “Where the court finds, based upon competent professional evidence, that an injury, injuries, or detrimental condition sustained by a minor is of a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained except as the result of the unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of either parent, the guardian, or other person who has the care or custody of the minor, that finding shall be prima facie evidence that the minor is a person described by subdivision (a), (b), or (d) of Section 300.”
Section 355.1 does not affect the burden of proof, but only the burden of producing evidence. (In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1041.) Section 355.1 requires the mandatory inference of two presumed facts unless rebuttal evidence is offered: “The first requires the court to presume a child’s injury actually occurred by injury or neglect when the court finds the injury is of the sort which ordinarily would not occur except by abuse or neglect. The second permits the court to presume that, given such an injury, the child’s home is unfit. The presumption only survives, however, until the parents or guardian(s) present rebuttal evidence as to either or both presumed facts. Where rebuttal evidence is offered, the presumption in no way relieves the court of its obligation to make factual findings as to the cause of the injury and the fitness of the home.” (In re James B. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 934, 937.) If rebuttal evidence is offered, DCFS maintains the burden of proving the facts alleged by clear and convincing evidence. (Id. at p. 937, fn. 2.) The juvenile court must make factual findings as to the cause of the injury and the fitness of the home. (Id. at p. 937.)
Dr. Egge testified that the fractures sustained by Alex were such that ordinarily do not occur except as a result of unreasonable or neglectful acts of either parent. Mother introduced rebuttal evidence that such fractures could be caused by falls, but no evidence was introduced that Alex sustained such falls. As discussed post, we conclude that the juvenile court’s factual findings with respect to the section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b) allegations as to the cause of the injury and the fitness of the home were supported by substantial evidence.
C. Section 300, Subdivision (a)
Mother argues that DCFS did not establish as required under section 300, subdivision (a) that Alex’s skull fractures were the result of his parents’ neglect or intentional conduct. She claims that the most likely cause of Alex’s injuries was an accidental fall. We disagree.
Pursuant to section 300, subdivision (a), a child may be adjudged to be a dependent child of the court if he or she “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian. For the purposes of this subdivision, a court may find there is a substantial risk of serious future injury based on the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history of repeated inflictions of injuries on the child or the child’s siblings, or a combination of these and other actions by the parent or guardian which indicate the child is at risk of serious physical harm....”
Mother points to selected portions of the experts’ testimonies as support for her argument that the juvenile court’s finding that Mother or Father nonaccidentally inflicted the injuries was based on speculation. But to the extent that Mother requests us to reweigh the evidence, her argument must fail. (In re Matthew S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 315, 321 [“We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.”].) Mother admits that the injuries probably did not occur at the home of Linda M., that there was no evidence that Mother had inflicted harm that could have resulted in a skull fracture, and that it did not appear likely that Alex could have sustained a skull fracture during his seizure. She also contends that Father could not have inflicted the injuries. She urges that although Father admitted hitting Alex once in the back of the head, Dr. Grogan and Dr. Egge testified that one blow to the back of the head would not have been sufficient to cause the fractures. She also cites Dr. Grogan’s testimony that both fractures were of a type that could occur from a collision with a flat object and that Dr. Egge stated that the fractures could have been sustained by a mechanism other than child abuse. She points out that Dr. Grogan disagreed with Dr. Egge’s opinion that Alex had suffered an impact seizure and instead opined that Alex had suffered a febrile seizure. She also cites to Alex’s past history of febrile seizures and the emergency room physician’s report that the cause of the seizure was unknown at the time of examination on November 3, 2009. Finally, Mother urges that because there is no evidence that anyone had ever seen Mother inflict any kind of harm, and Linda M. stated that Alex was clumsy and tended to run into walls, the skull fractures must have occurred “during some type of accidental fall or head bumping incident as a result of Alex’s clumsiness.”
We conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that the minors were children described under section 300, subdivision (a). As stated, issues of fact and credibility are the province of the juvenile court. (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) Dr. Egge testified that the two skull fractures which caused the seizure were highly indicative of abuse, and were not such that would ordinarily occur except as a result of unreasonable or neglectful acts of either parent. She based her opinion on Alex’s history, her physical examination of him, the findings on the CAT scan and MRI, and Alex’s other injuries that were suspicious for child abuse. Dr. Egge stated that another mechanism could have caused the fracture, but that the lack of history of a fall or other mechanism indicated child abuse. She testified that a single blow to Alex could not have caused both skull fractures because they were located on opposite sides of the head, and therefore were the result of two impacts. And Dr. Egge opined that Alex’s seizures were related to the impacts and not a fever because Alex did not have a fever when he was admitted to the hospital in November 2009. Also, although Mother urges on appeal that Alex must have sustained the fractures through an accidental fall, Mother testified that other than the May 2009 incident, Alex did not fall while in her care.
Based on Dr. Egge’s testimony, the juvenile court could well have rejected Father’s report of hitting Alex only once with his hand and concluded that the fractures were inflicted nonaccidentally. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that the minors were children described under section 300, subdivision (a).
D. Section 300, Subdivision (b)
Mother contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish a causal link between parental misconduct and harm to Alex pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b). We disagree.
Section 300, subdivision (b) provides a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left....”
“A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b) requires: ‘“(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the child, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] The third element ‘effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur).’ [Citation.]” (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 135.)
Mother cites In re James R., supra, 176 Cal.App.4th 129, In re Esmeralda B., supra, 11 Cal.App.4th 1036, and In re J.O. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 139 in support of her argument that there was no causal relation between Mother’s actions and the skull fractures sustained by Alex. In those cases, however, the reviewing courts concluded that the link between the parents’ actions and any harm or future risk of harm to the minors was speculative or unsupported by substantial evidence. The In re James R. court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding under section 300, subdivision (b) that the minors were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness based on the mother’s mental illness or substance abuse or the inability of the father to protect them. (In re James R., supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 131.) In that case, the minors came to DCFS’s attention when the mother had a negative reaction to taking ibuprofen and alcohol together. But there was no evidence that the mother used illegal drugs after the birth of the minors and the evidence showed that the minors were healthy, well cared for, and always supervised. (Id. at p. 137.) The court held that because there was no evidence of actual harm to the minors from the mother’s conduct or evidence that the parents were unable to provide care for them, any causal link between the mother’s mental state and future harm to the minors was speculative. (Id. at p. 136.)
The court in In re Esmeralda B., supra, 11 Cal.App.4th 1036, concluded that there was no evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) on the basis that the parents were incapable or unwilling to adequately protect their children. (Esmeralda B., at p. 1038.) There, the minor, who had fallen off her bicycle shortly before detecting blood on her underwear, was examined by a doctor and found to have suffered an injury to the posterior fourchette and a small tear of the hymen. In making its jurisdictional finding, the juvenile court did not point to any evidence supporting a finding that any molestation resulted from the parent’s failure or inability to adequately supervise the minor but instead concluded that the minor needed the protection of the juvenile court based on the actions of the parents subsequent to the injuries, including the father’s belief that the minor’s injury was not caused by sexual molestation. (Id. at pp. 1043–1044.) The court reversed the juvenile court’s order, finding there was no support for its conclusion that the minor needed the protection of the juvenile court based on the parents’ actions. The court noted that the social worker testified that the parents acted appropriately after the minor’s injury by seeking immediate medical care, cooperating with all authorities, providing therapy for the minor, and obtaining expert medical advice from a pediatrician who opined that the injuries were consistent with the minor’s history of falling from a bicycle. (Id. at p. 1044.) And in that case, “no professional or other person testified the [injury] was such that ordinarily it does not occur except as a result of unreasonable or neglectful acts of either parent.” (Id. at pp. 1040–1041.)
Finally, the In re J.O. court concluded that the factual finding against the father as to section 300, subdivision (b) was not supported by the evidence because there was no causal nexus between the juvenile court’s findings of serious injury caused by the mother’s use of a safety pin and knife to scrape ink tattoos from the minor’s body and her inappropriate physical discipline of the minor and the findings relating to the father. (In re J.O., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 152.)
Here, in contrast to the minor in In re James R., supra, 176 Cal.App.4th 129, Alex suffered actual harm. He sustained two skull fractures that Dr. Egge opined were inflicted nonaccidentally, and, according to Dr. Grogan, at different times. Unlike the case of In re Esmeralda B., supra, 11 Cal.App.4th 1036, where there was no professional testimony of nonaccidental injury, Dr. Egge testified that the skull fractures were injuries that would not have occurred except for the unreasonable or negligent acts of Mother and Father. Finally, unlike all three cases, the link between Mother’s action or inaction to Alex’s injuries was not based on speculation or insufficient evidence as Mother suggests. Dr. Egge opined that the occipital bone is very strong and can rarely be broken by a child’s mere fall. Dr. Egge concluded that the seizure was impact related and the skull fractures were inflicted by two separate impacts consistent with nonaccidental trauma. Dr. Egge based her opinion on Alex’s history, her physical examination of him, the findings on the CAT scan and MRI, and Alex’s other injuries that were suspicious for child abuse. After changing her story several times, Mother admitted that she left the minors in the care of Father for two hours. Father admitted that he lost his temper and hit Alex before he suffered his seizure. Accordingly, the juvenile court could well conclude that the injuries occurred as a result of Mother’s or Father’s failure to protect Alex or Mother’s willful or negligent failure to adequately protect Alex from Father.
On appeal, Mother urges that the injuries must have occurred during a fall. Yet other than the May 2009 incident, Mother claimed that Alex never fell in her presence. Even under her theory, substantial evidence would support the juvenile court’s findings that Mother failed to supervise or protect Alex, because she would have been unaware of falls that Alex had sustained that were serious enough to cause two skull fractures.
We conclude that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b).
E. Section 300, Subdivision (e)
Mother contends that because DCFS failed to conclusively prove how Alex’s injuries occurred, the juvenile court’s finding under section 300, subdivision (e) must be reversed. We do not agree.
A minor may be adjudged a dependent child of the court under section 300, subdivision (e) if “[t]he child is under the age of five years and has suffered severe physical abuse by a parent, or by any person known by the parent, if the parent knew or reasonably should have known that the person was physically abusing the child....” (§ 300, subd. (e).)
In re E.H. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 659 holds that where there was severe physical abuse of the minor who was never out of her parents’ custody and remained with a family member at all times, the parents reasonably should have known that someone was inflicting abuse on the minor. The court held that without resorting to the presumption of section 355.1, subdivision (a), the juvenile court’s finding that a minor is a person coming within the provisions of section 300, subdivision (e) may be supported by circumstantial evidence where there is no identifiable perpetrator if the parents reasonably should have known the minor was being injured by someone. (In re E.H., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 670.)
Similarly, here, Mother was Alex’s custodial parent and responsible for his care and supervision. She claimed to never have left him alone. Yet Alex sustained two skull fractures. Thus, Mother reasonably should have known that Alex was being injured by someone. But she denied knowing the identity of the person who caused Alex’s skull fractures and claimed that the fractures were sustained accidentally, notwithstanding expert testimony that the fractures were indicative of abuse and notwithstanding the lack of a history of falls. As in In re E.H., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at page 670, the juvenile court could reasonably have concluded through circumstantial evidence that Mother knew or should have known about the abuse.
We conclude that the juvenile court’s finding that Alex was described as a person coming within the provisions of section 300, subdivision (e) is supported by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed.
We concur: ROTHSCHILD, J., JOHNSON, J.