Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SJ12169 Garry G. Haehnle, Judge.
McCONNELL, P. J.
Christopher A., the father of Alana A., appeals an order terminating his reunification services at the 18-month review hearing. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding he was offered reasonable services. We affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2009 the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a petition on behalf of newborn Alana under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged the mother, L.A., tested positive for amphetamine/methamphetamine when the baby was born and Christopher admitted to a history of drug use. Alana was placed in foster care.
All further statutory references are also to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The petition also alleged Alana was born with a positive drug result. A confirmatory toxicology screen could not be provided because of a handling error, and thus the allegation was stricken from the petition.
Christopher's service plan, dated May 27, 2009, included supervised visitation, individual therapy, a parenting education program, and random drug testing. If he had a positive result, he was required to submit to an assessment with SARMS (Substance Abuse Recovery Management System) and comply with any requirements or recommendations it may make. L.A.'s plan was similar, but her duty to submit to a SARMS assessment was unconditional.
We do not concentrate on L.A.'s services or her compliance because she is not involved in this appeal.
The parents lived together in a hotel. At the time of the six-month review hearing, they had maintained regular visitation with Alana. Christopher's single drug test was negative, he had completed a parenting class, and he had begun therapy. The court found the parents had made substantive progress with their case plans and it authorized another six months of services and short unsupervised visits.
In April 2010 the Agency filed a petition under section 388 to return the parents' visitation to supervised. The petition alleged the parents were engaged in a domestic violence incident in February 2010, after which L.A. relapsed. L.A. accused Christopher of hitting her in the lip and throwing her across a bed. She reported that several months earlier she and Christopher began using methamphetamines together and "they would use in between tests and clean up before being tested." Christopher denied physical violence but admitted to a full day of arguing. Christopher had been drug tested twice and the results were negative. He denied drug use but he admitted he had purchased drugs for L.A.
Christopher's therapist, Nancy Deutsch, LCSW, reported she was worried about his behavior. He had only attended two sessions and he was 30 minutes late to one of them. Deutsch was concerned "that the father was using again because of his missed sessions and 'very tired' appearance." She reported there had been verbal altercations between the parents and she believed they had codependency issues. In May 2010 the court continued the section 388 petition to the 12-month hearing.
At the time of the 12-month review hearing in June 2010, the parents had separated. L.A. moved to northern California to enter a residential drug treatment program, and Christopher became homeless. Christopher had been drug tested almost monthly with negative results. He had missed three visits with Alana in one month, and the Agency was concerned with his sporadic participation in services since "he has no known commitments besides his Saturday schooling and one therapy session per week." The Agency recommended an extension of services to the 18-month date and the updating of Christopher's service plan to include participation in a court-approved anger management class. The court adopted the Agency's recommendations. The court's order does not refer to the Agency's section 388 petition.
The Agency's report for the 18-month review hearing states Christopher was living in the men's dorm area of the St. Vincent de Paul shelter. He told the social worker he was unable to meet with her because of his participation in reunification services. He had made an appointment with her but canceled it. He had maintained three three-hour visits per week with Alana. He reported he was participating in an anger management program at St. Vincent de Paul, and in a 52-week anger management program with Dr. Ida Greene. Dr. Greene reported that he began the program in June 2010 but only attended about six sessions, and there was an extended period when he did not attend.
The social worker believed it would be detrimental to return Alana to either parent. Christopher refused the social worker's request that he sign a release to verify he was living at St. Vincent de Paul and that he would be able to transfer to its family program to facilitate Alana's placement with him. The Agency recommended the termination of services for both parents and the scheduling of a selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26.
A contested hearing was held on January 10, 2011. In an addendum report dated January 7, the Agency recommended the continuation of services for L.A. to the 24-month date. The Agency continued to recommend the termination of Christopher's services and supervised visitation for him. St. Vincent de Paul informed the social worker that Christopher was struggling with recovery. His drug tests on October 5 and December 22, 2010, were positive for amphetamines. On January 7, 2011, he completed a detoxification program and St. Vincent de Paul required that he begin anew its drug treatment program.
The court determined by a preponderance of the evidence that reasonable services were offered to Christopher, but he had not made substantive progress with his plan. The court terminated services for him and changed his visitation to supervised. He was to undergo three random drug tests within the next few weeks, and if he had no positive or missing tests he could resume unsupervised visits. The court scheduled a 24-month review hearing for L.A.
DISCUSSION
I
"Whenever a minor is removed from parental custody, the juvenile court must, in the absence of certain specified exceptions, order the social worker to provide services to the parent for the purpose of facilitating reunification of the family." (In re Jesse W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 49, 59, fn. omitted (Jesse W.); § 361.5, subd. (a).) Parents are ordinarily entitled to 12 months of reunification services. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) For a child under three years of age, however, "court-ordered services shall be provided for a period of six months from the dispositional hearing..., but no longer than 12 months from the date the child entered foster care." (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B).) The shortened six-month period was intended " 'to give juvenile courts greater flexibility in meeting the needs of young children, "in cases with a poor prognosis for family reunification, " ' " and it also "represents a legislative determination that in certain situations, efforts to continue reunification services beyond the statutorily mandated six months do not serve and protect a minor's interest." (Jesse W., supra, at p. 59.) The court may nonetheless extend the reunification period for a minor under the age of three up to 18 or 24 months if there is a substantial probability the minor will be returned to the parent's physical custody within the extended period or reasonable services have not been provided to the parent. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3) & (4).)
"Reunification services need not be perfect. [Citation.] But they should be tailored to the specific needs of the particular family. [Citation.] Services will be found reasonable if the [Agency] has 'identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult....' " (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972; In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 (Misako R.) ["The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances"].)
We review the court's ruling on the reasonableness of reunification services for substantial evidence. (Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 545.) "[T]his court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent. We must indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the verdict. If there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment, our duty ends and the judgment must not be disturbed. [Citations.] ' " '[W]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, ' either deduction will be supported by substantial evidence, and 'a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.' [Citations.]" [Citation.]' " (Ibid.)
II
A
Christopher contends his services between the 12- and 18-month review hearings were inadequate because there was more than a two-month gap in therapy sessions with Deutsch. He began seeing her on December 1, 2009, and his authorization expired on September 1, 2010. Despite Deutsch's numerous phone calls and e-mails to the Agency, it did not renew the authorization until early November 2010. Further, the authorization expired on December 1, 2010, and thus, there was time for only four of the six additional sessions authorized.
Deutsch testified the hiatus in therapy sessions frustrated Christopher because he "need[ed] to talk about some of the issues, " and he was living in a homeless shelter and "needed support." She also testified, however, that by late November 2010 Christopher had met all of his therapeutic goals. The goals included increasing his "effectiveness in communicating his feelings regarding his child's removal and his ability to understand the period that led up to the child's birth and removal, " increasing his "ability to identify safety skills to provide a protective environment for his child, " increasing his "ability to understand the dynamics and effects of drug abuse on the family and how that negatively impacts the emotional and physical well-being of his child, " and identifying and using anger management skills.
Deutsch explained that Christopher was aware of his role in Alana being removed from parental custody, and it appeared he could provide a home for her in the family section of St. Vincent de Paul. Christopher had advised Deutsch he was involved in two anger management courses. Christopher's positive drug tests in October and December 2010 did not affect Deutsch's opinion he had met his therapeutic goals. She testified, "I think people in recovery do relapse." The court asked Deutsch whether she thought Christopher needed additional therapy, and she responded, "I felt there was nothing I could do further for him." She added, "I think [what] he needs is probably a drug rehab[ilitation] program before anything."
Deutsch sought authorization for two additional sessions with Christopher, but only to properly terminate the therapeutic process. The Agency approved the sessions.
Since Christopher completed the therapy component of his case plan, and no additional therapy was recommended, the hiatus in sessions was not a barrier to reunification. Thus, the gap in therapy does not show the court's finding of reasonable services lacks evidentiary support. Despite Deutsch's opinion he reached his therapeutic goals, the court could reasonably find there was no potential for his reunification with Alana by the 24-month date because of his recent drug relapses, one of which occurred shortly before the 18-month hearing. Christopher completed his detoxification program just three days before the hearing, and St. Vincent de Paul required him to restart his drug treatment program. The court explained it was too late in the proceedings to allow Christopher additional time, and this is particularly true since Alana was taken into protective custody at birth. The court advised him from the onset of the proceedings that since she was under three years of age when she was removed from parental custody, the reunification period may be of only six months' duration.
Christopher's theory that his positive drug tests are somehow attributable to a hiatus in therapy is unconvincing. He cites Deutsch's testimony, but she merely said the hiatus was frustrating to Christopher. Contrary to his current position, Christopher testified he took responsibility for the relapses, and "I used what the Agency was putting me through as an excuse." His counsel stated in closing argument, "I'm not making light of the relapses. I understand that is a very concerning behavior. However, my client is not making excuses. He's taking responsibility for those relapses. He understands that he controls his own behavior[]."
Moreover, throughout the proceedings, Christopher was represented by appointed counsel who could have brought any issue pertaining to services to the court's attention. As this court explained in In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416: "If Mother felt during the reunification period that the services offered her were inadequate, she had the assistance of counsel to seek guidance from the juvenile court in formulating a better plan: ' "The law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge's attention to any infringement of them. If any other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be careful to be silent as to his objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the result would be that few judgments would stand the test of an appeal." [Citation.]' " Christopher did not complain until the 18-month review hearing, which was actually held at the 20-month date.
B
Additionally, Christopher contends the Agency unreasonably insisted at the 12-month review hearing that he attend a 52-week anger management program. The court's order does not specify a 52-week program. Rather, it states he was to "participate in a court approved anger management class." It is unclear whether the Agency referred him to this program, but even if it did our analysis would be the same.
Christopher testified that in July 2010 he began a 10 session/15 hour anger management program at St. Vincent de Paul. He did not complete the program until November 22, 2010. He testified that in this program he learned not to "bottle things inside" and to reduce stress through breathing techniques, meditation and exercise.
Christopher also testified he attended sessions of a 52-week anger management program given by Dr. Greene. At the 18-month hearing, the court did not indicate the intended length of Dr. Greene's program would prohibit Christopher from meeting the anger management component of his case plan. Rather, the court criticized Christopher for attending only 11 of the 28 sessions available to him. Christopher testified his attendance was sporadic because he felt Dr. Greene was "very biased, " her program consisted of listening to other people's stories rather than learning coping techniques, and he was confused by homework assignments and was rarely able to get Dr. Greene's individual attention. The court explained: "[Christopher] intentionally decided not to go to the classes for Dr. Greene.... I have no evidence he told the [social] worker or anybody else he was unhappy with Dr. Greene's classes. He should have told somebody he was unhappy with those classes. He doesn't get to just decide on his own he's not going to go."
It is unclear whether the 52-week program was specifically for anger management or domestic violence, but the title does not affect the outcome.
Christopher cannot reasonably complain about the adequacy of his services on the anger management component of his case plan when he intentionally attended Dr. Greene's program only sporadically. He could have conveyed his dissatisfaction to his appointed counsel so she could bring it to the court's attention long before the 18-month hearing. Substantial evidence supports the court's finding he did not comply with Dr. Greene's program to the extent he could within the allotted time, thus justifying the termination of services.
Further, reversal is unwarranted because even without any issue as to the anger management component, it is not reasonably probable the outcome would have been more favorable to Christopher. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Denny H. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1508-1509, fn. 2 [ruling on reasonable services subject to harmless error analysis]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) The primary reason for the termination of his reunification services was his recent drug abuse. His lack of participation in Dr. Greene's program was a secondary reason.
C
Christopher also contends the court's finding of reasonable services lacks evidentiary support because six social workers were assigned to the case seriatim during the proceedings. The 12-month review hearing was held on June 15, 2010, and Rachel Swaykos handled the case between April 1 and June 18, 2010. Three other social workers preceded Swaykos from the commencement of the case in May 2009. Wanda Tischer handled the case between June 22 and mid-August 2010, and Sondra Miller-Shegog took it over on September 16 and continued through the 18-month hearing on January 10, 2011. Christopher cites Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598, which observes that a social services agency is required "to maintain reasonable contact with the parent during the course of the plan, and to make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves difficult."
Christopher's updated service plan of June 15, 2010, required a monthly meeting with the social worker. The record does not include any Agency report indicating Tischer met with Christopher. He testified that when he first learned she was his new social worker he had difficulty getting in touch with her. He was, however, able to reach her. After Tischer was off the case, Christopher was able to meet with her supervisor.
On October 29, 2010, Miller-Shegog filed a report to request a 30-day continuation of the 18-month hearing. The report indicates that because of the involvement of several social workers, Miller-Shegog needed additional time to provide the court with a complete assessment and recommendations. It also states she would work closely with the parents and the foster mother in the following weeks. The court granted a continuance to November 30, at which time it granted a continuance to January 10, 2011, for a contested hearing.
Christopher complains about the number of meetings he had with Miller-Shegog. The record does not reveal whether she met with him before November 1, 2010, but he ignores evidence showing that from at least that date he caused or contributed to any lack of contact with her. The Agency's report for the 18-month review hearing explains she had difficulty scheduling a meeting with him. They met briefly at the courthouse after a hearing on November 1. Christopher agreed to meet with Miller-Shegog on November 5 "to discuss in detail his case and to provide an update on his current circumstances." The preceding day, however, he left a phone message canceling the appointment. He said he would call back to reschedule, but he apparently did not do so. The report also states that on November 22, Miller-Shegog went to a trolley station unannounced to speak with Christopher and schedule a meeting. Christopher was there to exchange Alana with the foster mother. He said he was unavailable to meet then and he would contact Miller-Shegog with a time he was available. He presumably did not do so. Miller-Shegog had left a phone message for him at St. Vincent de Paul on November 16, which he denied receiving.
At the hearing, Miller-Shegog testified she twice went to the trolley station to speak with Christopher. She also met with him on November 1 and 30, 2010, after hearings. She tried twice to contact him by leaving phone messages for him at St. Vincent de Paul. She testified it was difficult to set up a meeting with Christopher or to communicate with him. On November 30, Christopher complained about "[t]he many different hands on the case."
Christopher testified that Miller-Shegog had told him she had difficulty contacting him. He explained he had several different phone numbers throughout the proceedings, and he denied to Miller-Shegog that he received phone messages from her at St. Vincent de Paul. He agreed he needed to have better communication skills with the social workers.
Christopher ignores the evidence unfavorable to him. " 'A party who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a particular finding must summarize the evidence on that point, favorable and unfavorable, and show how and why it is insufficient. [Citation.]' Where a party presents only facts and inferences favorable to his or her position, 'the contention that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence may be deemed waived.' " (Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 738, italics omitted; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.)
Even without waiver, we would find against Christopher. His claim is that "the lack of continuity in assigned social workers had been frustrating" for him. At the time of the 12-month review hearing, however, the court found Christopher had made substantive progress on his case plan despite the involvement of four social workers to that date. As he points out, "It is very clear that up to the 12 month review hearing, [he] was doing well in his reunification plan." Thus, the involvement of three social workers between the 12- and 18-month review hearings, standing alone, does not satisfy Christopher's burden of showing the court's ruling on reasonable services is unsupported by substantial evidence.
One of the three social workers was only on the case for three days after the 12-month review hearing, and thus for practical purposes there were two on the case between the 12- and 18-month review hearings.
The record does not reveal why the Agency assigned six social workers to this case, a situation obviously less than ideal. The evidence, however, amply supports the court's ruling. Christopher's lack of progress in his services plan at the time of the 18-month hearing was based on his drug abuse rather than on any hardship related to the number of social workers involved. Since the Agency did not learn until shortly before the 18-month review hearing on January 10, 2011, of Christopher's positive drug tests on October 5 and December 22, 2010, the social worker had no time to assist Christopher in an area "where compliance proves difficult." (Katie V. v. Superior Court, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 598.) As the court noted, Christopher knew in October 2010 that he tested positive for methamphetamine, but he did not tell his therapist or anyone else, "and by keeping that in it led to another relapse... just really recently. And as long as [he] has been in court he has known that... he's got to watch every step, if he wants to get back with his daughter."
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order.
WE CONCUR: McDONALD, J.O'ROURKE, J.