Opinion
No. 352318
08-20-2020
In re S. J. AL-NAHARI, Minor.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 10-496988-NA Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and STEPHENS and CAMERON, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her minor child, SA, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent's act caused physical injury or physical abuse), (i) (prior termination of parental rights due to serious and chronic neglect; prior attempts at parental rehabilitation unsuccessful), and (j) (reasonable likelihood that child will be harmed if returned to parent). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), filed an initial petition for permanent custody after SA tested positive for cocaine and opiates at birth. Petitioner alleged that respondent suffered from chronic substance abuse and caused injury to SA by using cocaine and opiates while she was pregnant with SA. Petitioner further alleged that respondent previously had her parental rights terminated to two other children as a result of neglect stemming from respondent's chronic substance abuse. Petitioner also sought to terminate the parental rights of respondent's husband, YA, alleging that YA knew of respondent's drug use but failed to act protect SA. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence to support termination of respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (i), and (j). The trial court also determined that petitioner established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination of respondent's parental rights was in SA's best interests. However, the trial court declined to terminate YA's parental rights.
Respondent's other children were the subjects of an appeal in which this Court affirmed the order terminating respondent's parental rights. In re Mullins/Oltersdorff, Minors, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 20, 2013 (Docket No. 313069), p 1. --------
II. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
Respondent first argues that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence to support termination of respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (i), and (j). We disagree.
In order to terminate parental rights, a trial court must find that a statutory ground has been established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). The trial court's findings regarding statutory grounds are reviewed for clear error. Id. "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court's special opportunity to observe
A trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child or sibling of the child has suffered physical injury or physical or sexual abuse under circumstances in which "[t]he parent's act caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent's home." MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i).
Petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that SA suffered physical injury as a result of respondent's actions. During the evidentiary hearing, foster care worker Laneisha Steen testified that respondent admitted that she used cocaine and heroin throughout her entire pregnancy with SA. Steen also stated that respondent admitted that she did not receive any prenatal medical care during her pregnancy with SA. Steen and YA both testified that SA tested positive for cocaine and opiates on the date of SA's birth, and SA required treatment for withdrawal symptoms as a result of respondent's drug use. YA testified that SA was receiving treatment at a hospital in the neonatal intensive care unit, and an individual at the hospital informed YA that SA may need medical treatment for six months as a result of respondent's drug use during pregnancy. Petitioner presented SA's medical records which confirmed that SA tested positive for cocaine and opiates at birth, and SA required treatment for withdrawal symptoms as a result of respondent's drug use. Accordingly, petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that SA suffered physical injury in the form of drug dependency and accompanying withdrawal symptoms as a result of respondent's drug use during her pregnancy.
Furthermore, petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable likelihood that SA would suffer from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if SA was returned to respondent's care. Steen testified that respondent admitted to using cocaine and heroin on a consistent basis for approximately 10 years. Respondent told Steen that her parental rights were previously terminated to her two other children as a result of respondent's substance abuse. Respondent also told Steen that respondent did not wish to see SA or form a bond with SA because respondent was aware that her parental rights would likely be terminated. Finally, respondent told Steen that she had not purchased the necessary items to properly care for SA. Based upon the foregoing, petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence of a reasonable likelihood that SA would suffer from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if SA was returned to respondent's care. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it determined that petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence to support termination of respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i).
Because only one statutory ground needs to be established to support termination of parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3), In re Martin, 316 Mich App 73, 90; 896 NW2d 452 (2016), we need not address the two additional statutory grounds for termination. Therefore, termination of respondent's parental rights was appropriate based upon MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) alone.
III. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent next argues that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that termination of respondent's parental rights was in SA's best interests. Again, we disagree.
"Whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence." In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 90. This Court reviews the trial court's findings and ruling that termination is in the child's best interests for clear error. In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). "A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court's special opportunity to observe the witnesses." In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 80 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
"The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children's best interests." In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014) (citation omitted). To determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests, the court should consider factors including "the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). The trial court may also consider the child's well-being while in care and the possibility of adoption. Id. at 714 (citation omitted). "If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made." MCL 712A.19b(5).
The trial court did not clearly err when it determined that termination of respondent's parental rights was in SA's best interests under MCL 712A.19b(5). Respondent had not yet formed a bond with SA at the time of the termination. During the evidentiary hearing, Steen testified that respondent did not wish to see SA or form a bond with SA because respondent anticipated that her parental rights would likely be terminated. In fact, respondent failed to purchase the necessary items for SA even prior to her birth and according to YA, used money he gave her prior to the birth to purchase drugs. Respondent's drug problem spanned over ten years with no signs of abatement evidencing an ability to safely parent. Steen also testified that SA was receiving appropriate care in a non-relative foster home placement. Thus, petitioner presented evidence that SA's foster home had advantages over respondent's home.
Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err when it determined that termination of respondent's parental rights was in SA's best interests under MCL 712A.19b(5).
Affirmed.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron