Opinion
No. 5-425 / 05-0614
Filed June 15, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Gerald W. Magee, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals from a juvenile court order denying her motion for a new trial. AFFIRMED.
Timothy L. Lapointe of Lapointe Lapointe, Mason City, for appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Paul L. Martin, County Attorney, and Gregg Rosenbladt, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Mark Young of Young Law Office, Mason City, guardian ad litem for minor child.
F. David Eastman of Eastman Law Office, Clear Lake, for father.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Jean appeals from a juvenile court order denying her motion for a new trial. She claims the court (1) erred in determining that what she asserted to be newly discovered evidence was not in fact newly discovered evidence, and (2) abused its discretion in ruling on her motion without a hearing. We conclude the juvenile court was correct in determining it was without jurisdiction to address Jean's motion. We therefore affirm.
On May 6, 2004, the State filed a petition seeking termination of Jean's parental rights to her son, Adam. Following a hearing the juvenile court filed a detailed ruling on January 18, 2005, terminating Jean's parental rights. After the court ruled on Jean's post-decision motions Jean timely appealed on February 11, 2005. On March 21, 2005, while that appeal was pending, Jean filed the motion for new trial that is involved in the present appeal. Because the contents of Jean's motion are important to our decision, we set forth the body of her motion, which states the following:
We affirmed the termination of Jean's parental rights to Adam. See In re A.L., No. 05-0250, Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2005).
COMES NOW the undersigned attorney for Jean . . ., mother of Adam . . ., hereby moves for a new trial pursuant to Iowa Rule Civil Procedure 1.1004 and a stay of execution and enforcement of the judgment pending disposition after new trial, and in support thereof states:
That the undersigned received a letter from James Anastasi of Anastasi Counseling Services on March 10, 2005, in which he states, "I am still confused as to how [Jean] has lost parental rights of her son and why her daughter has been removed to foster care. . . . From what I currently know, I believe termination of parental rights to be hasty, if not inappropriate." (See attached Exhibit "A.")
Mr. Anastasi goes on to mention that Adam has been suspected to be dealing with ADHD/ODD challenges and that testing to confirm this diagnosis would shed light on the parenting style needed and support given to the parent and would do much to improve the family situation. Mr. Anastasi states, "Not knowing Adam's diagnosis would make any therapy with [Jean] difficult and termination of rights premature."
WHEREFORE, the undersigned respectfully requests that the Court enter an order granting a new trial.
(Omission in original). Attached Exhibit "A" is a letter from Mr. Anastasi, dated March 10, 2005.
Jean's motion was expressly brought pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1004. The motion did not expressly state it was founded on a claim of newly discovered evidence. However, not only does Jean assert on appeal that it was so founded, the State does not dispute her assertion, and the motion can most reasonably be read as being based on a claim of newly discovered evidence. We will therefore proceed under the assumption it was so intended.
On March 30, 2005 the juvenile court entered an order denying Jean's motion. The court noted that the motion was brought pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1004, paraphrased the substance of rules 1.1004, 1.1006, and 1.1007, and thereafter ruled as follows:
Ruling Terminating Parental Right was filed on January 18, 2005. Also, Notice of Appeal was filed on February 14, 2005. Prior Motion for New Trial was denied on February 2, 2005. The Court FINDS there is no newly discovered material evidence, that Motion for New Trial and Motion for Stay is not timely, and based on Notice of Appeal any such Motions should be addressed to the Appellate Court.IT IS ORDERED that Motion for New Trial and Motion for Stay are hereby denied.
Jean appeals.
We must first determine the scope of our review. How we review the denial of a motion for new trial depends on the grounds asserted in the motion and ruled on by the trial court. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Thermogas Co., 620 N.W.2d 819, 823 (Iowa 2000). When the motion and ruling are based on discretionary grounds our review is for an abuse of discretion. Id. When the motion and ruling are based on a claim the trial court erred on issues of law our review is for correction of errors of law. Id.
The portion of the juvenile court's ruling which states "based on Notice of Appeal any such Motions should be addressed to the Appellate Court" is a conclusion that because an appeal from its decision had been perfected and was pending the juvenile court was without jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the motion. Our review of jurisdictional questions is for correction of errors at law. Heartland Express v. Gardner, 675 N.W.2d 259, 262 (Iowa 2003). We also note there is no dispute over the facts relevant to the jurisdictional question, i.e., the date of the juvenile court termination ruling, the date of Jean's appeal, the date of Jean's motion for new trial, and the fact the juvenile court's termination ruling was on appeal when Jean filed her motion for new trial on March 21, 2005. Thus the only dispute concerning the question of the juvenile court's jurisdiction to entertain the merits of Jean's motion concerns the legal consequences flowing from undisputed facts. Under such circumstances also our review is for the correction of errors of law. See, e.g., Cubit v. Mahaska County., 677 N.W.2d 777, 781 (Iowa 2004) (stating, in summary judgment context, "Where the only dispute concerns legal consequences flowing from undisputed facts, our review is limited to whether the district court correctly applied the law."). We conclude our review of the jurisdictional question here is for correction of errors of law.
Although Jean's notice of appeal was not filed with the clerk of the supreme court until February 14, 2005, and with the clerk of the district court until February 16, 2005, it was served on February 11, 2005.
The general rule is that once an appeal has been perfected, the appellate court has jurisdiction and the trial court loses jurisdiction over the merits of the controversy. IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 628 (Iowa 2000); In re B.L., 470 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Iowa 1991). The trial court then may not consider post-trial motions filed after the notice of appeal. IBP, Inc., 604 N.W.2d at 628. An exception to the general rule provides that the trial court retains jurisdiction to proceed on collateral issues not affecting the subject matter of the appeal. Gutierrez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 638 N.W.2d 702, 706-07 (Iowa 2002); In re B.L., 470 N.W.2d at 347. Although matters not directly involved in an appeal may be dealt with by the juvenile court during the appeal, see In re B.L., 470 N.W.2d at 347, Jean's motion sought new trial on the very issue involved in her then-pending appeal, termination of her parental rights to Adam. We conclude the juvenile court did not err in concluding it was without jurisdiction to address the merits of her motion.
We note the juvenile court alternatively or additionally denied Jean's motion on the grounds that (1) the purported newly discovered evidence did not in fact qualify as such, and (2) Jean's motion was not timely. Although we find it unnecessary to address these grounds for denial, we state no disagreement with them. See Benson v. Richardson, 537 N.W.2d 748, 762-63 (Iowa 1995) (stating "Newly discovered evidence" under the predecessor of Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1004(7) is evidence which existed at the time of trial); Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1007 (stating that motions for new trial and motions to stay enforcement of a judgment must be filed within ten days after the challenged decision is filed unless an additional time of not to exceed thirty days is granted).
Jean claims the juvenile court abused its discretion in ruling on her motion without a hearing. For two reasons we conclude she is not entitled to reversal on this issue. First, nothing in Jean's motion or elsewhere in the record indicates she sought a hearing on the motion. Second, the facts relevant to the jurisdictional question are clear and undisputed. Under such circumstances, and assuming without deciding that the juvenile court should have held a hearing on Jean's motion, she cannot have been prejudiced by not having a hearing. A trial court error does not require reversal unless the error was prejudicial. Mercer v. Pittway Corp., 616 N.W.2d 602, 612 (Iowa 2000); Iowa-Illinois Gas Elec. Co. v. Black Veatch, 497 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1993). Reversal is not required if the record shows a lack of prejudice. Mercer, 616 N.W.2d at 612; McClure v. Walgreen Co., 613 N.W.2d 225, 235 (Iowa 2000); Shawan v. Polk County., 420 N.W.2d 808, 810 (Iowa 1988).
We affirm the juvenile court's denial of Jean's motion for new trial.