Opinion
2 CA-JV 2023-0037
06-30-2023
In re Termination of Parental Rights as to A.K.,
Sarah Michele Martin, Tucson Counsel for Appellant. Domingo DeGrazia, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Ingrid T. Bedrick Law and Policy PLLC, Tucson By Brooke H. Bedrick Counsel for Appellee A.K.
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. S20210193 The Honorable Geoffrey L. Ferlan, Judge Pro Tempore.
Sarah Michele Martin, Tucson Counsel for Appellant.
Domingo DeGrazia, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Ingrid T.
Bedrick Law and Policy PLLC, Tucson By Brooke H. Bedrick Counsel for Appellee A.K.
Presiding Judge Eppich authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Vasquez and Judge Gard concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
EPPICH, PRESIDING JUDGE.
¶1 Appellant Keaton K. challenges the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights to his adopted daughter A.K., born in November 2015, on grounds of abandonment. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). He contends the court abused its discretion in finding that termination of his rights was in A.K.'s best interests. We affirm.
¶2 To sever a parent's rights, the juvenile court must find that clear and convincing evidence of at least one of the statutory grounds for termination exists and that a preponderance of the evidence establishes severing the parent's rights is in the child's best interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, ¶¶ 32, 41 (2005); § 8-533(B). We will affirm the order if reasonable evidence supports the factual findings upon which the order is based. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the court's order. See Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, ¶ 12 (App. 2007).
¶3 Keaton, who had children from a previous relationship, married Ingrid T. in 2011. In 2015, his daughter gave birth to A.K., and he and Ingrid subsequently adopted her. Keaton and Ingrid separated in 2017, and during the dissolution proceedings the two were granted shared parenting time. Ingrid married Alexander G. in 2018, and he has acted as a parent to A.K. since.
¶4 In March 2019, A.K. told Alexander that Keaton had choked her during a visit with him. The superior court in the dissolution matter amended the parenting time orders, granting Keaton supervised visitation for ten hours per week. Keaton did not, however, regularly attend visitation, having as few as five to eight visits with her over the span of nearly a year. In April 2020, the superior court ordered Keaton to pay child support and attend therapeutic visitation with A.K., but he failed to comply with either requirement. He last saw A.K. in February 2020. Ingrid filed a petition for termination of his parental rights in December 2021.
¶5 After Ingrid filed the petition, Keaton filed a motion for therapeutic parenting time. After a contested hearing on Ingrid's petition, the juvenile court concluded Ingrid had established the ground of abandonment and severance was in A.K.'s best interests. This appeal followed.
¶6 On appeal, Keaton does not contest the juvenile court's finding of abandonment, but argues that it "erred" in finding that severance of his parental rights was in A.K.'s best interests. He contends "the evidence does not support" the court's finding. Rather, he suggests that Ingrid did not "present evidence of how the child would be endangered or harmed by allowing the parental relationship to remain intact" and that severance will deprive her "of her relationship . . . with her entire biological family."
¶7 As Ingrid points out, however, a juvenile court may find severance is in the child's best interests based on either a benefit or a detriment to the minor. Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, ¶ 13 (2018). "Although a finding of detriment to the child is not necessary, some benefit must be gained by the child from a termination." In re Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274 , 167 Ariz. 1, 7 (1990). In this case, the juvenile court relied on evidence that Alexander, who had acted as a parent to A.K. for nearly four years, wished to adopt her. The child welfare consultant who drafted a social study of the family also opined that severance would be in A.K.'s best interests because it would provide her with permanency and allow Alexander, "who she identifies as her father," to adopt her. Thus, reasonable evidence supported the court's conclusion that severance was in A.K.'s best interests. Keaton's argument to the contrary is essentially a request for this court to reweigh the evidence on appeal. We will not do so and instead defer to the court's factual findings because, as the trier of fact, that court "is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 4 (App. 2004).
¶8 To the extent Keaton attempts to diminish the benefit of adoption to A.K. by arguing that the juvenile court's "consideration of the step-father circumstances in its best interest analysis was inappropriate," we reject his argument. The question of A.K.'s best interests is not based on a comparison of the relative rights of Keaton and Alexander to her custody, as Keaton implicitly maintains. Rather, because the court found the existence of a statutory ground for severance, Keaton's "continuing interests in the care and custody of the child bec[a]me less important than [A.K.'s] best interests." Timothy B. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, ¶ 30 (2022). Thus, the court was not required to weigh Keaton's interest against Alexander's, but rather A.K.'s interests "in a safe and stable home life" against Keaton's "diluted parental interest." Id. (quoting Kent K., 210 Ariz. 279, ¶ 35). As described above, the court properly did so, and we therefore cannot say it abused its discretion in granting Ingrid's petition for termination.
¶9 We affirm the juvenile court's order terminating Keaton's parental rights to A.K.