TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2); In re A.J.L., 136 S.W.3d 293, 301 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet); see also In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003) (applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 324(b)(2) requiring motion for new trial to preserve complaint of factual sufficiency to support jury finding in parental termination cases). J.T. did not file a motion for new trial.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2); In re A.J.L., 136 S.W.3d 293, 301 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet); see also In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003) (applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 324(b)(2) requiring motion for new trial to preserve complaint of factual sufficiency to support jury finding in parental termination cases). G.H., Sr. did not file a motion for new trial.

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2); In re A.J.L., 136 S.W.3d 293, 301-02 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); In re J.M.S., 43 S.W.3d 60, 62 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.)

Because Brandon did not file a motion for new trial, the Department argues that he has not preserved a factual sufficiency complaint. See TEXR. CIV. P. 324(b)(2); In re A.J.L., 136 S.W.3d 293, 301-02 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). But we have held that a factual sufficiency complaint in a termination case may be reviewed even though it was not preserved in the trial court.

Failure to do so results in waiver of the complaint. In re A.J.L., 136 S.W.3d 293, 301-02 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); see Brazosport Bank of Tex. v. Oak Park Townhouses, 889 S.W.2d 676, 682 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (holding that factual sufficiency challenge was waived when the motion for new trial raised only no-evidence challenge); see also Hardy v. C. P. I. Sales, Inc., 511 S.W.2d 89, 93 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ) ("A legal sufficiency assignment cannot be enlarged on appeal to embrace a factual sufficiency point of error, or vice versa.").

Appellees advocate that we evaluate the reliability of psychiatric expert testimony or "soft" science testimony based upon the Court of Criminal Appeals’ Nenno factors, rather than the Robinson factors." SeeNenno v. State , 970 S.W.2d 549, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds,State v. Terrazas , 4 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (noting that when measuring the reliability of an expert's opinion in fields within the soft sciences, we consider whether: "(1) the field of expertise is a legitimate one; (2) the subject matter of the expert's testimony is within the scope of that field; and (3) the expert's testimony properly relies upon the principles involved in that field of study"); see alsoIn re J.R. , 501 S.W.3d at 748 (employing Nenno factors in parental termination case to psychologist's testimony); see alsoIn re A.J.L. , 136 S.W.3d 293, 297–301 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (applying soft science factors in parental termination case to counselor's testimony); In re G.B. , No. 07-01-0210-CV, 2003 WL 22327191, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 10, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same). In light of the Supreme Court's recognition that the Robinson factors may not apply to certain testimony, we decline to adopt a new test to evaluate the reliability of the psychiatric testimony in this case.

P. 324(b)(2), (3); Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex. 1991). See also In re M.X.R., No. 04-20-00042-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 4063, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 27, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re A.J.L., 136 S.W.3d 293, 301-02 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.)); In re D.T., 593 S.W.3d 437, 439 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. filed 3-12-20).

J.A.V., 2019 WL 6887709, at *2 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2), (3); A.L., 486 S.W.3d at 130; In re A.J.L., 136 S.W.3d 293, 301 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.)). Stephanie did not preserve her challenges to the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence because she did not make a motion for new trial or any other motion or objection in the trial court that would preserve those challenges.

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2), (3); In re A.L., 486 S.W.3d at 130; In re A.J.L., 136 S.W.3d 293, 301 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). Here, however, Appellant Mother R.V. did not file a motion for new trial raising factual sufficiency of the evidence to the jury's best-interest finding.

Because a motion for new trial is a prerequisite to a factual sufficiency challenge in a jury trial, Mother and Father have forfeited their complaints that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the best-interest findings against them. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 324(b)(2)-(3); In re A.J.L., 136 S.W.3d 293, 301 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); see also J.V., 2015 WL 4148500, at *1. Accordingly, we overrule the sole issue of each parent.