Opinion
05-23-00134-CV
06-29-2023
IN THE INTEREST OF A.J.F. AND A.E.B, CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 397th Judicial District Court Grayson County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. FA-21-0763
Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Kennedy
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CORY L. CARLYLE JUSTICE
Mother and Father appeal from the trial court's decree terminating their parental rights to their child, A.E.B., and naming the Department of Family and Protective Services sole managing conservator of Mother's child, A.J.F. We affirm in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
The Department filed a petition seeking protection, conservatorship, and termination of parental rights in June 2021, after a caregiver reported concerns about physical injuries suffered by then three-year-old A.J.F. The caregiver, Daisy Elizabeth Guzman Medina, testified that she babysat Mother's children for a few months and never had any issues with the children hurting each other. But she noticed that A.J.F. had different bruises "[a]lmost every day." And one time when she went to pick up A.J.F., he complained that his back hurt. Mother's daughter, A.G.F., lifted up A.J.F.'s shirt to reveal serious injuries to A.J.F.'s back that had scabbed over. When Ms. Medina asked who injured A.J.F., A.G.F. fearfully told her, "My mom won't let us talk about anything or say anything."
Ms. Medina was concerned, so she notified her cousin whose friend worked for the Department. Law enforcement soon arrived, and Mother arrived sometime later. Ms. Medina testified she had seen Mother interact with the children before, and she "appear[ed] to care for them and love them." And Ms. Medina acknowledged that in the months she babysat the children, the children were clean, fed, and dressed appropriately. Ms. Medina did not believe Mother was responsible for harming the children.
Department investigator Amy Phelps testified that, when she visited Ms. Medina's home to investigate, A.J.F. had "long, scabbed-over, bloody injuries on his back." And "[h]e had a bruise that was on his face and looked like something had hit his eye, because it had a blood vessel that was broken in his eye." According to Ms. Phelps, when Mother arrived at the scene, she "sat down and started watching a movie on her phone" and "didn't really seem concerned about the children." When asked what happened to A.J.F., Mother and Father both accused Mother's sevenyear-old son, A.F.G., of causing the injuries without providing any details.
Ms. Phelps noted that the Department had previously investigated the family in 2019 when A.F.G. went to school with a black eye. According to Ms. Phelps, Mother told the Department that Father injured the child accidentally when he opened a door the child was standing behind. The Department investigated again in 2020 based on an allegation that Mother struck A.F.G. with a hanger. When interviewed, none of the children identified Mother as the person responsible for hitting A.F.G., but the Department suspected the children were coached on what to say.
Mother disputed this during her testimony, saying instead that she was the one who opened the door that hit A.F.G. in the eye.
Concerned the children might again be coached with respect to A.J.F.'s 2021 injuries, Ms. Phelps sent the children home with a relative, F.G., who brought them for their forensic interviews the next day. Melisa Harris conducted those interviews, and she testified that A.J.F., A.F.G, and A.G.F., all identified Father as the person responsible for harming A.J.F.
F.G. is A.F.G.'s and A.G.F.'s biological father. And although the Department eventually learned F.G. is not A.J.F.'s biological father, he has always treated him as his own child.
Ms. Harris also conducted forensic interviews with A.F.G. and A.G.F. in 2022 concerning allegations of sexual abuse. A.G.F. was seven-years-old at the time of her interview, and she said Father touched her "vaginal area" with his "mouth, hand, and his penis." She talked about "things that happen when you're married" and made "gestures of going inside of the vaginal area." Although A.G.F. at one point told Ms. Harris that Mother did not know what was going on, A.G.F. later said she told Mother about the sexual abuse, and Mother "said she didn't care." A.G.F. also said Father took pictures of her with her clothes off, and Father told her "not to tell anyone about what was happening."
During his 2022 forensic interview, A.F.G. also alleged that Father sexually abused him. He said Father "touched his balls with his hands" and took pictures of his and his siblings' private parts.
Diana Gillum, a teacher at the children's school, testified that A.F.G. once told her: "They tie me with duct tape, my hands, my mouth, and my feet. They put me inside the closet without no lights." When Ms. Gillum asked who did that to him, he said Father. Ms. Gillum also said she saw bruises on A.G.F.'s back at one point, and A.J.F. later told her that Mother offered to buy him McDonalds if he would say A.F.G. was the one who hit him.
Detective Nathan Hendrickson testified about his investigation into A.J.F.'s 2021 injuries. When officers first arrived at the scene, A.J.F. was hesitant to show them his back. With F.G.'s assistance, police were able to view and photograph A.J.F.'s injuries. Detective Hendrickson said Mother appeared agitated that officers were there investigating.
Detective Hendrickson also attended the children's 2021 forensic interviews. In his interview, A.F.G. identified a yellow cable as an instrument of abuse. After the interview, he showed officers marks on his own body from such abuse, and officers photographed A.F.G.'s injuries. When asked whether A.F.G.'s injuries from the cable were similar in appearance to A.J.F.'s injuries, Detective Hendrickson noted that A.J.F.'s injuries were "notched, ribbed, [and] consistent with what a cable would be." Officer Hendrickson did not believe A.F.G. was capable of causing A.J.F.'s injuries.
When Detective Hendrickson interviewed Mother, she said A.J.F. was injured while she was at work. Father told her that the kids were fighting and that A.J.F. might have been hurt then. When Detective Hendrickson showed her photographs of A.J.F.'s injuries, she appeared surprised, but her only response was: "Shit, I didn't do it." Although she claimed not to know how the injuries occurred, she offered an unsolicited comment about the children's access to cables. She also said she and Father only punished the children by putting them in timeout, and she did not believe Father could have caused A.J.F.'s injuries.
When Detective Hendrickson interviewed Father, he said he did not know how A.J.F. was hurt, but he believed A.F.G. was responsible. Father did not appear surprised by A.J.F.'s injuries, and he acknowledged that he kept cables for his job around the family's apartment. When detectives visited the apartment, they found numerous yellow cables matching A.F.G.'s description.
Detective Tyler Halter also testified about his investigation into the children's abuse. He testified he had no indication that Mother participated in or was aware of the alleged sexual abuse, although he acknowledged he did not take notes from the children's 2022 forensic interviews. At the time of the trial, Detective Halter did not believe charges were pending against Father based on the allegations of sexual abuse.
Department conservatorship worker Dominique Chavez testified that Mother told her she believed either A.F.G. or Ms. Medina caused A.J.F.'s injuries. With respect to the sexual abuse allegations, Mother said she never saw it and would need to see proof. Ms. Chavez said that, although Father claims to have moved out of Mother's apartment, she has been unable to locate him at or otherwise verify that he lived at any of the addresses he provided to the Department. She visited Mother's apartment approximately twice a month and noted there were still boxes of wiring at the home and a power washer outside that, according to Mother, belonged to Father.
Ms. Chavez testified that neither parent made any court-ordered support payments. And although Mother has completed many of the services the Department required, she was discharged from her counseling program because the counselor did not believe she was being forthcoming. Similarly, although Father completed many of the required programs, he never submitted to the court-ordered substanceabuse evaluation, despite accommodations made by the Department. Ms. Chavez acknowledged, however, that Father never tested positive for any drugs while the case was pending.
Ms. Chavez testified that she has not noticed any marks or bruises on A.F.G., A.G.F., or A.J.F. since being placed with F.G. following their removal. She has no concerns about the children's welfare in F.G.'s care, A.J.F. now recognizes F.G. as his father, and he is "very bonded to him." The Department recommended that the children attend counseling, and F.G. has been supportive of that. F.G. intends to adopt A.J.F., and A.E.B.'s foster family intends to adopt A.E.B. In addition, A.E.B.'s foster parents have established a relationship with F.G.'s family, they have coordinated sibling visits, and they have all expressed a willingness to allow those visits to continue in the future. Terminating Mother's and Father's parental rights would allow A.E.B. the opportunity to have a permanent home with his adoptive family.
Ms. Chavez acknowledged that Mother appropriately visited A.J.F. and A.E.B., that they love her, and that they are well-bonded with her. According to Ms. Chavez, the Department's goal all along was to reunify the children with Mother, and the Department extended this case as far as the statute would allow to give her an opportunity to come around to believing her children's outcries. But Mother refuses to believe them, and the Department does not think she can be protective.
The Department is also concerned Mother is still in a relationship with Father. The Department gave Mother the chance to show she could be protective by allowing her newborn daughter to return home with her, but they had to remove the child within a week after they found Father at Mother's apartment during a visit. In Ms. Chavez's opinion, terminating parental rights to A.J.F. and A.E.B. is in the children's best interests.
Mother testified she works at a restaurant where she is paid $500 a week. She does not believe any of her children's allegations against Father. She said she never saw Father hitting her children, and she would not believe he hit them unless she witnessed it. Mother never asked Father whether he hit A.J.F. because she did not think that was possible. Instead, she thought either A.F.G. or the children's babysitter, Ms. Medina, caused the injuries. She said A.F.G. was untruthful, and she recalled a time when Ms. Dillon allegedly told her that A.F.G. stabbed another child at school with plastic silverware.
Mother also denied that A.G.F. ever told her about Father's alleged sexual abuse. She believed someone else may have told the children to allege sexual abuse against Father in the period between their removal in 2021 and the children's 2022 forensic interviews. She said that if the abuse happened, A.G.F. would have told her. And she would not believe allegations of sexual abuse if the child did not report them right away. She never asked Father whether he molested A.G.F.
Mother testified she has done everything the Department asked of her and always exercises her visitation rights, although she acknowledged she did not pay court-ordered child support. When asked why, she said: "I never went ahead to investigate how to get all of that done." She said she had the money to pay the support, but she did not do it because she was "focused more on trying to do everything else" the Department asked. She added that she was not working during a portion of the relevant time period because she was pregnant. Mother's plan, if reunited with her children, was to work and put the children in day care.
Mother testified she separated from Father because the Department told her she had to. She admitted the Department found Father at her apartment during a visit, but she said he was just visiting his newborn daughter that day. He did not live there, and she did not know where he lived. She acknowledged that Father kept an expensive trailer at the apartment but said it was only because the trailer was broken and he was not allowed to go pick it up. She said she would be willing to keep Father away from the children if the court ordered her to do so. In fact, she did not intend to give Father access to the children regardless because she would prefer it just be her and the kids, and Father's bond conditions prevent him from having contact with the kids anyway. She does not believe terminating either hers or Father's parental rights would be in their children's best interests.
Evidence at trial established that Father was charged with injury to a child and that his bond conditions prevented him from going near A.G.F., A.F.G., or A.J.F.
Father testified that he cannot afford to pay child support. With respect to any questions concerning the children's allegations against him, Father exercised his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. He said he did not communicate with Mother in the six months before trial, and he left the trailer at her apartment after they separated both because it was broken and because he was not allowed to go pick it up. When asked why he did not have a friend pick it up for him, he said he did not trust any of his friends to do that.
Father admitted he did not complete a court-ordered substance-abuse evaluation after missing two scheduled appointments, but he blamed it on the evaluation center never returning his calls. Apart from that, he complied with all of the Department's requests and has consistently attended his supervised visits with A.E.B. He thinks Mother is a "real good mom" and does not believe terminating either his or Mother's parental rights would be in the children's best interests.
After the bench trial, the trial court issued a final order affecting the parentchild relationship and explained its ruling in a letter to the parties. The court found that Father physically abused A.J.F. and sexually abused A.G.F. The court noted that Mother refused to believe her children's outcries, and there was evidence she continued to allow Father to have access to her children. The court concluded that Mother's conduct poses a danger to the children. And although both parents complied with parts of their service plans, neither fully completed them.
Noting that it lacked jurisdiction over A.G.F. and A.F.G., the court concluded it was in A.J.F.'s best interest to continue his placement with them in F.G.'s care. The court thus named the Department A.J.F's sole permanent managing conservator with the intent that conservatorship be transferred to F.G., and it named Mother a possessory conservator with limited visitation governed by the Department and F.G. The court stated it would leave it up to F.G. whether to initiate separate termination proceedings involving all three of the children in his care.
With respect to A.E.B., the court found by clear and convincing evidence that both Mother and Father violated family code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O), and that termination was in A.E.B.'s best interest. The court thus terminated both Mother's and Father's parental rights and named the Department A.E.B.'s permanent managing conservator. Mother and Father appeal.
We begin by addressing Father's appeal. Father's appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding that no arguable grounds for reversible error exist and that Father's appeal is wholly frivolous. In his Anders brief, Father's counsel provides a professional evaluation of the record, detailing the compelling evidence supporting the trial court's findings against Father. We provided Father a copy of that brief, and we advised him of his right to file a pro se response, which he did not do.
Having thoroughly and independently reviewed the record, paying close attention to the trial court's findings under family code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), we find nothing in the record that might arguably support Father's appeal. Indeed, there is ample evidence from which the trial court could conclude Father endangered A.E.B. through a pattern of abuse against his siblings, including: (1) testimony that A.G.F., A.F.G., and A.J.F. each identified Father as the person who caused A.J.F.'s injuries; (2) testimony that A.F.G. credibly accused Father of physical abuse; (3) photographs depicting injuries to A.J.F. and A.F.G. consistent with the allegations of abuse; and (4) testimony that both A.G.F. and A.F.G. credibly accused Father of sexual abuse. See In re L.J.H., No. 05-21-00183-CV, 2021 WL 4260769, at *12 (Tex. App.-Dallas Sept. 20, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (abuse against one child sufficiently supports termination with respect to other children).
The extent to which appellate courts must address termination under family code subsections 161001(b)(1)(D) and (E) in the Anders context is unclear See In re NG, 577 S.W.3d 230, 233-37 (Tex 2019) (holding that due process and due course of law require appellate analysis of terminations under family code subsections 161001(b)(1)(D) and (E)); see also In re EK, 608 S.W.3d 815, 815 (Tex 2020) (Green, J, concurring in denial of petition for review) (stating that the issue of how In re N.G. applies in the Anders context is "an important question" the supreme court "should answer").
The same evidence, along with evidence of A.E.B.'s positive placement with an adoption-motivated foster family, amply supports a conclusion that terminating Father's parental rights is in A.E.B.'s best interest. We thus agree with Father's counsel that any issues he might assert would be frivolous, and we affirm the trial court's order terminating Father's parental rights to A.E.B.
That said, we deny counsel's motion to withdraw. Because this is a case involving termination of parental rights, appointed counsel's duties continue through the filing of a petition for review in the supreme court. See in re Z.E., No. 05-22-01337-CV, 2023 WL 3595627, at *7 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 23, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Absent good cause, filing a motion to withdraw in our Court is premature. See id. (citing In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam)). Father's counsel has not offered good cause for withdrawing at this stage. See id.
We next turn to Mother's appeal. Mother first challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings under family code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O). A trial court may terminate the parentchild relationship involuntarily only if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) one or more of the statutory grounds for termination enumerated in the family code has been established; and (2) termination is in the child's best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b). "Clear and convincing evidence" is "the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." Id. § 101.007.
To the extent Mother's brief alludes to counsel violating her rights by failing to raise certain objections in the trial court, she waived those issues by failing to adequately present them for our review. In addition to impermissibly making such arguments in her statement of facts and multifarious sufficiency issues, Mother fails to cite or apply any relevant authorities supporting her conclusory assertions. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Sprowl v. Stiles, No. 05-18-01058-CV, 2019 WL 3543581, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 5, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). Likewise, to the extent Mother contends the trial court erred by restricting her rights to A.J.F., she waived that issue by failing to adequately brief it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Sprowl, 2019 WL 3543581, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 5, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). Mother's sufficiency arguments address only parental termination. But the trial court did not terminate her rights to A.J.F.; rather, it named her as a possessory conservator with limited visitation rights and named the Department sole permanent managing conservator. Mother provides no separate argument or authorities suggesting the trial court erred in that regard. See In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 615-17 (Tex. 2007) (distinguishing between proof required to support termination and proof required to support conservatorship while noting that a challenge to conservatorship is not subsumed within a challenge to termination). We thus construe Mother's sufficiency issues as challenging only the termination of her parental rights to A.E.B.
Because a court may terminate based on only one predicate finding under family code subsection 161.001(b)(1), we affirm if the evidence supports any of the statutory bases the trial court found. In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam). But where, as here, a parent challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings under family code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E), we must determine whether termination is supported under either or both of those grounds because of their potential collateral consequences on the parent's rights to other children. See id. at 235; TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(M).
Our standards of review in these cases reflect the elevated burden of proof at trial. In re A.E.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. 2014). Both legal and factual sufficiency reviews require us to review the evidence to determine whether the factfinder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were established. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tex. 2018). The difference between the two lies primarily in the way we consider evidence contrary to a finding. Id. at 630-31.
Our review of legal sufficiency requires us to view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding. Id. Thus, we assume the factfinder resolved all factual issues in favor of the finding and disregard all disputed evidence to the contrary. Id. Our factual sufficiency review, in contrast, requires us to weigh the disputed evidence contrary to the finding and determine whether in light of the entire record the evidence that could not reasonably be credited in favor of the finding is so significant that it would prevent the formation of a firm belief or conviction that the finding is true. Id. at 631. In applying this standard, we must be mindful not to scrutinize the evidence to the point where "the only factfindings that could withstand review are those established beyond a reasonable doubt." In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).
Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D) requires that the parent "knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child," and subsection (E) requires that the parent "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child." Both subsections require proof of endangerment, which in this context means "to expose to loss or injury or to jeopardize a child's emotional or physical health." In re K.B., No. 05-19-00700-CV, 2019 WL 5485320, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 25, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). It is not necessary, however, that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child is injured. Id. The primary distinction between the two subsections is the source of the child's endangerment. Id.
Subsection (D) focuses on whether endangerment results from the child's environment. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). "Environment" refers to both the acceptability of living conditions and the parent's conduct in the home. Id. "A child is endangered when the environment creates a potential for danger that the parent is aware of but consciously disregards." Id. "Inappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by a parent or other persons who live in the child's home can create an environment that endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child as required for termination under subsection (D)." Id.
Subsection (E), in contrast, focuses on whether endangerment results directly from the parent's conduct, including the parent's acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re C.J.B., No. 05-19-00165-CV, 2019 WL 3940987, at *6 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 21, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). Subsection (E) termination must be based on more than a single act or omission; it requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent. Id.
Child abuse necessarily endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being. See In re M.H., 05-22-00017-CV, 2022 WL 3135919, at *6 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 5, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). And we have held that a parent's steadfast refusal to believe a child's outcry and meaningfully limit the alleged abuser's access demonstrates a pattern of conduct endangering the child's physical or emotional well-being. See id.; see also In re S.R.M., No. 04-21-00168-CV, 2021 WL 4875538, at *5 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Oct. 13, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that a mother's "inclination not to believe the sexual abuse allegations demonstrates a pattern of endangerment to the emotional well-being of her children").
Here, Mother steadfastly refused to believe her children's outcries, testifying that she would not believe their allegations of physical abuse unless she witnessed Father beating them. In fact, she would not even ask Father whether he abused the children because she thought it was "impossible." She likewise testified she would not believe allegations of sexual abuse unless reported right away, discounting the possibility that a child might be afraid or embarrassed to report it.
The trial court also heard evidence suggesting Mother was both aware of the abuse and indifferent towards it. Indeed, the court was free to credit testimony that A.G.F. told Mother about Father's sexual abuse and that Mother "said she didn't care." There was also testimony that, when asked who injured A.J.F., A.G.F. fearfully stated: "My mom won't let us talk about anything or say anything." There was evidence that Mother mentioned the children had access to cables despite claiming she did not know how A.J.F. suffered his injuries. And there was testimony that Mother sought to bribe A.J.F. by promising to buy him McDonald's if he would accuse A.F.G. instead of Father.
In addition, there was evidence that Mother continued to allow Father access to a child despite the abuse. Such evidence included that: (1) the Department could not verify Mother's and Father's assertions that they were separated; (2) Father continued to keep expensive property at Mother's apartment despite their purportedly being separated; and (3) the Department found Father at Mother's apartment during a visit after Mother brought her newborn child home. On this record, the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother engaged in a course of conduct that endangered A.E.B.'s physical or emotional wellbeing. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
Because we conclude Mother's termination is supported under subsection (E), we need not address whether the evidence also supported termination under subsections (D) or (O). See In re M.H., 2022 WL 3135919, at *6 n.5. We likewise need not address Mother's complaint that the terms of her service plan were not sufficiently specific to support termination under subsection (O).
Mother next argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination is in A.E.B.'s best interests. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). "Best interest" is a term of art encompassing a broad facts-and-circumstances evaluation and we accord the factfinder significant discretion in its best interest conclusion. In re L.J.H., 2021 WL 4260769, at *14. Although there is a strong presumption that maintaining the parent-child relationship serves the child's best interest, TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.131, there is also a presumption that promptly and permanently placing the child in a safe environment is in the child's best interest, id. § 263.307(a).
In Holley v. Adams, the supreme court identified a nonexclusive list of factors potentially relevant to a best-interest determination, including: (1) the child's desires; (2) the child's current and future emotional and physical needs; (3) current and future emotional and physical dangers to the child; (4) the parental abilities of those seeking custody; (5) the programs available to help those individuals promote the child's best interest; (6) those individuals' plans for the child; (7) the home's or proposed placement's stability; (8) the parent's acts or omissions indicating that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the parent's acts or omissions. 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). An absence of evidence of some Holley factors does not preclude a finding that termination is in the child's best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Moreover, the same evidence can be relevant to both subsection 161.001(b)(1) termination grounds and the child's best interest.
Here, there are no Holley factors weighing in favor of returning A.E.B. to Mother. Although there is evidence suggesting A.E.B. loves her and is bonded with her, we must weigh that against the danger posed by Mother's steadfast refusal to believe her children's outcries despite clear and convincing evidence of Father's abuse, not to mention the evidence suggesting Mother was both aware of and indifferent towards that abuse. Further, there was testimony that A.E.B.'s foster family is adoption-motivated and that A.E.B. would benefit from the stability and permanency provided through adoption. See In re C.J.B., 2019 WL 3940987, at *8 ("A child's need for permanence is a paramount consideration in evaluating a child's physical and emotional needs."). There was also testimony that A.E.B.'s foster family has established a relationship with F.G.'s family, that A.E.B.'s foster family has facilitated visits between A.E.B. and his siblings, and that A.E.B.'s foster family expressed a willingness to allow those sibling visits to continue in the future. On this record, the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination was in A.E.B.'s best interest.
Finally, Mother contends the Department violated her rights by failing to make reasonable efforts to reunify her with her children. To the extent this issue is preserved, whether the Department made reasonable reunification efforts is not an element of a claim for termination under the family code subsections at issue here. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(1)(b)(D), (E), (O). The Department had no burden to present evidence of its reunification efforts at trial, and thus the trial court's decree is not subject to reversal based on the sufficiency of such efforts. See In re M.H., 2022 WL 3135919, at *10; see also Melton v. Tex. Dep't of Fam. &Protective Servs., No. 03-08-00168-CV, 2010 WL 668917, at *10 (Tex. App-Austin Feb. 25, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("Termination requires particular findings, none of which distinctly address reunification. The reunification issue is subsumed into the requirement to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child." (citation omitted)).
Having overruled each of Mother's and Father's issues, we affirm.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.