Summary
applying generally applicable transfer principles to a § 1407 transfer and noting that "decisions by a transferor court are the `law of the case'"
Summary of this case from Good v. Altria Group, Inc.Opinion
MDL NO. 1448 (RWS), 02 Civ. 8411 (RWS)
January 15, 2003
Richard F. Schaden, Esq., Schaden, Katzman, Lampert Mcclune, Broomfield, CO, Daniel J. Smith, Esq., Smith Smith, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff.
Desmond T. Barry, Jr., Esq., Condon Forsyth, New York, NY, Steven R. Pounian, Esq., Kreindler Kreindler, New York, NY, for Defendant.
OPINION
Defendant American Airlines, Inc. ("American") has objected to the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations (the "Recommendations") of United States Magistrate Judge Paul D. Stickney of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, that the instant matter be remanded to state court. Before the Recommendations could be ruled upon by the district court, the matter was transferred to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. As a result, it is now up to this Court to rule on American's objections.
For the following reasons, the Recommendations are respectfully rejected in light of this Court's prior opinion in a related matter, DeGeorge v. American Airlines, Ltd., No. 02 Civ.4765, 2002 WL 31356266 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2002), which was issued approximately one week after the issuance of the Recommendations.
Prior Proceedings
This case arises out of the November 12, 2001 crash of American Flight 587 at Belle Harbor, New York, shortly after take-off from J.F.K. International Airport en route to Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. The accident resulted in the deaths of all 251 passengers and nine crewmembers on board the aircraft, the deaths of five persons on the ground, several personal injuries and property damage. To date, more than 245 lawsuits arising out of the Flight 587 accident have been filed, more than 235 of which are pending before this Court.
Plaintiffs Edgar Cabral and Altagracia Andujar de Santana filed this wrongful death action against American in the District Court of Dallas County, Texas, seeking to recover damages for the death of Iris Magaly Santana, a passenger on Flight 587. American timely removed the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1441 on the grounds that the Warsaw Convention and the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub.L. No. 85-726, as recodified as amended in 49 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq. govern plaintiffs' claims.
On July 12, 2002, plaintiffs filed a motion to remand to state court. Judge Stickney's Recommendations were issued on October 8, 2002. On October 17, 2002, this Court's opinion in DeGeorge was issued.
The case was docketed in the Southern District of New York on October 21, 2002. The parties were not notified of the docketing, however, and thus American erroneously filed the instant objections to the Recommendations in the Northern District of Texas on October 23, 2002. Plaintiffs responded to those objections on October 29, 2002.
On October 29, 2002, the Northern District of Texas forwarded the file in this action to the Southern District of New York. American notified the Court by letter dated November 14, 2002, that the matter was properly before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c). Plaintiffs responded by letter dated November 25, 2002, and the matter was taken on submission on December 11, 2002.
Discussion The Magistrate Judge's Recommendations
In his report dated October 8, 2002, Judge Stickney recommended that the instant case be remanded to state court. Recommendations, slip op., at 4. In making this decision, he relied on the decision by Chief Judge A. Joe Fish of the United States Court for the Northern District of Texas. Id. at 3-4. He concluded that American had "not met its burden to establish federal jurisdiction either by proving that Plaintiffs' state-law claims have been completely preempted by the Warsaw Convention or that Plaintiffs' well-plead complaint raises issues of federal law. Plaintiffs' complaint alleges only violations of Texas law." Id. at 4.
I. Standard of Review
As an initial matter, there is a conflict between the parties as to what degree of deference the magistrate judge's findings are entitled. Plaintiffs argue that his report has become the "law of the case," and accordingly entitled to much greater deference than the already significant deference that is normally accorded magistrate judges' findings pursuant to Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The standard of review of the "law of the case" is extremely deferential. Washington Nat. Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Morgan Stanley Co. Inc., 974 F. Supp. 214, 218-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Under the `law of the case' doctrine, `when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.'") (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983) (dictum) (citation omitted)). In such a situation, courts should be "loathe" to revisit a previously decided issue except for rare circumstances, such as when the initial decision was "clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Id.; see also Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 48 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding law of the case doctrine a rule of practice, not a restriction on the court's jurisdiction). The grounds upon which a court may reconsider an issue previously decided in an earlier stage of the litigation are: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error or to prevent manifest injustice. DiLaura v. Power Auth., 982 F.2d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Virgin Atl. Airways v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992)).
However, the plaintiffs have not cited any case law to support their proposition that, in multi-district litigation, when a case is transferred after a magistrate judge has issued a recommendation, but prior to the transferor district court's review thereof, that the transferee district court, in reviewing the recommendation and objections thereto, must treat the magistrate judge's recommendations as the "law of the case." The two cases cited by plaintiffs instead recognize only that decisions by a transferor court are the "law of the case." E.g., Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1984); Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1982). These cases thus merely stand for the proposition that if the transferor district court had ruled on the magistrate judge's report, it would be considered the "law of the case" as a prior ruling in an earlier stage of litigation. See also Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1516-17 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that court should not reconsider prior ruling of transferor court unless governing law has changed, new evidence becomes available, clear error has been committed or manifest injustice will result).
This district has dealt with a similar — though not identical — situation to the instant one in Washington National. There, a magistrate judge issued a report, recommending that the case be transferred from the Southern District of New York to Nebraska. 974 F. Supp. at 218. Before the district court had the opportunity to review the magistrate judge's report, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the action to Louisiana. Id. The district court in Louisiana ruled that the action should be transferred back to the Southern District of New York. Id. at 219. The Court in Washington National concluded that the district court's ruling was the "law of the case." Id. There was no similar description of the magistrate judge's report as the "law of the case." As a result, it appears that — in the absence of review by district court — a magistrate judge's findings are not entitled to deferential review under the standards of the "law of the case."
As a result, this Court will review the magistrate judge's Recommendations pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, which requires that a magistrate judge's order may only be set aside if found to be "clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a).
II. Second Circuit Law Shall Apply
Although plaintiffs urge this Court to review the magistrate judge's Recommendations based on the law of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the district courts of the Northern District of Texas, they again do not cite any case law to support this contention. Transferor courts are normally instructed to apply their interpretation of federal law, "not the constructions of the federal law of the transferor court." In re NASDAQ Market Makers Antitrust Litig., 929 F. Supp. 174, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (collecting cases); see also Coker v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 950 F.2d 839, 847 (2d Cir. 1991). Therefore, to the extent that Fifth Circuit law differs from Second Circuit law, the latter shall control in reviewing the Recommendations.
III. The Report Is Rejected as "Contrary" to DeGeorge and the Law on Which It Relies
In DeGeorge, this Court held that the plaintiff's wrongful death claims arising from the crash of Flight 587 were completely preempted by the Warsaw Convention and thus that federal jurisdiction was appropriate. DeGeorge, 2002 WL 31356266 at *4-*5. Further, it rejected plaintiff's reliance on Perez and on the instant report by the magistrate judge. Id.
As a result, the magistrate judge's finding that plaintiffs' claims were not completely preempted by the Warsaw Convention is contrary to the law of this district and is accordingly rejected. The plaintiffs' motion to remand is denied for the same reasons described more fully in DeGeorge.
It is worth noting that this case has presented some novel procedural tangles as a result of the magistrate judge's refusal to stay the case until it was transferred. Had he done so, this Court would have dealt with the motion to remand from the outset. Because he did not, and because the timing worked out so that his report was not reviewed by the transferor district court, his report — relying as it did on Fifth Circuit and Northern District of Texas precedent — was rendered a nullity. Such a determination not to stay flies in the face of judicial economy and uniformity, and presents unnecessary difficulties for choice of law in review.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Stickney that this case be remanded to state court is rejected, and the plaintiffs' motion to remand is denied.