Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Solano County Super. Ct. No. J39057
Sepulveda, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court sustained a petition alleging that the minor, A.I., committed attempted robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 664.) The court declared the minor to be a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, and placed him in the custody of his mother. The court also set a maximum term of confinement of two years and six months. The minor appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the allegation that he committed attempted robbery, and that the specification of a maximum term of confinement was improper. We reject these claims and affirm.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 18, 2008, Michael A. was walking home from school when he saw his friend, J.M., across the street getting “jumped” by three young men. Michael intended to cross the street to help J.M., but he was stopped by the minor, a boy he had never seen before. The minor was standing about 18 inches from Michael when he told Michael “[i]n a mean tone” to stop. The minor told Michael to “[s]tay here or you’re going to get beat up.” The minor asked Michael if he had any money, and Michael replied that all he had was his MP3 player. The minor asked, “[c]an I have it?” and Michael replied “no.” Michael testified that he was scared when the minor approached him, “[b]ecause [he] didn’t know what was about to happen.” When asked whether there was anything that the minor said or did that made him afraid, Michael responded, “[n]o, the only thing made me scared was all the people was approaching.” Michael did not give anything to the minor, “[b]ecause [he] wasn’t gonna give up his stuff.”
On direct examination, Michael testified that the minor told him “[d]on’t move or I’ll beat you up” or “[d]on’t move or I’ll fight you.” On cross-examination, Michael acknowledged that on the day of the incident, he told the investigating officer that the minor had actually stated the words as quoted above.
No testimony was elicited at the jurisdictional hearing regarding what happened after Michael refused to hand over his belongings.
On February 6, 2009, after a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found true the allegation that the minor committed an attempted robbery. (Pen. Code §§ 211, 664.) At a dispositional hearing on February 24, 2009, the court adjudged the minor a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, and placed him on probation in the custody of his mother. The court set a maximum potential confinement time of two years and six months. This timely appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of Evidence.
The minor contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the allegation that he committed an attempted robbery. In a juvenile appeal claiming insufficiency of the evidence, we apply the same standard of review as we would in an adult criminal appeal. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) On a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record below to determine “whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319.) The appellate court’s role in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence below is limited. (People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1138.) We presume “ ‘the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372.) Determination of the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. (Ibid.) Before the order of the lower court can be set aside for insufficiency of the evidence “ ‘it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it.’ ” (Ibid.)
Robbery is defined as “the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” (Pen. Code, § 211.) An attempted robbery consists of two elements: (1) the specific intent to commit the robbery and (2) a direct, unequivocal, overt act (beyond mere preparation) toward its commission. (People v. Vizcarra (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 858, 861.)
The minor argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding that he committed an attempted robbery because Michael testified that nothing the minor said or did made him feel afraid, and he instead was concerned about the group across the street. Although it is true that in order to sustain a conviction of robbery it must be proven that a defendant used force or fear to take property from another, “[i]t is not necessary... for this element to be reflected in the overt act of an attempted robbery if the crime has not progressed to that point.” (People v. Vizcarra, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 862.) “Since a completed robbery would have required a force-and-fear element, an attempted robbery may also include this element of the offense, but it is erroneous to say that the crime must have progressed this far in order to constitute an attempt.” (Id. at pp. 862-863, original italics.) An attempt to commit robbery “does not itself necessarily amount to an assault and does not require assault as an essential element.” (Id. at p. 863; see also People v. Medina (2007) 41 Cal.4th 685, 694 [completed assault is not an element of attempted robbery].) Thus, it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the minor used force or fear to sustain the finding that the minor committed an attempted robbery.
Further, “an attempt to steal may be proved by inference from all of the circumstances of the case.” (People v. Vizcarra, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 863.) Here, Michael testified that he was afraid when the minor initially approached him, “[b]ecause [he] didn’t know what was about to happen.” The minor used intimidation to block Michael from crossing the street to help his friend, J.M., when he ordered him to stop in a “mean tone of voice.” This intimidation, coupled with the minor’s “requests” that Michael hand over his money and his MP3 player, and the violence that was occurring across the street, was sufficient evidence of the minor’s intent to use fear in order to permanently deprive Michael of his belongings.
The minor also relies on the fact that there are multiple possible interpretations of what transpired between the minor and Michael, and argues the logical inference is that the minor was simply warning Michael not to get involved in the confrontation across the street. However, just because there might be other reasonable interpretations, this does not establish that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding. “ ‘ “[W]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts,” either deduction will be supported by substantial evidence, and “a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re James D. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 810, 814.) Here, the juvenile court said that “the totality of the circumstances, I think do provide all the elements of an attempted robbery. The friend being robbed, the request for money, and then followed by a request for an MP3 player, being dissuaded from helping his friend in a mean tone of voice, and a generalized fear of the whole situation and the number of individuals that are involved. [¶] There appears to be some connection between what is between [the minor] and what is occurring across the street and I am going to sustain the petition.” “[T]his court is bound by the findings of the trier of fact where it has rejected a hypothesis pointing to innocence and there is evidence to support its implied finding that guilt is the more reasonable of the two hypotheses.” (In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372.)
B. The Juvenile Court’s Specification of a Maximum Term.
The minor also contends that the juvenile court erred when it set the maximum term of confinement of two years and eight months. Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c), if wardship is declared and the minor is removed from the custody of his or her parent or guardian, the court is required to specify the maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed on an adult convicted of the same offense. (In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 573.) Here, the minor was not removed from the home, so specification of the maximum term was not required. (Ibid.)
Although the parties agree that the maximum term of confinement in the dispositional order is of no legal effect, they disagree whether the statement setting the maximum term should be stricken. The minor asks that we strike the statement, citing In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 541; the People ask that we declare the statement to be of no legal effect, and that striking the statement is unnecessary, citing In re Ali A., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pages 569, 573-574. We agree with the People that including the maximum term of confinement in the dispositional order has no legal effect. Because the minor is not prejudiced, there is no cause for reversal or remand. (Id. at pp. 569, 573.)
IV. DISPOSITION
The dispositional order is affirmed.
We concur: Ruvolo, P. J., Rivera, J.