Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. DP019203, Jane L. Shade, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.).
Brent Riggs, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Nicholas S. Chrisos, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Aurelio Torre, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
O’LEARY, ACTING P. J.
A.H. (Mother) appeals from the order made at the six-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21), at which the juvenile court terminated reunification services as to her daughter A.H. Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings: (1) she had been provided with reasonable reunification services; (2) she had failed to make substantive progress in her case plan; and (3) there was a risk of detriment if A.H. was returned to Mother’s custody. We find no error and affirm the order.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTS
Detention
A.H. was taken into protective custody by the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) in early December 2009 when she was almost two years old. The original petition alleged jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) [failure to protect], and subdivision (j) [abuse of sibling]. While in the care of paternal relatives, A.H. accidentally fell down the stairs and suffered a small brain bleed as a result. Mother lived in Nevada where her four older children had been declared dependent children due to Mother’s chronic neglect and failure to provide necessities for them. Mother had voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to those children.
Over three months earlier, Mother left A.H. with the paternal relatives saying her apartment complex in Nevada had been condemned and she could not care for A.H. Mother arranged to leave A.H. with the paternal relatives for just two weeks, but A.H. had been there for over three months when the accident occurred. Mother had not provided the paternal relatives with any written authorization or consent for medical care for A.H., despite having been asked by them to do so. The paternal relatives reported that when A.H. was first left with them, she was “severely overweight and was bowed legged with both of her legs.” But after three months of proper diet and exercise, one leg was getting better and she had lost weight. Mother had only called to check on A.H. approximately five times over the preceding three months. The paternal relatives were interested in guardianship of A.H. and had concerns about Mother’s stability.
Although Mother came to Orange County from Las Vegas after the accident wanting to take A.H. home with her, a hospital hold was placed on A.H. Mother told the SSA social worker she had voluntarily given up her parental rights to four of her other five children for adoption “due to being beyond stressed.” Her oldest child, now an adult, had gone to live with his father several years earlier. Mother said the family’s problems were because one of her children was bipolar. Mother stated D.J. (Father), who was currently in prison and had a history of drug use, was A.H.’s biological father, but he was not listed on her birth certificate and paternity had never been formerly established. Mother said she worked fulltime in Nevada, and had health insurance, but no driver’s license. She was moving to a new apartment in Nevada but did not know the address.
The social worker spoke with Mother’s former social worker from Nevada, who confirmed four of Mother’s children had been removed from her care due to neglect and lack of necessities. Mother had a criminal history related to check cashing fraud. The Nevada social worker explained Mother’s other children were “in and out of care from 2003 to 2007” and her parental rights were relinquished in April 2008. She said, “Mother presents well but does not follow through with needed services.” There was no mental health diagnosis for mother. At the detention hearing on December 9, 2009, the juvenile court ordered A.H. detained and placed in the temporary care and custody of SSA pending a jurisdictional hearing.
Jurisdictional and Dispositional Hearing
In its first report for the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, SSA reported A.H. had been moved to the home of one of the paternal uncles and was doing well. Mother admitted to the social worker that most of the allegations of the original petition were true. The paternal relative with whom A.H. was living when the accident occurred told the social worker Mother did not contact him during the three months he cared for the child and she did not provide a medical consent for A.H. despite being asked for one. Mother had not been able to meet the child’s basic needs, including shelter, in the past. The paternal grandmother reported Mother, Father, and A.H. resided with her for the first five months of A.H.’s life. During that time, the paternal grandmother and Father were A.H.’s primary caregivers. Mother would leave the house for eight hours a day, saying she was going to work, but the paternal grandmother did not believe Mother actually had a job.
The SSA social worker spoke with the Nevada social worker who handled dependency proceedings involving Mother’s other children. The Nevada social worker had no progress reports showing services in which Mother participated, but Mother told the Nevada social worker she had completed counseling aimed at addressing her development of emotional attachments to her children. The Nevada social worker provided the SSA social worker with referrals for services for Mother in Nevada including parenting classes and counseling. The SSA social worker spoke with Mother about services, but Mother indicated she was not willing to participate in services “at this time.” When the social worker tried to give Mother information on a parenting program, she “began to laugh[, ]” and said she had already “‘passed’” a parenting class.
SSA initially recommended Mother not receive reunification services. The social worker was concerned about Mother’s “lack of insight” into why A.H. was at risk due to her failure to provide a medical consent for A.H., her failure to provide for the child’s basic needs, her failure to follow through with services in Nevada, her lack of contact with A.H. while she was in the care of others, and her lack of a bond with the child. The social worker also suggested it would be reasonable to attempt transferring the case to Nevada juvenile court system, where authorities had already worked with Mother and where Mother resided, but that could only be done through an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). The juvenile court denied Mother’s demurrer to SSA’s original petition.
On January 11, 2010, Mother pleaded no-contest to, and the juvenile court sustained, an amended jurisdictional petition alleging jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) [failure to protect]. The sustained petition contained allegations about Mother’s leaving A.H. with paternal relatives, her failure to provide any authorization for medical consent and care for A.H., the dependency status of Mother’s other children in Nevada due to Mother’s general neglect, and the termination of Mother’s parental rights with respect to those children.
The juvenile court declared A.H. a dependent and approved a reunification service plan for Mother. The service plan goals included Mother show her ability and willingness to have custody of A.H.; obtain resources sufficient to meet A.H.’s needs and provide her a safe home; comply with all orders of the juvenile court; meet her child’s physical, emotional, medical, and educational needs; and pay attention to and monitor her child’s health, safety, and well-being. Under the heading “other service objectives, ” the plan provided Mother was to keep her social worker apprised of all “pertinent changes” in her life situation (i.e., address, telephone number, employment, income, arrests, etc.), keep appointments with the social worker, inform the social worker of difficulties in completing her service plan, and sign any and all necessary releases of information of request records and medical consents so the social worker could keep apprised of Mother’s progress with the plan goals.
The plan contained a counseling component. It required Mother to participate in “individual, conjoint, family, and/or group therapy... to address issues in the petition.” It further required counseling “to continue until such time as the assigned social worker determines in consultation with the therapist that the goals of therapy have been accomplished and therapy is no longer necessary. Frequency of counseling is to be determined by the assigned social worker in consultation with the therapist.” Mother was required to successfully complete an SSA-approved parenting class. She was given twice monthly monitored visitation with A.H., the court authorized funding for bus transportation for Mother to travel from Nevada for visits with A.H., and the court ordered an expedited ICPC to evaluate Mother’s home in Nevada for placement. The court scheduled a six-month review hearing for June 2010.
Progress Review
On April 12, 2010, SSA filed a progress review report. The Nevada ICPC was completed and placement with Mother in Nevada had been denied because Mother had not completed the majority of her case plan goals. SSA reported that in February and March, the social worker had given Mother referrals for a counseling center that would work with clients on a “sliding fee scale[, ]” and provided her with referrals to parenting classes in Nevada.
Mother was employed fulltime. Although she had private medical insurance, Mother refused to use her health insurance to pay for counseling because she would still have deductibles and co-pays. Mother refused to “pay any out-of-pocket costs for counseling” as she believed it was SSA’s responsibility to pay for the counseling saying “‘referral means county pays for it.’” When the social worker explained “providing referrals did not imply funding for counseling, ” Mother replied the court had not ordered her to pay for her own counseling.
Mother also complained the counseling center SSA had found for her only had available counseling times that conflicted with her current schedule, including her visits with her other children (who were placed in an open adoption). Mother would not change the times of those visits. Mother decided to “‘hold off’ on starting counseling....”
Mother had only visited A.H. sporadically. Her caregivers reported Mother had no visits in January 2010 and only one visit per month in February and March 2010. When the social worker reminded Mother the court had authorized funding for transportation, Mother indicated she had transportation receipts for reimbursement, but she did not submit them. Mother did not contact the social worker as agreed.
At the progress review hearing, Mother’s counsel moved for funding to pay for Mother’s counseling. Mother’s trial counsel argued the services were not reasonable if SSA was not going to pay for them; “we’re arguing it’s unreasonable services to request services and then not pay for [them].” The court denied the request without prejudice. It observed Mother was employed fulltime and had medical insurance, and there was no evidence before the court suggesting she could not afford to pay for counseling. The court advised Mother’s counsel that if Mother presented evidence she could not participate in services because she could not afford them, the court would reconsider the request.
Six-Month Review
In SSA’s first report for the six-month review hearing, SSA recommended services be continued for Mother and a 12-month review hearing be set. The current SSA social worker, Veronica Zamora-Chavez, reported A.H. was thriving in her paternal uncle’s home. Zamora-Chavez again gave Mother numerous referrals for counseling centers that had sliding fee scale programs. Mother complained counseling was not in her budget as it “was not a necessity.” Mother failed to respond to Zamora-Chavez’s voicemail messages about the referrals, until finally in mid-May, she left the social worker a message saying she was slated to begin her therapy sessions. But in early June, Mother left Zamora-Chavez a message saying she was changing to another provider who would work with her insurance. Mother was finally scheduled to begin counseling in mid-June.
On June 16, 2010, Zamora-Chavez spoke with Mother’s therapist Susan Beglingler who said Mother had completed only one session and was in denial about why her child was out-of-home. Mother said she would call to schedule her next session but did not. Mother had completed most of her six-week parenting class. Mother stated she was visiting A.H. about every two weeks but did not see the point of setting any behavioral limits on A.H. during visits because she did not get to see her often.
Zamora-Chavez talked to Mother about the prior dependency proceedings in Nevada. Mother said she relinquished her children to obtain mental health care for one of them, which required all her children be taken away (“if one child is taken into custody, then all children are taken in”) and she could not reunify with any of the children because the one child was too difficult. Mother denied knowing she needed to provide a medical consent for A.H. while left in her relatives’ care and said she would have provided one had she been asked. Zamora-Chavez did not believe Mother was ready to resume custody of A.H.—she had no understanding as to why her child was in custody, and she had not complied with counseling treatment services.
SSA’s June 28, 2010, report again recommended services be continued and a 12-month review hearing be set. Mother visited A.H. only once in May and not at all in June. In mid-June, Mother left a voicemail message for the caretakers saying she was calling to check on A.H. and to make sure “‘that she is okay, that she’s not dead.’” Mother said she would call back, but she did not. The six-month review hearing was continued to July 28.
On July 28, SSA continued its recommendation, although it questioned whether there had been substantial progress with the services. Mother had only one visit with A.H. in July that went well. She had scheduled her second counseling session with Beglingler. The hearing was continued to September 7.
On September 7, SSA changed its recommendation to termination of services for Mother and setting a permanency planning hearing. Mother was not visiting A.H. frequently. Mother told Zamora-Chavez she repeatedly left messages for the caregivers to schedule visits, but they did not return her calls. The caregivers denied receiving multiple messages and they detailed times visits were scheduled, but Mother cancelled or showed up hours late. Mother complained she could not afford the travel for more frequent visits, but Zamora-Chavez pointed out SSA would pay for the travel—Mother needed to ask for the funds. Mother was not returning Zamora Chavez’s calls. When asked why, Mother said it was because she had to travel long distances to her counseling sessions and she had other things she needed to do.
In August, Mother told Zamora-Chavez she was attending her individual counseling on a weekly basis. But Beglinger told Zamora-Chavez she had seen Mother only once. Mother missed her second scheduled therapy session in late July, missed the rescheduled appointment date, and made no further efforts to schedule appointments. Beglinger felt Mother was “oblivious” to her responsibilities in this case. On September 2, Zamora-Chavez left Mother an “urgent voice message” to discuss her case. She called Mother again on September 3, but got a message the voicemail system could not process the call. Mother did not return Zamora-Chavez’s call. The six-month review hearing was continued to September 21.
On September 21, SSA reported Mother had finally called Zamora-Chavez and left a message informing her that she had selected a new therapist, Jan Flint, and had stopped seeing Beglinger “because of too many issues.” When Zamora-Chavez asked Mother if she and Flint had discussed Mother’s treatment goals and her history with Nevada social services and SSA, Mother replied a court order prohibited her from discussing the dependency proceeding involving her other children (although she could never provide a copy of any such order). Mother continued to miss visits with A.H. and had not seen her since July. Zamora-Chavez was able to confirm with Flint Mother had attended counseling sessions in August and September—she attended four visits and missed three. Flint said Mother refused to discuss her other children in counseling saying it was prohibited by “‘the laws involved’” although Flint could not confirm any such restrictions. The hearing was continued to October 18.
On October 18, SSA reported Mother had missed numerous counseling appointments and then stopped attending sessions with Flint altogether. Mother told Zamora-Chavez it was because her work hours had been cut and she lost her health insurance. Mother admitted she knew in August she was going to lose her insurance but never told Zamora-Chavez. Mother did not have an answer for why she failed to notify Zamora-Chavez of the counseling issues earlier.
In mid-October, Mother began therapy with a new counselor, Leigh Geldmacher, who worked on a sliding fee scale. Mother had one visit with A.H. in late September that went well. Father had finally come forward and filed a petition to be declared presumed father of A.H. The six-month review hearing was continued to November 8.
On November 8, SSA reported Mother told Zamora-Chavez she signed an authorization for release of information so Zamora-Chavez could talk to Geldmacher about Mother’s therapy. But Geldmacher subsequently told Zamora-Chavez twice Mother failed to provide any such authorization. Mother did not sign the releases until mid-November. Mother visited A.H. twice in late October 2010 but not at all in November. One of A.H.’s caretakers reported Mother said she planned to come to Orange County to take A.H. because she was “tired of the system” and told the caretakers “[A.H.] is a child of Nevada and thus [Mother] could charge the child’s caregivers with kidnapping.” Mother did not return Zamora-Chavez’s telephone messages asking about these statements. The hearing was continued to November 19, at which time the court granted Father’s request for services. The six-month review was continued to December 6.
On December 6, 2010, SSA continued to recommend termination of services for Mother but an additional period of services for Father. Mother failed to visit with A.H. at all in November 2010 and did not contact the caregivers. The hearing was continued to January 11, 2011.
On January 10, 2011, SSA reported A.H. continued to thrive in the care of her caregivers to whom she was bonded. Mother told Zamora-Chavez she did not visit A.H. in November because she was trying to “‘catch up on bills’” but when Zamora-Chavez reminded Mother she could be reimbursed for her travel expenses, Mother replied “she has ‘not gotten around’ to mailing the travel receipts.” When Zamora-Chavez stressed to Mother the need for consistent visitation with A.H., she agreed it was important but said she “had too much going on and felt overwhelmed.” Mother alluded she was “‘dealing with another court hearing’ in Las Vegas” but would not disclose what it was about. Mother’s new therapist, Geldmacher, told Zamora-Chavez that Mother agreed she should have provided a medical consent for A.H. Mother did not feel she had abandoned A.H. when she left her with the paternal relatives. Mother continued to refuse to consent to discuss the Nevada dependency cases involving her other children.
The six-month review hearing took place on January 11, 2011. The parties waived cross-examination of the social worker and no additional evidence was introduced. Mother’s counsel argued counseling was only necessary to address the allegations within the sustained jurisdictional petition, i.e., that Mother left A.H. with the paternal relatives without providing a medical consent. Counsel argued Mother understood she had erred and given that Father was to receive an additional period of services, Mother’s services should be extended as well.
The juvenile court found return of A.H. to her parents would create a substantial risk of detriment. It found reasonable services had been provided, but Mother failed to participate regularly or make substantive progress in her case plan. The juvenile court commented Mother failed to visit A.H. regularly and although Zamora-Chavez had diligently worked at obtaining local out-of-state referrals for Mother, Mother did not take advantage of those therapeutic resources. The court terminated Mother’s reunification services. It authorized additional services for Father, who had only recently been in contact with SSA, and set a 12-month review hearing.
DISCUSSION
At the six-month review hearing “the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that detriment.... The failure of the parent or legal guardian to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental. In making its determination, the court shall review and consider the social worker’s report and recommendations... and shall consider the efforts or progress, or both, demonstrated by the parent... and the extent to which he or she availed himself or herself to services provided....” (§ 366.21, subd. (e).)
Generally, reunification services are limited to six months in cases such as this where the child was under the age of three years when removed from parental custody. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(2).) The purpose of the six-month limitation on services is to provide the juvenile court greater flexibility in meeting the needs of young children where the “[parent has] made little or no progress in [his or her service plan] and the prognosis for overcoming the problems leading to the child’s dependency is bleak.” (Daria D. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 606, 612.)
The court may provide an additional six months of services as to a child under the age of three if there is “a substantial probability” the child may be returned to his or her parent within those six months, or if the court finds reasonable services have not been provided. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) If at the six-month review hearing “the child is not returned to his or her parent... the court shall determine whether reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent... in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent or legal guardian. The court shall order that those services be initiated, continued, or terminated.” (Ibid.)
A. Adequacy of Reunification Services
Mother contends she was denied adequate reunification services and the juvenile court erred in finding reasonable services were provided. We disagree.
Mother argues the case plan was “‘flawed from the outset’” as its counseling component was “too vague to permit reasonable compliance and ascertainment of completion.” The service plan required Mother to participate in therapy “to address issues in the petition” until such time as the social worker determined “the goals of therapy have been accomplished and therapy is no longer necessary.” Mother asserts given the only allegation in the petition (and sole reason for the dependency) concerned her failure to provide A.H.’s caretakers with written consent for medical treatment, she simply “could not have understood what her therapy needed to address....”
Preliminarily, we agree with SSA that Mother has waived her complaints concerning her services. The case plan was adopted at the dispositional hearing, and having failed to challenge its contents by direct appeal from the dispositional order, Mother has waived her right to argue the services provided were inadequate. (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 47.) Furthermore, Mother did not raise adequacy of the service plan at the six-month hearing either. “In dependency litigation, nonjurisdictional issues must be the subject of objection or appropriate motions in the juvenile court; otherwise those arguments have been waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.” (In re Christopher B. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 551, 558; see also In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846; In re Kevin S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 882, 885-886.)
Even were Mother’s contention not waived, it fails on the merits. Services are reasonable when the supervising agency identifies the family’s problems, offers services targeting those problems, maintains reasonable contact with the parent(s), and makes reasonable efforts to assist in areas where compliance is difficult. (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.) To be reasonable, the services provided need not be perfect. The “standard is not whether [they] were the best that might have been provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances.” (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) We review the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding reasonable services were provided. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) It does.
The service plan required Mother to participate in “individual, conjoint, family, and/or group therapy... to address issues in the petition.” It further required counseling “to continue until such time as the assigned social worker determines in consultation with the therapist that the goals of therapy have been accomplished and therapy is no longer necessary. Frequency of counseling is to be determined by the assigned social worker in consultation with the therapist.”
Contrary to Mother’s characterization of this case, it is not only about a parent’s simple oversight in failing to provide a written consent for medical treatment when leaving a child in the care of another. The allegations of the petition and the components of the service plan must be read in context. The petition alleged jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), due to mother’s general failure to protect her child. Having already had parental rights to four other children terminated due to neglect and Mother’s stress, Mother left her youngest child in the care of paternal relatives saying it was to be for only two weeks. She left the child for over three months during which she communicated with the caretakers only minimally and did not properly provide for her child’s care—medical or otherwise. A.H.’s accident, and the lack of any provision by Mother for her medical care, brought the situation to light. But the petition clearly indicates underlying problems of parental neglect. The service plan required Mother to complete a parenting class. Furthermore, it contained goals that included Mother demonstrating an ability and willingness to care for her child, meet her child’s physical, emotional, medical, and educational needs, provide her a safe home, and pay attention to and monitor her health, safety, and well-being. Thus, when viewed in context, it is apparent the directive that Mother was to participate in counseling “to address issues [raised] in the petition” encompassed not simply her failure to sign a note but an overall pattern of child neglect and abandonment. Mother cannot claim she was unaware of why she needed to undergo counseling to regain custody of her child.
B. Failure to Make Substantial Progress
Mother contends the juvenile court’s finding she failed to make substantial progress in her case plan was unsupported by the evidence. Echoing her prior argument, Mother asserts her sole “culpable act” was her failure to provide A.H.’s caretakers with a written consent for A.H.’s medical treatment. Accordingly, she argues, once she acknowledged to her therapist she should have done so, she had done all the service plan required of her. We disagree.
As already discussed above, this case is not about a simple oversight. It is about a pattern of neglect and Mother’s inability to parent and provide for her children. Mother lost custody of four other children through the dependency system and a fifth child sent to live with his father. Mother’s social worker in Nevada observed Mother failed to follow through on services for her other children. Mother then left two-year-old A.H. in the care of paternal relatives for an extended period, failing to adequately provide for her care during that time, and rarely communicating with the child’s caretakers. Mother’s service plan required her to complete a parenting class, which she did, and we applaud her efforts. But it also required she demonstrate an overall ability and willingness to care for her child, meet her child’s physical, emotional, medical, and educational needs, provide her a safe home, and pay attention to and monitor her health, safety, and well-being. And importantly, the service plan required Mother to participate in counseling to help achieve these goals.
When A.H. was initially detained, Mother indicated her reluctance to participate in any services and SSA initially recommend denial of reunification services because Mother lacked any insight into how or why she had placed her child at risk. For much of the reunification period, Mother failed to engage meaningfully in her counseling services. The service plan was adopted in January 2010, but it was not until the summer of 2010 that Mother began somewhat regular counseling sessions. Despite being employed fulltime and having health insurance, Mother refused to expend any of her own funds on counseling believing SSA should pay for counseling. The social worker gave Mother repeated referrals to therapists who worked on reduced fees, but Mother kept making changes in therapists. The first therapist described Mother as being completely oblivious as to why any of her children were removed from her care. Subsequent therapists reported Mother refused to discuss anything having to do with dependency proceedings involving her other children.
Mother’s lack of progress was also demonstrated by her failure to cooperate with her social worker. She did not tell the social work about changes in therapists or tell her about changes in her life situation (e.g., loss of health insurance). She did not contact the social worker at the times they had agreed upon. She did not return the social worker’s telephone calls.
Mother was also very inconsistent in her contact with A.H. She would often go months between visits and call the caretakers infrequently. Although SSA was authorized to reimburse Mother for her travel expenses, Mother would not get around to submitting her receipts. When the social worker cautioned Mother about the lack of consistent visits, Mother agreed consistent visitation was important but said she had a lot going on and was overwhelmed. In short, the record supports the finding Mother did not make significant progress toward the case plan goals of demonstrating an ability and willingness to raise her child.
C. Detriment Finding
Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding A.H. would be at risk of detriment if returned to her care. We disagree.
At the six-month review hearing, “the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) The parent’s failure to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs is prima facie proof that return would be detrimental. (Ibid.) The court must consider the parent’s progress and her capacity to meet the objectives of the plan, and whether she has ameliorated the reasons for removing the child. (In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Ca1.App.4th 1131, 1143.) We review the court’s detriment finding for substantial evidence. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 763.)
Mother’s reliance on this court’s decision in Rita L. v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 495 (Rita L.), is misplaced. There, the mother, who had history of alcohol and substance abuse, performed “‘outstandingly’ during her reunification period” but had one “last-minute stumble in [her] effort to remain drug free.” (Id. at p. 498.) The mother tested positive for drugs after her adult daughter gave her a Tylenol tablet for her headache, without telling her it was actually a prescription tablet of Tylenol with codeine. (Id. at p. 501.) The mother immediately told the drug tester (before testing) and her Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor. (Ibid.) The juvenile court “made very clear that absent the dirty test, it viewed [the mother] as a veritable superstar of the reunification process and, but for the codeine, would have returned [the child] to her.” (Id. at p. 505.) This court held there was insufficient evidence of risk of detriment to the child, reasoning that “the particular dirty test at issue in this case, arising as it did from [the mother’s] ingestion of a single prescription pain killer to combat a headache—in the absence of any prior listing of prescription drug abuse—was simply insufficient to justify the court’s conclusion that [the child] could not safely be returned to her custody.” (Id. at p. 506.)
Mother asserts this case and Rita L., while in a different factual context, are “exactly alike in the absence of any evidence... of detriment” because just as Rita L. concerned a single isolated incident, Mother’s “only culpability lay in not providing a medical consent form for [A.H.] after leaving her care with the paternal relatives.” Thus, Mother asserts, once she acknowledged her error, “the case should have ended, [A.H.] returned to [her] custody, and the case dismissed.”
But this case is not like Rita L. where the mother performed her service plan requirements “in an exemplary manner[, ]” and but for the one incident SSA was fully prepared to return the child to the mother’s custody. (Rita L., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 506.) This case was about more than an isolated occurrence—it was about Mother’s pattern of failure to provide for and parent her children. Having already lost custody of, and failing to reunify with, four children due to her stress and inability to cope with one of them, Mother left A.H. with the paternal relatives for over three months, failing to provide for her and maintaining only minimal contact. Mother failed to follow through on services in the Nevada dependency proceeding, and was described by one of her therapists in the present case as being in denial and oblivious to her responsibilities. Her participation in counseling was lackluster, and her contacts with A.H. throughout the reunification period inconsistent. The court found Mother had not made meaningful progress with her service plan and exhibited little insight into the problems that lead to jurisdiction. “Our ability to second-guess the trial court’s call is severely limited” (id. at p. 506), and we will not do so here.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: MOORE, J., FYBEL, J.