Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Ct. No. RIJ111192 Bradley O. Snell, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Karen J. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Joe S. Rank, County Counsel, and Prabhath D. Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jacquelyn E. Gentry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minors.
OPINION
RICHLI, Acting P.J
J.L. (Mother) appeals from the termination of her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 as to her 11-year-old daughter A.H. and her 6-year-old son P.H. Mother contends (1) the social workers’ reports contain misrepresentation of facts; (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her section 388 petition; and (3) the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the beneficial relationship exception set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
The father of the children (Father) is not a party to this appeal. Additionally, in 2007 and 2008, Mother gave birth to two other daughters, not subjects of this appeal, fathered by Mother’s boyfriend, H.Q.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November 2005, A. and P. came to the attention of the Riverside County Department of Children’s Services (DPSS) when a referral was received alleging A. was found “at the bottom of the hill with no adult supervision.” DPSS was also informed that the house was filthy with no food or gas in the home; A. was dirty and had gum in her hair; and Mother may have been abusing drugs. Mother denied the allegations.
When the social worker interviewed A., she was accompanied by the maternal grandmother and was relatively clean. A. stated that the maternal grandmother had picked her up and taken her to get something eat. A. further informed the social worker that her mother had hit her once with a hanger; had slapped her face resulting in a bloody nose on another occasion; and had hit her with a stick with nails in it, resulting in a scratch on her left wrist. A. also stated that she had seen her mother and H.Q. using drugs and described the drugs and paraphernalia. Mother later confirmed she had hit A. with a hanger. She also admitted slapping A. for talking back to her about a year earlier.
Besides the above allegations, Mother and Father had prior allegations for general neglect in 1998 and 2000 and physical abuse in 2004. At the time the current referrals were received, Father was in state prison for assault with a firearm and gang activity. In addition, the children had been exposed to frequent domestic violence between Mother and Father prior to their parents’ separation.
The children were removed from Mother’s care in December 2005, and a petition was filed on behalf of them pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provisions for support).
The social worker opined Mother failed to take responsibility for her actions and blamed others, including her daughter and mother, for DPSS intervention. The social worker also noted that Mother claimed her daughter was a liar. The social worker also believed that Mother had been unable to provide a stable and safe home for her children, had no viable means to support her children, and had failed to follow through with A.’s school to address A.’s academic and attendance problems.
The jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on February 7, 2006. The court found all of the allegations in the section 300 petition true, and the children were declared dependents of the court. The parents were provided with reunification services and ordered to participate. H.Q. was provided with nonstatutory services to address his substance abuse and other issues. Mother’s case plan required her to attend general counseling, a domestic violence program, a parenting education program, and a substance abuse program and to randomly drug test.
Initially, Mother was noncompliant with her case plan. Though she had completed a parenting education program and a domestic violence program, she had failed to participate in her substance abuse program, randomly drug test for the previous five months, or obtain employment. H.Q. had also failed to drug test. Moreover, Mother continued to blame others for her predicament, failed to take responsibility for her actions, and relied on others to meet her basic needs. She also blamed the social workers for failing to provide her with referrals, when in fact she had been given referrals by three different social workers. Mother remained unemployed and continued her relationship with H.Q., despite the children’s negative feelings toward him and allegations of H.Q.’s sexual abuse of A. In addition, by February 2007, Mother was six months pregnant with H.Q.’s baby.
About a year later, Mother made an effort to combat her substance abuse issues. She had randomly drug tested twice with negative test results and had enrolled in a substance abuse program. In May 2007, the social worker received a progress report from Mother’s substance abuse treatment counselor. The counselor informed the social worker that she had attempted to persuade Mother to enter the residential treatment program, but Mother was not willing to separate from H.Q., who was not participating in his services. The counselor believed H.Q. was “a block” in Mother’s treatment and believed Mother had “a high possibility of relapsing with the added stress” of H.Q. Mother reported that she feared leaving H.Q. and being alone. The social worker recommended that services be terminated due to Mother’s failure to successfully complete or benefit from her case plan, her lack of good judgment, and her inability to financially support herself.
Mother had regularly and consistently visited with her children. Nonetheless, the quality of the visits were poor. There was limited conversation between the children and Mother, partly because Mother would bring toys to the visits, and the children appeared to play with them rather than converse with Mother. At times, the children appeared to spend more time with the paternal grandmother, and A. appeared sad.
The children, meanwhile, were developing well and appeared to be comfortable with their paternal grandmother. A. reported that she felt safe in her grandmother’s home. Although the children missed their mother, they were happy living with their grandmother and were very bonded to her and to their aunts. A. reported that she did not want to return to her mother’s care, especially if Mother continued her relationship with H.Q., but would like visitation with her. A. reported that she did not like H.Q. because of the “‘dirty things’ that he had showed her.”
The contested 12-month review hearing was held on June 6, 2007. Following submission of evidence, reunification services were terminated and a section 366.26 hearing was set.
In its report filed September 21, 2007, DPSS recommended that parental rights be terminated and the children be adopted. Though Mother had “kicked” H.Q. out of her home and was continuing with her substance abuse aftercare program, he resided “across the driveway” and Mother remained in a relationship with him. Mother was still not working but had had an active worker’s compensation case since 2003. The children were in good mental and emotional health and were happy in their paternal grandmother’s home. They had been residing with their paternal grandmother for about a year and a half and felt confident she would take good care of them. The grandmother desired to adopt the children and provide them with a safe and loving home. In addition, the grandmother and the children had developed a mutually strong bond and loved each other. The grandmother was open to allowing the children appropriate contact with their birth parents. The children were content with their placement and wanted the grandmother to adopt them, though they wanted to continue to visit Mother.
Mother continued to regularly visit with the children after the termination of her services. However, at times Mother acted inappropriately during the visits, and the children tried to distance themselves from her. For instance, at one visit, Mother and the maternal grandmother improperly spoke about the matter, trying to convince A. and P. to tell the judge they wanted to come home. P. continued to state he did not want to return to Mother’s home and had been previously referring to Mother by her first name, causing Mother to become upset.
A. also wanted to call her mother by her first name instead of “mom.” A. had continued to refer to her paternal grandmother as “Mama Coco.” A. was very fond of the paternal grandmother and secure in her home, knowing the grandmother would believe her and protect her. P. also called his paternal grandmother “Mama Coco” and reported that he loved living with her and wanted to remain in her care. He did not “show much connection to his mother” and indicated that, even if his sister went home, he wanted to stay with his “Mama Coco.” A., who had begun therapy in October 2007, stated that she was scared to say that she did not want to return to her mother because she did not want her baby sister to be removed from her mother’s care. It appeared that A. was conflicted and had feelings of guilt and remorse.
On December 3, 2007, Mother filed a section 388 petition or Request to Change Court Order (form JV-180) with supporting documents. Mother claimed because she had successfully completed her case plan and the baby had remained in her care, the court should vacate the section 366.26 hearing and reinstate services with authorized overnight visits with the older children. DPSS filed a report recommending that the section 388 petition be denied. In support, the social worker noted that after the November 27, 2007, hearing, Mother “constantly called to badger her child . . . about statements [A.] said to her therapist about feeling guilty, and not really wanting to live with her mother.” Mother had questioned the child until A. began to cry, and then Mother apologized for making her cry. A. was afraid to talk about her feelings because she was afraid her mother would constantly call her about them. Additionally, A.’s therapist believed neither child would benefit from returning to Mother’s care. By May 2008, Mother was pregnant with her second child by H.Q. Though the record reveals Mother was not able to properly parent her older children, she was using proper parenting techniques with her baby and appeared to be providing her with good care.
A. had been attending individual therapy for about seven months and had been making excellent progress. Her grades improved at school; she was making more friends and had a happier outlook on the situation. However, her conjoint counseling sessions with Mother did not go well. A. had ended the sessions angry at her mother, reporting that her mother “always is fighting and saying that [A.] do[es] not say the truth.” In the first conjoint counseling session on March 12, 2008, when A. told her mother about the different sexually inappropriate actions by H.Q., Mother would not let the child talk, denied that the event ever happened, asserted that A. was never left alone with H.Q., and claimed that A. made up stories as she had done in the past. Mother also denied the reasons the children were removed from her care and denied doing anything wrong. Otherwise, the therapist reported, Mother and A. had a good relationship and showed appropriate affection. The therapist was highly concerned that Mother would not be willing or able to protect A. in the future based on her denial of the issues in the past. A. had expressed her concerns about Mother’s relationship with H.Q. and believed Mother was still in contact with him, even though Mother claimed she was not. A. was conflicted in wanting to be with Mother, as she did not believe her mother would “choose her over [H.Q.] or any other boyfriend.” A. also reported that Mother did not believe her during the therapy sessions and had called her a liar. A. claimed she was not lying and wanted her mother’s support.
H.Q. was under investigation by the police and child protective services for his inappropriate sexual conduct with A.
On May 28, 2008, the court denied Mother’s section 388 petition, finding it was not in the children’s best interest to change the previous orders of the court. Thereafter, the contested section 366.26 hearing was held. Following submission of evidence and arguments of counsel, the parents’ parental rights were terminated, and the children were found to be adoptable. This appeal followed.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Alleged Misrepresentation of Facts
Mother contends the denial of the section 388 petition and the termination order are fatally infected because, in making them, the juvenile court relied upon unsupported misrepresentations of facts in the social workers’ reports.
In the context of dependency proceedings, once reunification services are terminated, the focus shifts to permanency planning. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) A section 366.26 hearing is “specifically designed to select and implement a permanent plan for the child.” (Marilyn H., at p. 304.) If the court finds that the minor cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) Because adoption is the preferred plan, the court must order adoption unless one of the enumerated circumstances exist providing “exceptions to the general rule that the court must choose adoption where possible . . . .” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53, italics omitted.)
The alleged misrepresentation of facts here made by the social workers did not go to the heart of the section 366.26 hearing. Rather, the alleged misrepresentation of facts involved the initial referral, such as whether A. was found at the bottom of the hill unsupervised, whether A. had gum in her hair, whether the family home was filthy, whether the home had food or utilities, whether the parents abused controlled substances, whether the parents had a history of domestic violence, and whether Mother used hangers to discipline her children. The alleged misrepresentation facts cited by Mother all essentially involve the reasons for the dependency proceedings and do not concern whether the children were adoptable. Moreover, if Mother, who was represented by counsel, believed the statements made by the social workers were false, she should have brought those to the attention of the court at the time of the section 388 hearing and the section 366.26 hearing.
In any event, we reject Mother’s claim that the alleged misstatements of facts in the social workers’ reports cannot be used to support the court’s decision in denying the section 388 petition and terminating parental rights. Mother states the “initial referral was [A.] was found at the bottom of hill without supervision; dirty; gum in her hair; home messy; no food; no gas and parental substance abuse,” and argues that “after investigating the referral of November 2, 2005, the worker determined that these allegations were false.” There is no evidence in the record to support this assertion. Rather, these facts formed several of the allegations in the section 300 petition which the court found true at the jurisdictional hearing. The record on appeal supports these facts.
To support her assertion that the social workers were misrepresenting the facts, Mother states the investigating social worker found A. to be relatively clean with no gum in her hair. However, Mother cannot show that A. had not been cleaned up after her maternal grandmother had picked her up while she was waiting for her school bus. Presumably, the referral came in the morning, as A. waited alone for a school bus. The social worker interviewed A. and the maternal grandmother at the maternal grandmother’s home later that day after first interviewing the parents.
Mother also asserts that the 2008 social worker was mistaken about how often Mother used a hanger to discipline the children. Though, as DPSS concedes, the record reveals that Mother only struck A. once with a hanger, the record also shows that Mother had slapped A.’s face and hit her with a stick that had nails in it. In addition, the children had been exposed to frequent and violent domestic violence episodes: Father had pointed a gun at them on one occasion, and on another they were picked up by their hair. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that the mistaken reference to the frequency of Mother’s use of a hanger was relied upon the court in denying the section 388 petition or in terminating parental rights. Mother ignores the fact that in denying the section 388 petition and terminating parenting rights, the court considered the best interest of the children based on all of the evidence submitted at the hearings.
Lastly, Mother argues that the allegations concerning H.Q.’s inappropriate sexual actions with A. should not have been taken into consideration either by the therapist or the court because no subsequent or supplemental petition was filed concerning these allegations, and there was no evidence to support the statement that A. had reported these allegations to Mother while she was in Mother’s care. It is irrelevant whether or not a supplemental petition was filed and whether or not A. reported the allegations while in Mother’s care. It appears Mother does not understand that once A. revealed these allegations of sexual misconduct by H.Q., Mother failed to support her daughter. During conjoint therapy, Mother continued to deny that the misconduct had occurred and claimed that A. was a liar. Hence, A.’s therapist was properly concerned about Mother’s ability to protect A. if she was in denial or lying of “having done anything wrong.”
Based on the foregoing, we reject Mother contention that the challenged facts should not have been taken into consideration by the court in denying her section 388 petition and terminating parental rights.
B. Denial of Section 388 Petition
Mother claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her section 388 petition. In support, she agues that by the time of the section 388 hearing, she had turned her life around, had achieved 19 months of sobriety, had completed her entire case plan, had continued to test negative for drugs, and had consistently visited her children.
Section 388 provides for modification of existing juvenile court orders upon a showing of changed circumstances and a showing that the proposed modification may promote the child’s best interests. (§ 388, subds. (a), (c).) The burden of proving the changed circumstances and that the modification would promote the child’s best interest lies with the party who seeks the modification. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.)
Section 388 can provide “an ‘escape mechanism’ when parents complete a reformation in the short, final period after the termination of reunification services but before the actual termination of parental rights.” (In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 528.) “Even after the focus has shifted from reunification, the scheme provides a means for the court to address a legitimate change of circumstances while protecting the child’s need for prompt resolution of his custody status.” (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309.) However, the best interests of the child are of paramount consideration when a petition for modification is brought after termination of reunification services. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) In assessing the best interests of the child, the juvenile court looks to the needs of the child for permanence and stability. (Ibid.)
Factors to be considered in determining the child’s best interests include “the seriousness of the problem which led to the dependency” and “the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been.” (In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 532.) Substance abuse is generally considered a more serious problem and, therefore, is less likely to be satisfactorily ameliorated in the brief time between termination of services and the section 366.26 hearing. (Id. at p. 531, fn. 9.)
“‘The petition is addressed to the discretion of the juvenile court and its decision will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (In re S.M. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1119.) Discretion is abused only when it is exercised “‘in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that result[s] in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124-1125.)
Applying these principles, even if Mother can show changed circumstances, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the section 388 petition, as Mother had failed to show a changed order would be in the children’s best interests. Though Mother had completed her case plan, consistently visited her children, and tested negative for drugs, as the court noted, Mother had not really benefitted from her services, and it was not in the children’s best interest to change the court’s previous order. She had continued to deny any wrongdoing, blamed others for the removal of the children, and claimed A. was a liar. As the court noted, “One of the things most recently ordered was conjoint therapy . . . . And during the course of that therapy, it was evidenced to the Court that the mother has not learned or benefited from the counseling that she is going through, and that specifically she is shutting down her daughter during the course of that therapy, which is designed to help them come together, and just in absolute denial. It begs the question of whether she has really benefitted from the services and in the things she has done.” Moreover, as A. pointed out, Mother was still involved in a relationship with H.Q. and essentially chose him over her children.
As in any custody determination, “a primary consideration in determining the child’s best interest is the goal of assuring stability and continuity.” (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) “‘When custody continues over a significant period, the child’s need for continuity and stability assumes an increasingly important role. That need will often dictate the conclusion that maintenance of the current arrangement would be in the best interests of that child.’” (Ibid.)
This is a difficult burden to meet in many cases, and particularly so when, as here, Mother had a lengthy history of neglecting her children and substance abuse; continually denied any wrongdoing; and blamed others, including her own daughter, whom she accused of lying. After the termination of reunification services, a parent’s interest in the care, custody, and companionship of the child is no longer paramount. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) Rather, at this point, the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability. (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309.) “[I]n fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interest of the child. [Citation.] A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, what is in the best interest of the child.” (Stephanie M., at p. 317.)
Here, Mother made no such showing. Love alone does not support Mother’s contention that it would be in the children’s best interest to change the court’s order. Rather, as the record shows, if the orders were changed, the children would not have any stability and permanency. The prospective adoptive parent had “developed an attached, loving and committed relationship with [A.] and [P.] and she [was] highly motivated to adopt them.” Both the children had stated their desire to be adopted by the paternal grandmother, albeit A. was torn between the grandmother and her mother. Both children were physically, mentally, and emotionally stable and adoptable and had remained in their parental grandmother’s home since April 13, 2006. Contrary to Mother’s claims, the court properly denied Mother’s section 388 petition.
C. Beneficial Relationship Exception
At a section 366.26 hearing, the court determines a permanent plan of care for a dependent child. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 50.) Adoption is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573.) If the court finds that a child may not be returned to his or her parents and is likely to be adopted, it must select adoption as the permanent plan, unless it finds that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the seven exceptions set forth in section 366.26, subdivisions (c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B)(i) through (v). (See In re Jamie R. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)
Mother claims that the juvenile court erred in not finding applicable the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception to termination of parental rights, as she had maintained regular contact with the children, and they would benefit from the continued contact with her.
The parental benefit or “beneficial relationship” exception is set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). (In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1206.) The exception applies where “‘[t]he parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the minor and the minor would benefit from continuing the relationship.’” (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826.) The parent has the burden of proving that the exception applies. (Ibid.) “The parent must do more than demonstrate ‘frequent and loving contact[,]’ [citation] an emotional bond with the child, or that parent and child find their visits pleasant. [Citation.] Instead, the parent must show that he or she occupies a ‘parental role’ in the child’s life.” (Id. at p. 827.)
The parent must also show that his or her relationship with the child “‘promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.’” (In re Derek W., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 827, quoting In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
“ . . . ‘The balancing of competing considerations must be performed on a case-by-case basis and take into account many variables, including the age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs. [Citation.] When the benefits from a stable and permanent home provided by adoption outweigh the benefits from a continued parent/child relationship, the court should order adoption.’” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1349-1350, quoting In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 811.)
“Where a biological parent . . . is incapable of functioning in [a parental] role, the child should be given every opportunity to bond with an individual who will assume the role of a parent.’ [Citation.] Thus, a child should not be deprived of an adoptive parent when the natural parent has maintained a relationship that may be beneficial to some degree but does not meet the child’s need for a parent. It would make no sense to forgo adoption in order to preserve parental rights in the absence of a real parental relationship.” (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) One court has observed, “The ‘benefit exception’ found in section 366. 26, subdivision (c)(1)[(B)(i)] may be the most unsuccessfully litigated issue in the history of law.” (In re Eileen A. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1248, 1255, fn. 5, disapproved on other grounds in In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413-414.)
There must be a “‘compelling reason’” for applying the parental benefit exception. (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349.) This is a “quintessentially discretionary determination.” Thus, we review the juvenile court’s determination for an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 1351.) Nevertheless, “‘[e]valuating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion is similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the ruling. . . . Broad deference must be shown to the trial judge. The reviewing court should interfere only “‘if [it] find[s] that under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court’s action, no judge could reasonably have made the order that he did.’ . . . ”’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
We note that courts have reached different conclusions as to the standard of review that applies to a juvenile court’s ruling on exceptions to adoptability under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1). In In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 567, the court held that a finding that no exceptional circumstances exist to prevent the termination of parental rights is reviewed under the substantial evidence test. (Id. at pp. 575-576.) In contrast, in In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, the court applied the abuse of discretion standard of review. (Id. at pp. 1351-1352.) For purposes of the present case, it makes no difference which standard applies because, as discussed below, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err under either test.
Here, though Mother could satisfactorily demonstrate that she had maintained regular contact with the children, she had failed to show that the children would benefit from continuing the relationship. As stated above, “the parent must show more than frequent and loving contact or pleasant visits. [Citation.] ‘Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. . . . The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The parent must show he or she occupies a parental role in the child’s life, resulting in a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent. [Citations.]” (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 953-954, quoting In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) “In other words, for the exception to apply, the emotional attachment between the child and parent must be that of parent and child rather than one of being a friendly visitor or friendly nonparent relative, such as an aunt. [Citation.]” (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)
There was insufficient evidence that the children would benefit more from continuing their parent-child relationship with Mother than from adoption. The record shows that the children did not have a significant, positive, and emotional attachment to Mother such that they would suffer great harm from the severance of the paternal relationship. Both the children wanted to call Mother by her first name and referred to the prospective adoptive mother as “Mama Coco.” Moreover, Mother’s visits with the children were overall poor. Indeed, due to the poor relationship between Mother and A., the court ordered conjoint counseling sessions for the two in January 2008, about three months after the initial section 366.26 hearing was set. Despite receiving this additional opportunity to forge a positive relationship with her daughter, Mother repeatedly called her daughter a liar and “put her down,” causing A. to be angry with Mother.
Furthermore, for over two years, the prospective adoptive mother had been providing the children with the day-to-day care by providing them with the basic needs of food, shelter, clothing, education, and discipline. The record shows that Mother was more like a friendly visitor. The prospective adoptive parent is the one who had provided the children with permanency and stability. There was no evidence to show that the children would be greatly harmed by terminating parental rights. The social worker noted that the children were doing well in their prospective adoptive home and that their prospective adoptive parent was willing to adopt them and give them a permanent home.
Mother argues there is substantial evidence of a beneficial relationship because she had “reformed” her life and the children did not want to exclude her from their lives. Mother compares herself to the mother in In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, which concluded that the juvenile court had erred by declining to apply the beneficial relationship exception. In that case, “[t]he social worker, the only dissenting voice among the experts, provided no more than a perfunctory evaluation of Mother’s relationship to the children . . . .” (Id. at p. 690.) Although Mother in this case, like the mother in Amber M., had a relationship with her children and numerous appropriate visits, no one suggested that termination could cause significant detriment. Unlike in Amber M., neither the social workers nor A.’s therapist believed or even suggested that termination could cause significant detriment. The juvenile court was entitled to accept these opinions.
Mother also relies on In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1534. There, the juvenile court ordered legal guardianship for two minors but did not terminate the mother’s parental rights because it concluded it would be in the children’s best interest to maintain their relationship with their mother. (Id. at p. 1533.) At the section 366.26 hearing, the mother testified her children hugged and kissed her and called her “mommy” when she visited them. (Brandon C., at p. 1537.) The children’s guardian testified the children “‘look[ed] forward’” to visits with their mother and “‘ha[d] a good relationship’” with her. (Id. at p. 1536.) Because the Department of Children and Family Services did not present any evidence to contradict the mother and guardian’s testimony and failed to provide the juvenile court with information about the quality of mother’s visits, the Brandon C. court concluded the mother provided substantial evidence the beneficial relationship exception applied. (Id. at pp. 1537-1538.) Brandon C. does not advance Mother’s claim that the beneficial relationship exception applies here. Here, DPSS presented evidence about the children’s relationship with their mother and the quality of the visits. That evidence showed that the visits were only “okay” and at times inappropriate.
Mother’s reliance on the recent case of In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289 is misplaced. In that case, the father had been the child’s primary caregiver for three years. (Id. at p. 298.) A bonding study indicated that “because the bond between [the father] and [the child] was fairly strong, there was a potential for harm to [the child] were she to lose the parent-child relationship.” (Id. at p. 296.) The social worker even admitted that there would be “some detriment” to the child if parental rights were terminated. (Id. at p. 295.) The juvenile court found that the father and the child had “’an emotionally significant relationship’. . . .” (Id. at p. 298.) In addition, because the prospective adoptive parents in S.B. were relatives, the father there did not have to demonstrate termination would greatly harm his daughter (id. at p. 300, fn. 10), but he nevertheless did so, and the juvenile court’s contrary conclusion was unfounded. (Id. at p. 300.)
There is no analogous evidence in this case. Here, in contrast, as discussed, ante, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion Mother failed to demonstrate termination would greatly harm the children. Absent a showing of great harm, there is no basis to question the juvenile court’s conclusion that the benefits of adoption outweighed any detriment ensuing from termination. (See In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575 [well-being derived from continuing parent-child relationship must always be measured against Legislative preference for adoption].)
We conclude the juvenile court reasonably found there was insufficient evidence that the children would benefit more from continuing their relationship with Mother than from adoption. The children are doing well in their prospective adoptive home. There is no evidence that the child would be harmed -- much less “greatly harmed” (see In re L.Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 953) -- by severing the parent-child relationship with Mother. The juvenile court thus properly found that the beneficial parental relationship exception to terminating parental rights did not apply.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: KING, J., MILLER, J.