Opinion
2 CA-JV 2024-0045
09-04-2024
In re Delinquency of A.G.
Bradley D. Beauchamp, Gila County Attorney By Patricia R. Pfeiffer, Deputy County Attorney, Globe Counsel for State Emily Danies, Tucson Counsel for Minor
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Gila County No. S0400JV202200019 The Honorable Bryan B. Chambers, Judge
Bradley D. Beauchamp, Gila County Attorney By Patricia R. Pfeiffer, Deputy County Attorney, Globe Counsel for State
Emily Danies, Tucson Counsel for Minor
Presiding Judge Sklar authored the decision of the Court, in which Vice Chief Judge Eppich and Judge Brearcliffe concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
SKLAR, PRESIDING JUDGE
¶1 A.G. appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating his probation as unsuccessful and requiring that he register as a sex offender until the age of twenty-five. We affirm.
¶2 In December 2022, the juvenile court adjudicated A.G. delinquent for having committed child molestation. At a disposition hearing the following February, the court placed A.G. on a twelve-month term of probation, which included counseling or treatment. We affirmed the adjudication and disposition on appeal. In re Delinquency of A.G., No. 2 CA-JV 2023-0040 (Ariz. App. Aug. 24, 2023) (mem. decision).
¶3 In September 2023, A.G.'s probation officer moved to revoke A.G.'s probation based on his failure to complete court-ordered treatment-specifically because he had been discharged from counseling for repeatedly denying committing the underlying offense. At a review hearing, however, his probation officer noted there "is no treatment for a minor who is going to maintain their innocence" despite his adjudication. Thus, the officer recommended the court instead terminate A.G.'s probation as unsuccessful and require him to register as a sex offender. The court granted that request, ordering that A.G. register until he turned twenty-five. This appeal followed.
¶4 A.G.'s sole argument on appeal is that the juvenile court erred in requiring him to register as a sex offender "despite his low risk for recidivism" and compliance with the probation terms as an improper punishment for refusing to admit his offense during court-ordered treatment. "This court will not disturb the juvenile court's order requiring a juvenile to register as a sex offender unless the court abused its discretion." In re Javier B., 230 Ariz. 100, ¶ 17 (App. 2012). The court was permitted to order A.G. to register due to his delinquency adjudication for child molestation. A.R.S. § 13-3821(A), (D). That statute "does not direct the court to consider any specific factors" in determining whether to order registration. Javier B., 230 Ariz. 100, ¶ 18. Rather, the court has broad discretion to determine if registration is appropriate. See State v. Davis, 226 Ariz. 97, ¶ 23 (App. 2010).
¶5 A.G. is correct that his psychosexual evaluation characterized him as having a low risk to reoffend. But A.G.'s argument ignores the context of that statement. The evaluation stated A.G. would remain at a low risk to reoffend if he engaged in treatment, which he has failed to do. His predisposition report also emphasized the need for A.G. to participate in treatment because he otherwise "cannot develop a relapse prevention plan." Nor can we agree with A.G.'s argument that his refusal to admit having committed the offense as a necessary component of his treatment should somehow insulate him from being required to register as a sex offender. Nothing about his refusal suggests his threat to the community is diminished. Indeed, it suggests the opposite. See id. (recognizing public safety as potential factor in considering whether to require registration).
¶6 We affirm the juvenile court's order terminating A.G.'s probation and requiring him to register as a sex offender until the age of twenty-five.