Opinion
2 CA-JV 2023-0040
08-24-2023
In re Delinquency of A.G.
Bradley D. Beauchamp, Gila County Attorney By Patricia R. Pfeiffer, Deputy County Attorney, Globe Counsel for State Emily Danies, Tucson Counsel for Minor
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Gila County No. S0400JV202200019 The Honorable Bryan B. Chambers, Judge
COUNSEL
Bradley D. Beauchamp, Gila County Attorney By Patricia R. Pfeiffer, Deputy County Attorney, Globe Counsel for State
Emily Danies, Tucson Counsel for Minor
Judge Sklar authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge O'Neil and Judge Kelly concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
SKLAR, Judge:
¶1 A.G., born in May 2006, appeals from the juvenile court's order adjudicating him delinquent for having committed child molestation and placing him on twelve months' probation. A.G. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the adjudication finding. We affirm.
¶2 When reviewing a delinquency adjudication, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court's order. In re John M., 201 Ariz. 424, ¶ 7 (App. 2001). "[W]e will not reweigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses on appeal." In re James P., 214 Ariz. 420, ¶ 24 (App. 2007). We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, In re Jessi W., 214 Ariz. 334, ¶ 11 (App. 2007), and will reverse only "if there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the judgment or if the judgment is contrary to any substantial evidence," John M., 201 Ariz. 424, ¶ 7.
¶3 "A person commits molestation of a child by intentionally or knowingly engaging in or causing a person to engage in sexual contact, except sexual contact with the female breast, with a child who is under fifteen years of age." A.R.S. § 13-1410(A); see also A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(a), (b) (defining "intentionally" and "knowingly"). Sexual contact means "any direct or indirect touching, fondling or manipulating of any part of the genitals, anus or female breast by any part of the body." A.R.S. § 13-1401(3)(a).
¶4 Here, the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing was sufficient to support the juvenile court's finding. See Jessi W., 214 Ariz. 334, ¶ 11. From approximately 2020-2021, five-year-old A.M. lived at her aunt and uncle's house with her then-fifteen-year-old cousin, A.G. A.M. testified that A.G. repeatedly made her "suck on his pee pee." A.M. also testified that, on one occasion, A.G. "put his pee pee in [her] butt."
¶5 A.M.'s testimony was supported by circumstantial evidence. See State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 16 (2011) (both direct and circumstantial evidence considered in determining whether substantial evidence exists). When the aunt needed a break, A.M. stayed with another cousin, Alexis C. Alexis described A.M.'s behavior at that time as "weird," explaining that when someone would pick up A.M., she would "squeeze her legs together" and that when A.M. was given a lollipop and told to "suck on it," A.M.'s "face changed." Alexis also stated that A.M. had developed trust issues, "constantly felt the need to keep her mouth clean," and would start "acting out" when it was time to go back.
¶6 A.G. nevertheless argues that A.M.'s "inconsistent testimony" raises "reasonable doubt to the delinquency ruling." He points out that A.M. also "blamed her father" for "the same types of offenses."
¶7 At the adjudication hearing, A.M. testified that her mother had "told [her] to say it was [her] daddy that did it" and that "there was a time that [she] thought [her] dad had done . . . [e]verything that [A.G.] did to [her]." But the juvenile court identified this issue and rejected any suggestion of coaching. See State v. Buccheri-Bianca, 233 Ariz. 324, ¶ 38 (App. 2013) (trier of fact resolves conflicts in evidence). The court explained that A.M.'s responses were "pretty much instantaneous" and that her testimony at the adjudication hearing, as to the acts themselves, was "very consistent" with her statements at the forensic interview. A.G.'s argument is nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JV-132905 , 186 Ariz. 607, 609 (App. 1996).
¶8 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm A.G.'s delinquency adjudication and disposition.