Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Ct. No. CK67198, Terry T. Truong, Juvenile Court Referee.
William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel and Frank J. Davanzo, Deputy County, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
W.F. (father) appeals the jurisdictional finding and order regarding his daughter, A.F. (minor). We find no error and affirm.
FACTS
Father and N.G. (mother) had a boy, I.F., born in 2005, and a girl, R.F., born in 2006. The children ended up in foster care with Ms. F. and saw mother and father during scheduled visitation. In September 2009, Ms. F. took I.F. to the emergency room because he was complaining of rectal pain. His complaints prompted an investigation into whether he had been sexually abused. Over the course of several months, he graphically described sex acts with father to medical personal, police officers and a detective. Father was arrested for sexual assault of a child under 10 years of age. The ensuing charges were dropped, however, because the doctors and nurses who examined I.F. could not be certain that sexual abuse occurred.
The minor was born on November 10, 2009. The Department filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition alleging that the minor was at risk of physical and emotional harm because father sexually abused I.F. and mother knew about the sexual abuse but failed to take any protective action.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
At the adjudication hearing, the juvenile court received all of the Department’s reports into evidence. I.F. testified but did not confirm any of his prior statements. Following the close of evidence, father’s counsel argued that the petition should be dismissed because the allegations of sexual abuse had been planted in I.F.’s head by Ms. F. Mother’s counsel joined in the request for dismissal. She argued that I.F.’s prior statements could be explained by him accidentally walking in on mother and father having sex.
The section 300 petition was sustained.
This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
The juvenile court found jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (j). That statute provides that a child is a dependent if the child’s sibling has been abused or neglected and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected in the same manner. (§ 300, subd. (j).) Father contends that the jurisdictional finding and order must be reversed due to a lack of substantial evidence that he sexually molested I.F. (In re S. O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 461.)
We are required to resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prevailing parties, and to draw all reasonable inferences in a manner that upholds the judgment. (Holmes v. Lerner (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 442, 445.) Substantial evidence is “evidence of ponderable legal significance, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651.) “Inferences may constitute substantial evidence, but they must be the product of logic and reason. Speculation or conjecture alone is not substantial evidence.” (Ibid.) Credibility is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) An appellate court cannot reject witness testimony accepted by the trier of fact as credible unless the testimony is inherently improbable or implausible in light of the whole record. (People v. Jackson (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 13, 21.)
In father’s view, there is a significant amount of evidence that Ms. F. coached or manipulated I.F. into claiming he had been molested. Even if that is true, the juvenile court’s order must be affirmed. Because I.F. displayed a horrifying knowledge of sexual acts when he was only four years old, and because he explained sex acts in graphic detail to police officers and others, I.F.’s preadjudication statements are neither inherently improbable nor implausible. As a consequence, under the substantial evidence test, we must accept that he was telling the truth.
Given that there was substantial evidence that father molested I.F., there was substantial evidence of a risk to the minor.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
We concur: BOREN, P. J. CHAVEZ, J.