Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Merced County Super. Ct. No. JV27829, Harry L. Jacobs, Commissioner.
Karen J. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Dawson, J. and Hill, J.
OPINION
Appellant R.F. (father) appeals from orders denying a petition he brought to regain custody and terminating parental rights to his one-and-a-half-year-old daughter A. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 388, 366.26.) Father’s court-appointed appellate attorney informed this court that under In re Sade C. (1996), 13 Cal.4th 952, she was unable to file on father’s behalf an opening brief on the merits. After we granted father an extension of time, he filed his own letter brief. In it, he claimed his daughter would be better off in his care and asks for the opportunity to prove himself. Having reviewed the appellate record as summarized below, we conclude appellant’s argument does not establish that the juvenile court committed any error affecting the outcome of this case (In re Sade C., supra, at p. 994). We affirm the trial court’s orders.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
When A. was five months old, her mother admitted she could not care for the infant and her other children, despite having received lengthy court-ordered family maintenance services. Meanwhile, father was reportedly physically abusive towards the mother. There was also a substantial risk that A. would be sexually abused by father, who had unsupervised contact with A. Father was a registered sex offender having been adjudicated of violating Penal Code, section 288, subdivision (a) (lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14). These facts led the Merced County Superior Court to exercise its dependency jurisdiction over A. in July 2008.
Disposition in the case, however, would take another nine months. Respondent Merced County Human Services Agency (the agency) recommended the court remove A. from parental custody and deny each parent services. In father’s case, the agency alleged father had been convicted of a violent felony, namely, Penal Code, section 288, subdivision (a), and therefore was not entitled to reunification services (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(12)). The court determined father’s juvenile adjudication (§ 602) did not qualify as a violent felony conviction.
Nevertheless, the court remained deeply concerned about what services it might order for father. Also, father’s registered sex offender status arguably prohibited the court from ever granting father unsupervised visitation, let alone custody of a child, unless the court could find there was no significant risk to the child. (Fam. Code, § 3030.) Consequently, the court ordered a psychiatric evaluation of father.
Over the next several months, father submitted to three psychiatric evaluations. Based on the results of the first two evaluations, the agency urged the court to deny father reunification services because he suffered from a mental disability that rendered him incapable of utilizing services and, even with services, he was unlikely to be capable of adequately caring for A. (§ 361.5, subds. (b)(2) & (c).) Father’s trial counsel, after seeking the third evaluation, elected not to submit it to the court.
Eventually, at a March 2009 hearing, the court adjudged A. a dependent child and removed her from parental custody. It also denied both parents reunification services. In father’s case, the court found, based on father’s evaluation by two mental health experts, that he suffered from a mental disability, specifically, antisocial personality disorder, rendering him incapable of utilizing reunification services. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(2).) The court consequently set a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a permanent plan for A.
On the eve of the section 366.26 hearing, father filed a request to vacate the court’s setting order and denial of reunification services (§ 388). Father alleged that since the March 2009 hearing he had completed on his own a nurturing program and an anger management program as well as found new employment. He wanted either services or an order returning custody of A. to him. He alleged this would be best for A. because prior to her detention they shared a very close relationship and that relationship had continued.
Although the court characterized father’s petition as “minimal,” it permitted father a hearing on the matter. Father testified in support of his petition. He in fact had not completed any program. In particular, he had not participated in any mental health counseling and at most had an appointment to see a mental health counselor in the future. He offered no evidence that either services or return of custody would be in A.’s best interest. Noting these deficiencies, the court denied father’s request. The court found father had not addressed the issues raised in his psychological evaluations and had shown neither changed circumstances sufficient to compel the court to change its previous orders nor that a different order would be in A.’s best interests.
At the subsequent section 366.26 hearing, father asked the court for a chance to be a better father to A. Following closing arguments, the court found A. was adoptable and terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Father essentially repeats the requests he made to the trial court to give him a chance to be A.’s father. He does not make an arguable claim, however, that the trial court was wrong to reject his requests.
An appealed-from judgment or order is presumed correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is up to the appellant to raise claims of reversible error or other defect and present argument and authority on each point made. If the appellant does not do so, the appeal should be dismissed. (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 994.) With no error or other defect claimed against the orders appealed from, we have no reason to reverse or even modify the orders in question. (Ibid.)
To the extent father assumes the court erred by not giving him the opportunity to reunify with A., he fails to cite any legal authority to support his position, and we are unaware of any such authority. He also ignores the child’s rights at this stage of the dependency proceedings.
At the permanency planning phase, a parent’s interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child is no longer paramount. The court’s focus shifts to the child’s best interests and his or her need for permanency and stability. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) Appellant’s desire to be a father to A. does not address either the grounds on which the court denied him reunification services in the first place nor does it address A.’s compelling rights to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to her. (Id. at p. 306.) In fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued out-of-home care is in the best interests of the child. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) When, as in this case, the child is likely to be adopted, termination of parental rights and adoption are the norm. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)
DISPOSITION
The orders denying father’s request to regain custody and terminating parental rights are affirmed.