"Although the Uniform Act 'requires minimal judicial oversight since there is no need to present the matter to a judge in the discovery state before a subpoena is issued,' CPLR § 3119 expressly contemplates judicial review by providing a mechanism to move for relief against the subpoena under the rules or statutes of New York." In re Aerco Int'l, Inc., 964 N.Y.S.2d 900, 903 (Sup. Ct. 2013), citing Hyatt v. State Franchise Tax Board, 962 N.Y.S.2d at 292; CPLR § 3119[e]). *We note that the UIDDA considers the "discovery state" to be the state where the witness to be deposed lives—in this instance, Ohio.
"Although the Uniform Act 'requires minimal judicial oversight since there is no need to present the matter to a judge in the discovery state before a subpoena is issued,' CPLR § 3119 expressly contemplates judicial review by providing a mechanism to move for relief against the subpoena under the rules or statutes of New York." In re Aerco Int'l, Inc., 40 Misc.3d 571, 964 N.Y.S.2d 900, 903 (Sup.Ct.2013), citing Hyatt v. State Franchise Tax Board, 962 N.Y.S.2d at 292 ; CPLR § 3119[e]. {¶ 23} The court in Fischer discussed whether an Ohio court has the authority to quash a subpoena issued pursuant to R.C. 2319.09 and determined that for the purposes of Civ.R. 45(C)(3) the language of the rule referring to "the court from which the subpoena was issued" is the foreign court who granted the discovery order in the underlying action—i.e., the District of Columbia court—not the Ohio court where the clerk of courts issued the subpoena upon receiving an order under R.C. 2319.09.
"Although the Uniform Act 'requires minimal judicial oversight since there is no need to present the matter to a judge in the discovery state before a subpoena is issued,' CPLR § 3119 expressly contemplates judicial review by providing a mechanism to move for relief against the subpoena under the rules or statutes of New York." In re Aerco Int'l, Inc., 40 Misc.3d 571, 964 N.Y.S.2d 900, 903 (Sup.Ct.2013), citing Hyatt v. State Franchise Tax Board, 962 N.Y.S.2d at 292 ; CPLR § 3119[e]. {¶ 23} The court in Fischer discussed whether an Ohio court has the authority to quash a subpoena issued pursuant to R.C. 2319.09 and determined that for the purposes of Civ.R. 45(C)(3) the language of the rule referring to "the court from which the subpoena was issued" is the foreign court who granted the discovery order in the underlying action—i.e., the District of Columbia court—not the Ohio court where the clerk of courts issued the subpoena upon receiving an order under R.C. 2319.09.
The party issuing a subpoena on a non-party satisfies the notice requirement by either serving the subpoena with a cover letter stating the reasons such disclosure is sought, or submitting a showing of circumstances and reasons such disclosure is sought in opposition to a motion to quash (In re Aerco International, Inc., 40 Misc.3d 571, 964 N.Y.S.2d 900 [ Supreme Ct. Westchester County, 2013]). A motion to quash a subpoena is addressed to the sound discretion of the court (Koramblyum v. Medvedovsky, 19 A.D.3d 651, 799 N.Y.S.2d 73 [2nd. Dept. 2005]).
Plaintiff's counsel has offices in New York and New Jersey, and a member of said law firm, authorized to practice law in New Jersey, signed the subpoena. Thus, pursuant to the Rules of Court of New Jersey, any motion by defendant Central Mortgage Company to quash the TD Bank subpoena should have been made to the court in Camden County, New Jersey (see New Jersey Rules of Court Rule 4:11-4[b][6]; see also Phoenix Grantor Trust v Exclusive Hospitality, LLC, 59 Misc 3d 1231[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50808[U] [Sup Ct, Queens County 2018]; Matter of Aerco Intl., Inc. [Precision Machining & Stamping Inc.], 40 Misc 3d 571[Sup Ct, Westchester County 2013]). Moreover, even if this court had jurisdiction to quash the New Jersey subpoena, such relief is no longer available, as said subpoena has been complied with (see Matter of Brunswick Hosp. Center v Hynes, 52 NY2d at 339).
The Exclusive defendants do not dispute that Mirani's place of business is in Passaic County, New Jersey. Thus, pursuant to the Rules of Court of New Jersey, any motion by the Exclusive defendants to quash the Mirani subpoena should have been made to the court in Passaic County, New Jersey (see New Jersey Rules of Court Rule 4:11–4 [b][6]; see also Matter of Aerco Intl., Inc. (Precision Machining & Stamping Inc.) , 40 Misc 3d 571 [Sup Ct, Westchester County 2013] ). The branch of the motion by the Exclusive defendants to quash the subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum issued to nonparty Mirani is denied.
Although plaintiff properly contends that any facial defect with respect to the notice requirement may be cured in the opposition papers to a motion to quash (Velez v Hunts Point Multi-Svc. Ctr., Inc., 29 AD3d 104, 111 [1st Dept 2006]; In re Aerco Intl., Inc., 40 Misc3d 571, 576 [Sup Ct, Westchester County 2013]), it is unclear that improper venue for a deposition in a subpoena may be cured. Notably, plaintiff failed to address the improper venue for the deposition in opposition to defendant Nieves' motion to quash.