" Jayden G., 433 Md. at 96. Recently, in In re Adoption of K'Amora K., 218 Md. App. 287, 304 (2014), Judge Nazarian explained that "[o]n its face, the disjunctive wording in § 5-323(b) ('a parent is unfit . . . or . . . exceptional circumstances' exist) authorizes the court to terminate a parent's rights even absent a specific finding that a parent is unfit to care for her child." He further noted that "although the statute lists the factors the court must consider, it does not define 'exceptional circumstances,' and no published decision of this Court or the Court of Appeals has found exceptional circumstances in a TPR case independently of unfitness.

]In re Adoption of K'Amora K., 218 Md. App. 287, 301 (2014) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 5-323(b) of the Family Law Article states:

In considering whether to terminate a natural parent's parental rights, the court "must balance the presumption that 'a continuation of the parental relationship is in the child's best interests,' 'against the fundamental right and responsibility of the State to protect children, who cannot protect themselves, from abuse and neglect.'" In re Adoption of K'Amora K., 218 Md. App. 287, 301 (2014) (internal citations omitted). To that end, FL § 5-323(b) provides that if, after considering the factors listed in that statute, "a juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a parent is unfit to remain in a parental relationship with the child or that exceptional circumstances exist that would make a continuation of the parental relationship detrimental to the best interests of the child[,]" then the court may terminate the parental rights of the parent in the child.

"A parent's actions and failures to act both can bear on the presence of exceptional circumstances and the question of whether continuing the parent-child relationship serves the child's best interests." In re Adoption of K'Amora K., 218 Md. App. 287, 307 (2014) (emphasis in original). In re K'Amora K. is the first reported opinion in Maryland in which parental rights were terminated based on the existence of exceptional circumstances alone.

We did not apply the Ross factors or endorse application of those factors in our decision to remand the case to the juvenile court for an appropriate assessment of whether exceptional circumstances existed. Id. at 116–17, 8 A.3d 745.In re Adoption of K'Amora K. , 218 Md. App. 287, 305–06, 97 A.3d 169 (2014), similarly does not demonstrate that the Ross factors are utilized to assess exceptional circumstances in TPR proceedings under FL § 5-323. There, the Court of Special Appeals explained that this Court had included a parent's behavior or character in the exceptional circumstances analysis in another case, In re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A , 334 Md. 538, 640 A.2d 1085 (1994).

In re Ta'Niya C., 417 Md. 90, 104 (2010) (citing Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 499). Notably, the factors concerning the efforts DSS made to prevent placement, to reunify, and to fulfill its obligations under service agreements are not focused on how those efforts affect the interests of the parent, but on how those efforts affect the child's best interests. In re Adoption of K'Amora K., 218 Md.App. 287, 302 (2014) ("[A] parent's rights do not drive our decision. As the [Supreme Court] recently reaffirmed, 'the child's best interest has always been the transcendent standard in . . . TPR proceedings,' and 'trumps all other considerations,' even the rights and interests of parents."

"The exceptional circumstances alternative is meant to cover situations . . . in which a child's transcendent best interests are not served by continuing a relationship with a parent who might not be clearly and convincingly unfit." In re Adoption of K'Amora K., 218 Md.App. 287, 310 (2014) (footnote omitted). "[E]xceptional circumstances can exist where a parent's behavior might not necessarily rise to the level of unfitness, but nonetheless contributes to a broader picture that could justify termination[.]" Id. at 306 (emphasis deleted).

48-49 (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 87A262, 323 Md. 12, 19-20 (1991)). "[T]he court must work through the statutory factors in detail . . . and explain with particularity how the evidence satisfied them and how the court weighed them[.]" In re Adoption of K'Amora K., 218 Md.App. 287, 304 (2014). The court must further "determine expressly whether those findings suffice either to show an unfitness . . . or to constitute an exceptional circumstance that would make a continuation of the parental relationship detrimental to the best interest of the child

In short, it is not the parents' rights that drive a TPR decision-it is the child's best interests that are the court's "paramount consideration" in TPR proceedings. In re Jayden G., 433 Md. at 82; see In re Adoption of K'Amora K., 218 Md.App. 287, 302 (2014) (citing Ta'Niya C., 417 Md. at 111-12). The Family Law Article authorizes courts to terminate parental rights without consent only under specific, narrow circumstances-the court must make specific factual findings and determine whether they suffice to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, either that the parents are unfit or that exceptional circumstances exist:

In short, it is not the parents' rights that drive a TPR decision-it is the child's best interests that are the court's "paramount consideration" in TPR proceedings. In re Jayden G., 433 Md. at 82; see In re Adoption of K'Amora K., 218 Md.App. 287, 302 (2014) (citing Ta'Niya C., 417 Md. at 111-12). The Family Law Article authorizes courts to terminate parental rights without consent only under specific, narrow circumstances-the court must make specific factual findings and determine whether they suffice to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, either that the parents are unfit or that exceptional circumstances exist: